Florida Soc. of Ophthalmology v. Florida Optometric Ass'n

• Decision Date: 17 April 1986
• Docket Number: 66768 and 66774,Nos. 66762,s. 66762
• Citation: 489 So.2d 1118,11 Fla. L. Weekly 177
• Parties: 11 Fla. L. Weekly 177 FLORIDA SOCIETY OF OPHTHALMOLOGY, Petitioner, v. FLORIDA OPTOMETRIC ASSOCIATION, Jon S. Jacobs, O.D., and Fred R. Dudley, Respondents. Bob GRAHAM, Governor of Florida, George Firestone, as Secretary of the State of Florida, and Florida Society of Ophthalmology, Petitioners, v. FLORIDA OPTOMETRIC ASSOCIATION, Jon S. Jacobs, O.D., and Fred R. Dudley, Respondents. George FIRESTONE, as Secretary of the State of Florida, and Bob Graham, as Governor of the State of Florida, and Florida Society of Ophthalmology, Petitioners, v. FLORIDA OPTOMETRIC ASSOCIATION, Jon S. Jacobs, O.D., and Fred R. Dudley, Respondents.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 1118

489 So.2d 1118

11 Fla. L. Weekly 177

FLORIDA SOCIETY OF OPHTHALMOLOGY, Petitioner, v. FLORIDA OPTOMETRIC ASSOCIATION, Jon S. Jacobs, O.D., and Fred R. Dudley, Respondents.

Bob GRAHAM, Governor of Florida, George Firestone, as Secretary of the State of Florida, and Florida Society of Ophthalmology, Petitioners, v. FLORIDA OPTOMETRIC ASSOCIATION, Jon S. Jacobs, O.D., and Fred R. Dudley, Respondents.

George FIRESTONE, as Secretary of the State of Florida, and Bob Graham, as Governor of the State of Florida, and Florida Society of Ophthalmology, Petitioners, v. FLORIDA OPTOMETRIC ASSOCIATION, Jon S. Jacobs, O.D., and Fred R. Dudley, Respondents.

Nos. 66762, 66768 and 66774.

Supreme Court of Florida.

April 17, 1986.

Rehearing Denied July 7, 1986.

Richard B. Collins of Perkins & Collins, Tallahassee, and Arthur J. England of Fine, Jacobson, Schwartz, Nash, Block & England, Miami, for petitioner, Fla. Society of Ophthalmology.

Sidney McKenzie, III, Gen. Counsel and Arthur R. Wiedinger, Jr., Asst. Gen. Counsel, Tallahassee, for petitioners, Bob Graham, Governor of Fla., et al.

Thomas G. Tomasello, Gen. Counsel, Tallahassee, for petitioners, George Firestone, as Secretary of the State of Fla., et al.

Leonard A. Carson, James W. Linn and John D.C. Newton, II of Carson & Linn, Tallahassee, for respondents.

Reubin O'D. Askew, Former Governor of the State of Fla., Miami, for amicus curiae.

Wilbur E. Brewton of Taylor, Brion, Buker & Greene, Tallahassee, amicus curiae, for Claude R. Kirk, Jr., Former Governor of State of Fla.

BARKETT, Justice.

This cause is before us pursuant to jurisdiction granted in article V, section 3(b)(4), Florida Constitution. The First District Court of Appeal certified this case as presenting a question of great public importance. Florida Optometric Association v. Firestone, 465 So.2d 1319 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). The principal question presented is whether the Florida Constitution affords the governor seven or fifteen days to veto a bill presented to him after the legislature has adjourned sine die.

In May of 1983, the Florida House and Senate passed SB 168 which provides, inter alia, that certain optometrists may administer, use, and prescribe medicinal drugs. The House and Senate adjourned sine die the 1983 regular session on June 13, 1983. On June 14, 1983, the Legislature presented SB 168 to the governor. Fifteen days later, on June 29, 1983, the governor vetoed the bill. The Senate took no action on the bill subsequent to the gubernatorial veto.

The Florida Optometric Association, respondents herein, petitioned the trial court for a writ of mandamus ordering the Florida Secretary of State to publish SB 168 as a law of the state. The association claimed that the governor's veto of the bill was untimely and therefore ineffectual. The circuit court dismissed the association's petition with prejudice. On appeal, the First District Court reversed the order of dismissal, remanded the cause to the circuit court with directions that the writ be issued, and certified to this Court the following question as being of great public importance:

Whether Article III, section 8(a), Florida Constitution, allows the governor seven or fifteen consecutive days to act on a bill presented to him after the legislature adjourns sine die, and, if he is allowed only seven days thereafter, should the effect of an opinion so holding have only prospective application?

Article III, section 8(a) provides, in part:

Every bill passed by the legislature shall be presented to the governor for his approval and shall become a law if he approves and signs it, or fails to veto it within seven consecutive days after presentation. If during that period or on the seventh day the legislature adjourns sine die or takes a recess of more than thirty days, he shall have fifteen consecutive days from the date of presentation to act on the bill.

Any inquiry into the proper interpretation of a constitutional provision must begin with an examination of that provision's explicit language. If that language is clear, unambiguous, and addresses the matter in issue, then it must be enforced as written. See, e.g. Plante v. Florida Commission on Ethics, 354 So.2d 87, 89 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).

The provision in question, however, does not explicitly address the situation before us in which a bill is presented to the governor after the legislature has adjourned sine die. We recognize the rule that constitutional language must be allowed to "speak for itself." Application of that rule, however, must be tempered by judicial deference to offsetting and equally constraining rules. We refer to two fundamental principles of constitutional adjudication. First, constitutions "receive a broader and more liberal construction than statutes." State Highway Commission v. Spainhower, 504 S.W.2d 121, 125 (Mo.1973). Second, constitutional provisions should not be construed so as to defeat their underlying objectives. Plante v. Smathers, 372 So.2d 933, 936 (Fla.1979); State ex rel. Dade County v. Dickinson, 230 So.2d 130, 135 (Fla.1969).

Constitutions are "living documents," not easily amended, which demand greater flexibility in interpretation than that required by legislatively enacted statutes. Consequently, courts are far less circumscribed in construing language in the area of constitutional interpretation than in the realm of statutory construction. See Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 204 (3d Cir.1979). When adjudicating constitutional issues, the principles, rather than the direct operation or literal meaning of the words used, measure the purpose and scope of a provision. United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 467, 52 S.Ct. 420, 424, 76 L.Ed. 877 (1932). See also Bain Peanut Co. v. Pinson, 282 U.S. 499, 501, 51 S.Ct. 228, 229, 75 L.Ed. 482 (1932) ("[t]he interpretation of constitutional principles must not be too literal"); Plante v. Smathers, 372 So.2d 933, 936 (Fla.1979) ("[t]he spirit of the constitution is as obligatory as the written word").

An essential purpose of veto provisions such as that found in article III, section 8(a) is to safeguard the executive's opportunity to consider all bills presented to him. See Edwards v. United States, 286 U.S. 482, 486, 52 S.Ct. 627, 628, 76 L.Ed. 1239 (1932). Typically, a plethora of bills is passed and then presented to the executive at the end of a legislative session. The article III, section 8(a) grant of additional time to veto such bills is designed to afford the governor ample opportunity to review this last-minute legislative onslaught.

It is evident from the record that in a typical session of the Florida legislature some 60 percent of all bills passed during the session are presented to the governor just before or immediately after adjournment, with the bulk submitted after adjournment. The record further discloses that, in every year from 1979 to 1983, the omnibus general appropriations bill was presented to the executive post-adjournment. The governor's need for additional time to review legislation is, therefore, the most pronounced in regard to those bills presented after adjournment.

In order to give full effect to the constitutional objective that the governor be afforded additional opportunity to review legislation when his time constraints are the most severe, article III, section 8(a) must be read as allotting the governor fifteen days to veto those bills presented to him after adjournment sine die. The provision's design would be thwarted were the governor allowed only seven days to review what is generally the majority of the bills presented, and allowed fifteen days to review what is, in most years, a smaller number of bills presented during the last week of the session.

The Supreme Court, in Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583, 58 S.Ct. 395, 82 L.Ed. 439 (1938), was called upon to construe the executive's veto power narrowly. The Court refused and stated that it would not adopt any construction which would frustrate the veto provision's cardinal objective that the executive be afforded suitable opportunity to review those bills presented to him. Id. at 596, 58 S.Ct. at 400-01. We find ourselves facing a similar request, and we respond with a like answer. We will not construe article III, section 8(a) in a manner that defeats its underlying constitutional objective. Rather, we interpret the provision as affording the governor fifteen days (from presentment) to veto those bills submitted after the legislature has adjourned sine die.

Our holding is supported not only by the maxims of constitutional construction discussed above, but by others as well. If a constitutional provision is silent on a given issue, or if its literal language clashes irreconcilably with its obvious purpose, then courts may resort to consideration of historical evidence concerning the intent of those who drafted and adopted that provision. The various historical materials in the record relevant to the drafting of article III, section 8(a) leave no doubt but that the drafters never intended that the governor be limited to seven days to review bills presented after adjournment sine die.

Additionally, our holding is supported by that rule of constitutional interpretation which provides that the construction traditionally given to a provision by those officers affected thereby is presumably correct. In Amos v. Moseley, 74 Fla. 555, 77 So. 619, 625 (1917), we noted that

where there has been a practical construction, which has been acquiesced in for a considerable period, considerations in favor of adhering to this construction sometimes present themselves to the courts with a plausibility and force which it is not easy to resist. Indeed, where a particular construction has been generally accepted as correct, and especially when this has occurred contemporaneously with the adoption of the Constitution ... it is not to be denied that a strong presumption exists that the construction rightly...