Flower Valley, LLC v. Zimmerman
| Decision Date | 29 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | ED 109443 |
| Citation | 645 S.W.3d 582 |
| Parties | FLOWER VALLEY, LLC, et al., Respondents, v. Jake ZIMMERMAN, Assessor, St. Louis County, Missouri, Appellant. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
For Appellant: Paul N. Venker, Lisa A. Larkin, 100 N. Broadway, 21st Floor, St. Louis, MO 63102.
For Respondents: Patrick W. Keefe, 8000 Bonhomme Ave., Ste. 112, St. Louis, MO 63105.
Jake Zimmerman, the Assessor for St. Louis County, Missouri ("Assessor"), appeals from the circuit court's judgment awarding reimbursement of attorney fees and appraisal costs to Flower Valley, LLC; 12667 New Valley, LLC; John C. Crocker; Nolob, LLC; Keeven Development, LLC; Dunwood Development Company; French Quarter, LLC; and Glidepath, LLC (collectively, "Taxpayers") resulting from the successful appeals of their real estate tax valuations. Assessor challenges Taxpayers’ entitlement to these fees and costs because they were paid by a third party pursuant to contracts with Taxpayers. We reverse the circuit court's judgment and remand with instructions.
The underlying case arose from a dispute over the assessed values of real property owned by Taxpayers for the 2011-2012 tax years. Taxpayers individually contracted with Property Assessment Review ("PAR"), a property tax agent, to pursue property valuation reductions. After the individual appeals of their property valuations to the St. Louis County Board of Equalization did not significantly lower the assessed values, Taxpayers appealed to the State Tax Commission (the "STC"). Taxpayers were all represented at their hearings before the STC by an attorney retained by PAR ("Counsel"). Counsel presented evidence regarding appraisals that were conducted by a certified appraiser, who was also hired by PAR. After hearing the uncontested evidence, the STC lowered the valuation of each of Taxpayers’ respective properties. Each reduction in value exceeded 25 percent for Taxpayers’ commercial properties and 15 percent for their residential properties.
Taxpayers jointly filed for reimbursement of attorney fees and appraisal costs pursuant to section 138.434 and St. Louis County Ordinance No. 22,343 (2005).1 The STC heard testimony regarding the reasonableness of the professional fees requested and the fee arrangements between PAR and Taxpayers. The evidence established that the individual agreements between PAR and Taxpayers—all of which were identical in their material aspects—included: (1) a promise by PAR to directly pay all of the associated attorney fees and appraisal costs, and (2) an agreement by Taxpayers to pay PAR a contingency fee in the event of a successful reduction of the property assessments. The agreements provided that the contingency fee would be based on a percentage of the total tax savings from the reduction obtained. The evidence also showed that, consistent with the agreements, PAR hired and directed Counsel and the appraiser. PAR also received the invoices for the legal and appraisal services and directly paid those expenses.
In November 2015, the STC entered its Order of Reimbursement, which directed Assessor to award attorney fees and appraisal costs to Taxpayers. Assessor sought judicial review of the STC's order. The circuit court remanded the matter to the STC for rehearing and reconsideration, specifically requesting clarification from the STC regarding the authority it relied on in awarding fees and costs and the basis for its "interpretation of ‘reimbursement’ of such fees and costs as allowed under [the governing statutes]." In August 2016, the STC entered its Order upon Remand, which reversed its earlier order and denied Taxpayers any attorney fees or costs, emphasizing that the agreements between Taxpayers and PAR placed "the full responsibility for any appraisal fees, legal fees, and court costs" on PAR. The STC reasoned that if Taxpayers "did not make any payments of appraisal fees, attorney fees or court costs, [they] cannot be repaid or reimbursed. " Taxpayers then filed for judicial review of the STC's Order upon Remand.
In October 2017, the circuit court entered its judgment reversing the STC's Order upon Remand and reinstating the STC's Order of Reimbursement, which, again, awarded attorney fees and appraisal costs to Taxpayers. The circuit court also concluded that Taxpayers were entitled to an additional award of attorney fees and costs arising from their litigation seeking the reimbursement, although the circuit court indicated the amount of the additional award would be determined in further proceedings. The circuit court certified its judgment as final for purposes of appeal pursuant to Rule 74.01(b).2 Assessor appealed, and this Court dismissed the appeal without reaching the merits upon concluding there was not a final and appealable judgment due to the unresolved issue of Taxpayers’ additional award of attorney fees in the ongoing reimbursement litigation. See Flower Valley, LLC v. Zimmerman , 575 S.W.3d 497, 501-04 (Mo. App. E.D. 2019).
Taxpayers later withdrew their request for attorney fees and costs beyond those relating to their individual tax appeals and their original application for reimbursement. They then requested the circuit court to enter an amended judgment. On December 31, 2020, the circuit court entered its judgment awarding attorney fees and costs. In its judgment, the circuit court reversed the STC's Order upon Remand and reinstated the STC's Order of Reimbursement and the fees and costs awarded therein. The circuit court also awarded each of the Taxpayers an additional $997.25 in attorney fees in connection with the original application for reimbursement. This appeal follows.
We review the underlying decision of the administrative agency rather than the judgment of the circuit court. Peruque, LLC v. Shipman , 352 S.W.3d 370, 374 (Mo. App. E.D. 2011). When the STC bases its decision on its interpretation and application of law, appellate review is de novo. Id. In reaching its decisions in both the Order of Reimbursement and Order upon Remand, the STC construed section 138.434 and ordinance 22,343. Accordingly, our review is de novo. See id. ; see also City of Uni. City v. AT&T Wireless Servs. , 371 S.W.3d 14, 17 (Mo. App. E.D. 2012).
In its second of three points on appeal, Assessor contends the circuit court's reinstatement of the STC's Order of Reimbursement and award of additional attorney fees was based on an erroneous interpretation of section 138.434 and ordinance 22,343. Because Point II is dispositive of this appeal, we need not address the parties’ remaining arguments. 3
We reverse the circuit court's judgment and remand with instructions to reinstate the STC's Order upon Remand.
Resolution of this case turns on the interpretation of the enabling statute, section 138.434, and the ordinance enacted pursuant to this statutory authority, ordinance 22,343. Section 138.434 states, in relevant part:
Any first class charter county or a city not within a county may require by ordinance or charter the reimbursement to a taxpayer for the amount of just and reasonable appraisal costs, attorney fees and court costs resulting from an evidentiary hearing before the state tax commission or a court of competent jurisdiction if such appeal results in a final decision reducing the appraised value of residential property by at least fifteen percent or the appraised value of utility, industrial railroad and other subclass three property by at least twenty-five percent from the appraised value determined by the board of equalization for that tax year. The commission or court awarding such fees and costs shall consider the reasonableness of the fees and costs within the context of the particular case.
(Emphasis added). Ordinance 22,343 provides, in relevant part:
If an appeal by a taxpayer of an assessment of real property before the state tax commission or court of competent jurisdiction results in a final decision which reduces the appraised value as determined by the Board of Equalization for that tax year: i.) of residential property by at least fifteen (15) percent, or ii.) of utility, industrial, commercial, railroad and other subclass three property by at least twenty-five (25) percent, then such taxpayer shall be reimbursed the amount of such taxpayer's just and reasonable appraisal costs, attorneys fees and court costs which result from an evidentiary hearing before the state tax commission or court of competent jurisdiction.
St. Louis County Code section 503.300.1 (effective June 14, 2005 to August 3, 2021) (emphasis added).
When interpreting a statute, we "give effect to legislative intent as reflected in the plain language of the statute." Peruque, LLC , 352 S.W.3d at 374 (). Unless the legislature provides a specific definition, we consider the words used in their plain and ordinary meaning as found in the dictionary. Id. "The rules governing interpretation of a statute are employed when interpreting an ordinance." Tupper v. City of St. Louis , 468 S.W.3d 360, 371 (Mo. banc 2015).
Because section 138.434 and ordinance 22,343 allow for awards against a sovereign entity—here, St. Louis County—they constitute waivers of sovereign immunity. See Ford Motor Co. v. Dir. of Revenue , 97 S.W.3d 458, 461 (Mo. banc 2003). We strictly construe statutes that waive sovereign immunity. Id. "Strict construction means that a statute can be given no broader application than is warranted by its plain and unambiguous terms." Shaw v. Mega Indus., Corp. , 406 S.W.3d 466, 472 (Mo. App. W.D. 2013) (quoting Robinson v. Hooker , 323 S.W.3d 418, 423 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010) ). This rule "does not mean that the statute shall be construed in a narrow or stingy manner,...
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