Florida Indus. Com'n v. Felda Lumber Co.

• Decision Date: 09 June 1944
• Citation: 154 Fla. 507,18 So.2d 362
• Parties: FLORIDA INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION v. FELDA LUMBER CO. et al.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

18 So.2d 362

154 Fla. 507

FLORIDA INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION v. FELDA LUMBER CO. et al.

Florida Supreme Court

June 9, 1944

Appeal from Circuit Court, Hendry County; George W. Whitehurst judge.

Allen Clements and Raymond E. Barnes, both of Tallahassee, and William Barfield, of Jacksonville, for appellant.

Henderson Franklin, Starnes & Holt and Parker Holt, all of Fort Myers, for appellees.

BUFORD, Chief Justice.

On October 16th 1939, D. J. Allen was injured while engaged in the course of his employment. Shortly after the injury Allen died. No alleged dependents filed claim for compensation within one year from date of injury or from date of death of Allen. On October 30th, 1942, Florida Industrial Commission advised employer that hearing would probably be held to determine whether or not Allen's death was caused by the injury. On February 12th, 1943, an investigation and hearing was conducted by a Deputy Commissioner for the purpose of determining whether or not the Florida Industrial Commission was entitled to statutory contribution to the Commission of the sum of $500 by the employer and carrier because of the death of Allen under the provisions of Section 440.16(2)(g), Fla.Stat.1941, same F.S.A. 1941, which sub-section reads as follows:

'If the deceased employee leaves no widow or widower or no dependents entitled to compensation hereunder, five hundred dollars shall be paid to the Florida industrial commission and no other compensation or benefit, except funeral expenses provided in subsection (1) hereof, shall be due or payable and no compensation shall be payable to the personal representative, estate or anyone else on account of said death. Said sum shall become a part of the administrative fund of the commission provided for in § 440.50.'

At the hearing supra, the employer and carrier appeared and controverted the claim on the following grounds, viz:

'1. That death was not caused by accident or injury within the meaning of this act.

'2. That no claim was filed within the time required by law.

'3. There is no liability on the part of the employer or its carrier to the State of Florida or any persons, because any claims of any nature are barred by the Statute of Limitations.'

In support of the position stated in grounds 2 and 3, supra, reliance is based on Sec. 440.19(1), which is as follows: '(1) The right to compensation for disability under this chapter shall be barred unless a claim therefor is filed within one year after the time of injury, and the right to compensation for death shall be barred unless a claim therefor is filed within one year after the death, except that if payment of compensation has been made without an award on account of such injury or death a claim may be filed within one year after the date of the last payment. Such claim shall be filed with the commission.'

Pursuant to hearing, the Deputy Commissioner entered his finding and award in effect as follows: (1) That the death of the deceased D. J. Allen was a result of an injury by accident arising in and out of the course of his employment. (2) That the statute of limitations did not run against the Florida Industrial Commission, a state agency. (3) That the Florida Industrial Commission was entitled to $500.

On appeal to full Commission the findings and award of the Deputy Commissioner were affirmed in toto.

On appeal to the Circuit Court the findings and award of the full Commission were reversed in part and affirmed in part by an order inter alia, as follows:

'That the finding of the Full Commission affirming the Order of the Deputy Commissioner entered herein on the 27th day of February, 1943, to the effect that the statutory limitation of one year for making claim does not apply to the Florida Industrial Commission and in making Five Hundred ($500.00) Dollars statutory award to the Florida Industrial Commistion be, and the same is, hereby reversed.

'2. That the finding of the Florida Industrial Commission affirming the award of the Deputy Commissioner entered herein on February 27, 1943, to the effect that the injury suffered by the deceased employee herein arising out of and in the course of his employment was a direct and proximate cause of the death of the deceased employee herein, be, and the same is hereby affirmed.'

So it affirmatively appears that the Deputy Commissioner, the full Commission and the Circuit Court found and held that death was due to injuries received under conditions resulting in liability upon the employer and carrier, but the Circuit Court reversed the holding of the full Commission as to the enforcement of liability by holding that the enforcement of the claim was barred by the provisions of Section 440.19(1), supra.

It is not necessary to discuss the evidence on which the Deputy Commissioner, the full Commission and the Circuit...