Floyd County v. Scoggins

• Decision Date: 14 July 1927
• Docket Number: 5785.
• Citation: 139 S.E. 11,164 Ga. 485
• Parties: FLOYD COUNTY v. SCOGGINS.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

139 S.E. 11

164 Ga. 485

FLOYD COUNTY v. SCOGGINS.

No. 5785.

Supreme Court of Georgia

July 14, 1927

Syllabus by the Court.

So much of the Workmen's Compensation Act as requires the counties of this state to insure their employees against, or pay them compensation for, personal injuries or for their deaths while in the employment of the counties violates article 7, § 6, par. 2, of the Constitution of this state which declares the purposes for which the Legislature can authorize the counties to levy taxes.

The above ruling renders it unnecessary to consider the other ground of attack upon the constitutionality of the above provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act.

Error from Superior Court, Floyd County; James Maddox, Judge.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by E. C. Scoggins employee, to recover compensation for injuries, against Floyd County. To review a judgment affirming the award of the Industrial Commission, the County brings error. Reversed.

Russell C.J., dissenting.

Denny & Wright, of Rome, for plaintiff in error.

Porter & Mebane, of Rome, for defendant in error.

Little Powell, Smith & Goldstein, of Atlanta, for Industrial Commission.

HINES J.

By the Workmen's Compensation Act the counties of this state are required to pay compensation for personal injuries to, or death of, their employees, arising out of and in the course of their employment. Acts 1920, p. 167; 9 Park's Code Supp. 1922, § 3154(a) et seq. The validity of this act, so far as it relates to counties, is attacked upon the grounds: (a) That it violates article 7, § 6, par. 2, of the Constitution of this state, which declares that "the General Assembly shall not have power to delegate to any county the right to levy a tax for any purpose," except those therein specified; and (b) that it violates article 7, § 16, par. 1, which declares that "the General Assembly shall not, by vote, resolution, or order, grant any donation or gratuity in favor of any person, corporation, or association." Civil Code 1910, §§ 6562, 6573.

1. We deal with these grounds of attack in the order named. Before this court would be justified in declaring this act unconstitutional, so far as it relates to counties, the repugnancy between the statute and the Constitution must be clear and palpable. In case of doubt, the constitutionality of the act must be upheld. Wright v. Hirsch, 155 Ga. 229, 116 S.E. 795. With this cardinal rule of construction for our guidance, how does the first attack upon the constitutionality of this act stand? By the paragraph of the Constitution first cited, "the General Assembly shall not have power to delegate to any county the right to levy a tax for any purpose, except for educational purposes; *** to build and repair the public buildings and bridges; to maintain and support prisoners; to pay jurors and coroners, and for litigation, quarantine, roads, and expenses of courts; to support paupers and pay debts heretofore existing; to pay the county police, and to provide for necessary sanitation, and for the collection and preservation of records of birth, death, disease, and health." Acts Ex. Sess. 1926, p. 30, amending section 6562. It is contended that the power of a county to levy a tax to pay for injuries to, or death of, its employees under this act is derived from the provision authorizing the General Assembly to grant power to counties to levy a tax "to build and repair the public buildings and bridges." It is insisted that the proposition of law embraced in this contention is supported both by the previous decisions of this court and by sound logic and good reason. We will first deal with the decisions relied upon to support this contention.

In Dearing v. Shepherd, 78 Ga. 28, this court held that the provision which we now have under consideration, empowering the Legislature to grant to a county authority to levy a tax to build and repair bridges, conferred upon the county the power to raise money by taxation to pay a judgment arising from injuries caused by the neglect of the county to keep a bridge in repair. Counsel for the defendant in error rely upon the decision in that case to support their contention that the power granted to the Legislature to authorize counties to levy a tax "to build and repair the public buildings and bridges" includes the power to authorize the county to levy a tax to pay compensation for injuries to, or death of, county employees. There is some connection, though not close, between the expenditure of money to repair public bridges and the payment of damages arising from the failure of counties to discharge the duty imposed on them to keep such bridges in repair. It is the substitution and application of county funds which should have gone into the repairs of public bridges to the payment of damages arising from the failure to make such repairs. We think this decision went as far as this court should go in construing this constitutional provision, and in holding the power of the Legislature to authorize counties to levy taxes to build and repair public bridges included the power to authorize them to pay damages to persons injured by their failure to discharge the public duty resting upon them to keep such bridges in repair.

In Smith v. Floyd County, 85 Ga. 420, 11 S.E. 850, this court held that the language, "to build and repair public bridges," broadened the taxing power which the Legislature may confer upon counties sufficiently to embrace all expenses for constructing and maintaining bridges. In that case this court held that taxes could be levied for the purpose of paying damages done to private property in constructing approaches to a county bridge. There the relation between the language, "to build and repair public bridges," and the purposes to which county funds could be applied was immediate and direct.

In Townsend v. Smith, 144 Ga. 792, 87 S.E. 1039, this court ruled that the Constitution did not inhibit the delegation by the Legislature to any county of the right to levy a tax for tick eradication, and the decision in that case was based upon the language which provides "for...