Flowers v. Lavaca County Appraisal Dist.

• Decision Date: 19 January 1989
• Docket Number: No. 13-88-455-CV,13-88-455-CV
• Parties: Willie FLOWERS, Appellant, v. LAVACA COUNTY APPRAISAL DISTRICT, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 825

766 S.W.2d 825

Willie FLOWERS, Appellant, v. LAVACA COUNTY APPRAISAL DISTRICT, Appellee.

No. 13-88-455-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas,

Corpus Christi.

Jan. 19, 1989.

Rehearings Denied

Feb. 9 and Feb. 16, 1989.

Gary Schroeder, Gonzales, for appellant.

Peter Low, Calame, Linebarger & Graham, Austin, for appellee.

Before KENNEDY, UTTER and SEERDEN, JJ.

OPINION

KENNEDY, Justice.

Lavaca County Appraisal District, appellee, brought suit against Willie Flowers for delinquent ad valorem taxes on two automobiles for certain years between 1980 and 1986, and for taxes becoming delinquent thereafter until the date of judgment, and asserted a lien on the automobiles to secure payment of the taxes. The trial court granted judgment in favor of appellee for delinquent taxes on one of the automobiles in the amount of $364.75. Flowers appeals by six points of error complaining that the trial court lacked jurisdiction, that limitations bars the collection of a portion of the taxes, that there was no evidence to show that the automobile was within the taxing authority's geographical jurisdiction, that appellee has not passed a resolution giving it authority to tax the property in question, that the trial court failed to file findings of fact and conclusions of law, and that the document offered by appellee to prove appellant's tax liability was not a certified copy of the tax records. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part, and reversed and remanded in part.

By his first point of error appellant complains that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear the lawsuit, because the suit alleged an amount in controversy less than the $500 minimum jurisdictional amount in controversy of a district court. See Tex.Tax Code Ann. § 33.41 (Vernon 1982).

In its original petition for collection of overdue taxes in an amount less than $500, appellee alleged that the value of the taxable property was greater than $500, and included a request for foreclosure on the property. Appellant filed a plea in abatement challenging the district court's jurisdiction by claiming that appellee had not shown that the amount they claimed exceeded the minimum jurisdictional amount in controversy.

In order for the district court to entertain jurisdiction in a suit to foreclose a lien on personal property the petition must show that either the amount of the debt or the value of the property being foreclosed on is within its jurisdictional limit. Delk v. City of Dallas, 560 S.W.2d 519 (Tex.Civ.App.--Texarkana 1977, no writ); Corsicana Independent School District v. Corsicana Venetian Blind Co., 270 S.W.2d 296 (Tex.Civ.App.--Waco 1954, no writ).

The good faith allegations of the petition are determinative of whether the cause of action is justiciable by the court whose jurisdiction is sought to be invoked. Brannon v. Pacific Employers Insurance Co., 148 Tex. 289, 224 S.W.2d 466, 469 (1949). Such allegations should be accepted as true for purposes of jurisdiction unless the defendant pleads and proves that they were fraudulently made to confer jurisdiction. Delk, 560 S.W.2d at 520; Corsicana, 270 S.W.2d at 297.

Since appellant never alleged that appellee's valuation of the property at over $500 was made in bad faith or fraudulently, the district court has properly retained jurisdiction. See Delk; Corsicana; Brown v. Majors, 251 S.W.2d 786 (Tex.Civ.App.--Dallas 1952, no writ). Appellant's first point of error is overruled.

By his second point of error appellant complains that limitations has run on the appellee's claims for taxes delinquent for more than four years. The certified copy of the tax records produced as evidence at trial showed that delinquent taxes for the years 1980, 1982 through 1985, and 1987 totalled $364.75, which was the amount of the judgment, although the judgment itself failed to specify the years for which appellant was liable.

The statute of limitations for suits to collect delinquent taxes on personal property is four years under Section 33.05 of the Property Tax Code. Since appellee filed its Original Petition on July 30, 1987, the cause of action for taxes in a particular year must not have accrued earlier than July 30, 1983 in order to be timely filed. Under Sections 31.02 and 33.41 of the Property Tax Code, appellee's cause of action for collection of taxes imposed for one year would accrue after the taxes became delinquent on February 1st of the next year. Recovery of taxes, and statutory penalty and interest, for the years 1980 and 1982 is thus barred by limitations.

Appellee, however, challenges the four year statute of limitations as contrary to the Texas Constitution art. III, § 55, which prohibits the legislature from releasing or extinguishing an individual's liability to the state or any of its subdivisions, except for delinquent taxes due for a period of at least ten years. Appellee contends that the four year statute of limitations constitutes an unconstitutional release of appellant's liability to the state for taxes delinquent less than ten years. However, the Texas Supreme Court has stated in a similar case by a city to collect school taxes that "limitations statutes do not release or extinguish the debt, but merely affect the remedy when its enforcement is sought." Sam Basset Lumber Co. v. City of Houston, 198 S.W.2d 879, 882 (Tex.1947); see also Amarillo Independent School District v. Brockmeyer, 292 S.W.2d 886 (Tex.Civ.App.--Amarillo 1956, no writ). Unless the Texas Supreme Court changes its view of the nature of statutes of limitation, we will not express a contrary view. Appellants' second point of error is sustained with regard to taxes assessed for the years 1980 and 1982.

By his third and fourth points appellant complains that there was no evidence to show either that the automobiles were located within the geographical boundaries of the taxing authority as required by Tex.Const. art. VIII, § 11, or that appellee passed a resolution giving itself the power under Property Tax Code § 11.25(c) to impose an ad valorem tax on the automobiles in question.

Certified copies of the delinquent tax rolls, together with the testimony of the tax assessor-collector that the records show that the taxes in question were due, delinquent and unpaid, are sufficient to establish a prima facia case for the taxing authority in a delinquency suit. Davis v. City of Austin, 632 S.W.2d 331, 333 (Tex.1982); Alamo Barge Lines, Inc. v. City of Houston, 453 S.W.2d 132, 133-34 (Tex.1970); Bass v. Aransas County Independent School District, 389 S.W.2d 165, 172-73 (Tex.Civ.App.--Corpus Christi 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Tex.Tax Code Ann. § 33.47(a) (Vernon 1982).

When the taxing authority establishes a prima facie case in a tax delinquency suit, a rebuttable presumption arises that the personal property in question has a tax situs within the authority's jurisdiction, placing the burden on the taxpayer to produce evidence that the tax situs is outside the jurisdiction. Davis, 632 S.W.2d at 333. The prima facie case also creates a presumption that the taxing entity has taken all actions necessary to obtain legal authority to levy the tax. See Duval County Ranch Co. v. State, 587 S.W.2d 436, 442 (Tex.Civ.App.--San Antonio 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Stratton v. Del Valle Independent School District, 547 S.W.2d 727, 728 (Tex.Civ.App.--Austin 1977, no writ). In the present case, appellee produced the delinquent tax rolls and the testimony of the tax assessor-collector, but appellant produced no evidence of a situs outside the jurisdiction or that the district lacked authority to impose the tax.

In addition, appellant has waived any defense to personal liability for the assessments made after 1981 which are based on wrongful inclusion of his property on the appraisal records by failing to exhaust his administrative remedies before the appraisal review board, under Property Tax Code §§ 41.41(3), 41.42 and 42.09(a)(1) (Vernon Supp.1989). See Robstown Independent School District v. Anderson, 706 S.W.2d 952 (Tex.1986); Herndon Marine Products, Inc. v. San Patricio County Appraisal Review Board, 695 S.W.2d 29, 35 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Brooks v. Bachus, 661 S.W.2d 288 (Tex.App.--Eastland 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Appellant's third and fourth points are overruled.

By his fifth point appellant complains that the trial court erred in failing to file findings of fact and conclusions of law. Rule 296 provides that in a bench trial the parties must file any requests for findings of fact and conclusions of law within ten days after the final judgment is signed. Rule 297 requires the judge to file his findings and conclusions within thirty days after the judgment. If the judge fails to file them, the party must, in order to preserve error, call the omission to the judge's attention within five days after the time has expired, or between the 30th and 35th days after the judgment was signed. This...