Florida Moss Products Co. v. City of Leesburg
| Decision Date | 29 March 1927 |
| Citation | 112 So. 572,93 Fla. 656 |
| Parties | FLORIDA MOSS PRODUCTS CO. v. CITY OF LEESBURG et al. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Suit by the Florida Moss Products Company against the City of Leesburg and others for an injunction. From a judgment of dismissal, complainant appeals.
Affirmed.
Syllabus by the Court
Generally parol evidence is not admissible to vary, contradict, or defeat complete, unambiguous, written instrument. The general rule is that parol evidence is not admissible to vary contradict, or defeat the terms of a complete and unambiguous written instrument.
Parol evidence consistent with written instrument, not purporting to contain entire agreement, or executed in part performance of parol agreement, is admissible. Where a written instrument does not purport to contain the entire agreement between the parties thereto, nor to have been intended as a complete statement of the whole contract, and when such instrument was executed pursuant to a parol agreement and in part performance thereof, parol evidence of the verbal agreement is admissible when consistent with, and not contrary to, such written instrument.
Where deed recites consideration of money and other valuable considerations, true character of consideration may be shown by parol. Where a deed of conveyance recites a consideration of a sum of money 'and other valuable considerations,' the statement of the deed, as to the consideration thereof, is not complete, and the true character of the consideration may be shown by parol.
Parol evidence is not admissible to add to terms of unambiguous deed contractual obligation inconsistent therewith, even though it is part of consideration. The rule that parol evidence is admissible to show the true consideration for a deed does not authorize the admission of such evidence for the purpose of adding to the terms of an unambiguous deed an additional contractual obligation which is inconsistent with and repugnant to the terms of the grant, and which would impair the operative effect of the deed, even though such additional obligation forms a part of the consideration for the deed.
Consideration clause of deed is conclusive as to words creating right or extinguishing title, but for every other purpose can be explained by parol proof; consideration clause of deed is prima facie evidence only of amount, kind, and receipt of consideration. The consideration clause in a deed of conveyance is conclusive for the purpose of giving effect to the operative words of the deed creating a right or extinguishing a title, but for every other purpose it is open to explanation by parol proof, and is prima facie evidence only of the amount, kind, and receipt of the consideration.
Where deed neither contains nor refers to limitation on use of land, parol evidence is not admissible to impair rights of user, even though part of consideration. When a deed of conveyance neither contains nor refers to any limitation upon the right of the grantee to use the land conveyed in any manner consistent with the ownership of the fee-simple title absolute granted by the deed, parol evidence is not admissible as a basis for the enforcement of an additional contractual obligation which rests wholly in parol, and which, contrary to the terms of the deed, undertakes to impair the rights of user that are incident to the estate granted, even though such additional obligation forms a part of the consideration for the deed.
Appeal from Circuit Court, Lake County; J. C. B Koonce, judge.
George M. Powell, of Jacksonville, for appellant.
Gaines & Futch, of Leesburg, for appellees.
By a bill in equity in which the appellant, Florida Moss Products Company, is complainant, and the appellee city of Leesburg and others are defendants, it is alleged in substance that appellant, by a deed of conveyance, a copy of which was attached to and made a part of the bill of complaint, sold and conveyed to the city of Leesburg a certain parcel of land lying within said city, of which land appellant was theretofore the owner in fee simple. The deed of conveyance referred to discloses that said lands were 'granted bargained, sold, aliened, remised, released, conveyed, and confirmed unto the said grantee, and its assigns forever, * * * together with all the tenements, hereditaments, and appurtenances, with every privilege, right, title, interest and estate, reversion, remainder, and easement thereunto belonging or in any wise appertaining; to have and to hold the same in fee simple forever.' The deed contained a covenant of seisin, a covenant against incumbrances (with an exception), a covenant of right and lawful authority to sell, and a full covenant of warranty. The consideration expressed in the deed is 'the sum of ten dollars and other good and valuable considerations.' There is in the face of the deed no covenant restricting or limiting the future use of the property conveyed, nor any reservation of any interest, right, or estate therein.
The bill of complaint further alleges that the true consideration of said conveyance was 'the price of $15,000 and the agreement and representation on the part of said city of Leesburg that it was purchasing said lands for park purposes, and that the same were intended for and would continuously be used for park purposes,' which said representation and agreement, it is further alleged, 'was an integral and material part of the consideration of said deed, * * * without which this complainant would not have sold said property to said city of Leesburg for said sum or price, and that said complainant in making the said sale relied upon said agreement and representation, and was thereby induced to make the sale.' It is not alleged that said 'agreement and representation' was in writing, nor do we find any such agreement or representation in the deed. The bill of complaint further alleges a threatened conveyance of the lands by the municipality to private owners for residential purposes, which action, it is alleged, will result in irreparable injury to the complainant in its ownership of other lands which lie near and abut upon a street leading to said 'public park,' in that complainant's use and enjoyment of its other lands 'will be greatly, wrongfully, and unjustly restricted and interfered with' in respect to view and rights of ingress and egress which are now enjoyed, and the value and use of such other lands will be greatly lessened and diminished if the appellees should carry out the proposed conveyance of the first-named land to private owners, all of which appellant alleges will be in violation of the rights of said appellant, both as grantor in said deed on the one hand, and as owner of said first-mentioned parcel of land upon the other.
The prayer is for an injunction restraining appellees from abandoning or vacating the first-mentioned property, or any part thereof, as a public park, and from converting, altering, or changing the said property from its character as a public park and from selling or disposing of said property.
No fraud is charged against the appellees. The bill of complaint does not seek a rescission of the conveyance and a restoration of the parties to their former status. There is nowhere in the bill a positive or direct allegation that the land in question is or has been actually or potentially devoted to use for park purposes. Although there is a reference in the bill to threatened...
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Branch Banking & Trust Co. of Va. v. Beowulf
...evidence must still be “consistent with, and not contrary to, such written instrument.” Id., citing Florida Moss Products Co. v. City of Leesburg, 93 Fla. 656, 112 So. 572, 573 (1927). In this case, the mortgage on which the Bank relies to establish a preferred ship mortgage unambiguously i......
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Reid v. Barry
...Conner, 63 Fla. 408, 58 So. 241; Wofford v. Dykes, 67 Fla. 118, 64 So. 451; Ansley v. Graham, 73 Fla. 388, 74 So. 505. Fla. Moss Products Co. v. Leesburg, 112 So. 572, decided the present term. No particular form of words is necessary to create a trust, and whether one exists is to be ascer......
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Branch Banking & Trust Co. of Virginia v. Beowulf
...evidence must still be "consistent with, and not contrary to, such written instrument." Id., citing Florida Moss Products Co. v. City of Leesburg, 93 Fla. 656, 112 So. 572, 573 (1927). In this case, the mortgage on which the Bank relies to establish a preferred ship mortgage unambiguously i......
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...Fla.Jurisprudence, Evidence, Par. 393, p. 391, citing Chamberlain v. Lesley, 1897, 39 Fla. 452, 22 So. 736, Florida Moss Products Co. v. Leesburg, 1927, 93 Fla. 656, 112 So. 572; Bond v. Hewitt, 1933, 111 Fla. 180, 149 So. 10 See Wells v. Waddell, 1921, 59 Mont. 436, 196 P. 1000. 11 Saunder......