Florida Motor Lines, Inc. v. Railroad Com'rs

• Citation: 100 Fla. 538,129 So. 876
• Court: Florida Supreme Court
• Decision Date: 04 August 1930
• Parties: FLORIDA MOTOR LINES, Inc. v. RAILROAD COMMISSIONERS.

129 So. 876

100 Fla. 538

FLORIDA MOTOR LINES, Inc. v. RAILROAD COMMISSIONERS.

Florida Supreme Court

August 4, 1930

En Banc.

Certiorari by the Florida Motor Lines, Inc., to review an order of the Railroad Commissioners.

Motion to quash writ of certiorari denied, and the order complained of quashed.

Syllabus by the Court.

SYLLABUS

The writ of certiorari may be utilized to appropriately review only actions taken by courts, board, or officers exercising functions that are judicial or quasi judicial in their nature.

The Constitution (article 2) divides 'the powers of the government of the State of Florida' into three departments, legislative, executive, and judicial, and forbids any person properly belonging to one department to exercise any powers appertaining to either of the others except in cases expressly provided for by the Constitution.

All governmental functions may not be among 'the powers of government' which the Constitution separates into three departments.

Administrative and ministerial functions may be incidental to or essential to the exercise or execution of the 'powers' that are divided into three departments.

The performance of administrative functions may require the exercise of judgment and discretion that is in the nature of quasi legislative or quasi judicial authority; and, when not in conflict with some provision or principle of organic law statutes may authorize such functions to be performed by administrative or ministerial officers who do not exercise any of 'the powers of the government' that are divided into three departments, legislative, executive, and judicial.

'The powers of the government' that are 'divided into three departments' are not defined or enumerated in the Constitution or by statute. They are to be determined as occasion requires by a consideration of the language and intent of the Constitution, as well as of the history, the nature and powers, limitations and purposes, of the republican form of government established and maintained under the Federal and State Constitutions.

The essential nature and effect of the governmental function to be performed, rather than the name given to the function or to the officer who performs it, should be considered in determining whether the particular function is a 'power of government' within the meaning of the Constitution and, if it is such a 'power,' whether it is legislative, executive, or judicial in its nature, so that it may be exercised by appropriate officers of the proper department.

If a duty or function required by law to be performed, is not one of 'the powers of government' that is or must be assigned to only one department and that cannot be exercised by those 'properly belonging to' another department 'except in cases provided for by the Constitution,' then the Legislature may by statute authorize or require the performance of such governmental duty or function by those 'properly belonging to' any of the three departments, provided such a performance of such statutory duty or function is not inconsistent with applicable provisions or principles of organic law.

Under the Constitution of this state, statutory administrative officers cannot legally perform functions that are among the legislative, executive, or judicial 'powers of the government'; but statutes may within appropriate limitations authorize such administrative officers to perform quasi legislative or quasi judicial functions that are designed to effectuate a valid legislative purpose, when the administrative functions so authorized are consistent with organic law.

The chief legislative power is the lawmaking function.

Functions that are quasi legislative in their nature may with appropriate limitations be conferred by statute upon administrative officers to effectuate the statutory purpose when no provision of law is thereby violated.

There are complicated and contingent details in the performance of quasi judicial functions that may be legally and more expeditiously performed by administrative officers when duly authorized to effectuate a proper legislative purpose, and organic law is not thereby violated.

Under section 35, article 5, of the Constitution, as amended in 1910, 'the Legislature * * * may clothe any Railroad Commission with judicial powers in all matters connected with the functions of their office.'

Section 10, chapter 13700, Acts 1929, provides that 'the [Railroad] Commission shall, so far as the Constitution of this State permits, exercise all such judicial powers as may be necessary to enable it to enforce or perform any duty, power or function conferred on it by this Act.'

Whether a function is judicial or quasi judicial must be determined from its essential nature and attributes and the law applicable thereto.

The Railroad Commissioners are statutory administrative officers who exercise only statutory authority. Their administrative authority, functions, and duties are not among 'the powers of government' which are by the Constitution separated into legislative, executive, and judicial 'powers,' and which must be exercised only by appropriate officers 'properly belonging to' one of the three 'departments of the government of the State of Florida.'

The quasi judicial functions conferred by statute upon the Railroad Commissioners are not judicial 'powers' that must be exercised only by the courts.

The exercise of quasi judicial functions by a court or by a commission under a statute may be reviewed on certiorari in appropriate cases; no other remedy being afforded by the law.

Under section 30, article 16, Constitution, quasi legislative functions within appropriate limitations may be conferred upon the Railroad Commissioners, and, under amended section 35, article 5, quasi judicial functions may be likewise conferred upon any Railroad Commission 'in all matters connected with the functions of their office,' provided that in either case no other provision of organic law is thereby violated; and the exercise of such functions is subject to authorized appropriate judicial review.

Under the common law in force in this state, a statute providing for due notice and an adversary hearing by a legal official body, of conflicting claims to new and special rights or privileges conferred by the statute, and for the due exercise by the official body of independent judgment in making an authoritative determination of the contested claims under the law, the determinative order granting or denying the right or privilege under the statute may be quasi judicial in its nature and have the quality of finality, making a writ of certiorari a proper means for a permissible judicial review of the order where no other remedy is afforded by law.

The Supreme Court has power to review and quash on the common-law writ of certiorari, the proceedings of inferior tribunals when they proceed in a cause without jurisdiction, or when their procedure is essentially irregular and not according to the essential requirements of law and no appeal or direct method of reviewing the procedure exists.

The writ of certiorari may be issued to final judicial or quasi judicial orders that are alleged to be invalid, where no other adequate remedy is afforded by appellate procedure or otherwise.

At common law, certiorari lies only to inferior courts and officers exercising judicial powers, and then only to review an act judicial in its nature, and not merely ministerial, but, where a new jurisdiction is created, the proceedings so authorized, whether in court or not, if of a judicial or quasi judicial character, and not subject to review by other means, may be reviewed by writ of certiorari.

The provisions of chapter 13700, Acts 1929, and the nature of the duties prescribed, require the performance of quasijudicial functions by the Railroad Commissioners; and such provisions do not violate the Constitution. As the order is the exercise of quasi judicial function conferred by law upon the Railroad Commissioners and is final in its character, the writ of certiorari is a proper means for a judicial review of such order; no other remedy being afforded by the law.

On writ of certiorari, the ultimate adjudication is to quash the judgment or order that is reviewed or to quash the writ of certiorari.

Where it is duly made to appear in appriate judicial proceedings that the Railroad Commissioners have made an order that is materially injurious to legal rights or privileges, without giving appropriate consideration to matters affecting such rights and privileges, which matters the law contemplates shall be considered in making the order complained of, thereby misapplying the law in making the order, such order may be adjudged to be invalid.

COUNSEL

Peter O. Knight and Knight, Thompson & Turner, all of Tampa, for petitioner.

T. T. Turnbull, of Tallahassee, and Stanton Walker, of Jacksonville, for respondents.

OPINION

WHITFIELD J.

The material matters to be determined are whether an order of the Railroad Commissioners that is final in its nature and is predicated upon adversary hearing and affects conflicting claims of legal privileges may be reviewed and should be quashed on a writ of certiorari issued upon the petition of a corporation claiming to have been injured in its legal privileges by the order.

'The writ of certiorari lies only to review the actions of courts, boards, or officers exercising functions clearly judicial or quasi judicial.' Sirmans v. Owen, 87 Fla. 485, 100 So. 734. 735.

If an order of the Railroad Commissioners having a character of finality is the exercise of authority that is either judicial or quasi judicial in its nature, it may be reviewed; and, if illegal, it may be quashed on certiorari since the...