Floyd v. State, 85-2087
| Decision Date | 01 September 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 85-2087,85-2087 |
| Citation | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 2105,511 So.2d 762 |
| Parties | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 2105 Alphonso FLOYD, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Roberta Simon, Sp. Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Michele L. Crawford, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Before BASKIN, DANIEL S. PEARSON and FERGUSON, JJ.
This case presents the same question we decided in Slappy v. State, 503 So.2d 350 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)--whether the trial judge properly accepted at face value the prosecutor's race-neutral explanations for the removal of black venirepersons through exercise of the peremptory challenges. We hold that a presumption of discriminatory use of the peremptory challenge did arise placing a burden on the state to give a credible race-neutral explanation, and that the state failed to satisfy the burden.
Floyd, a black man, came to trial on charges of automobile theft. After voir dire the state used five of its six peremptory challenges to remove five black persons from the six-person venire. A jury was selected but before it was sworn the defendant interposed an objection and requested that the court conduct a hearing, pursuant to State v. Neil, 457 So.2d 481 (Fla.1984), on grounds that a prima facie case was presented that the state's exercise of the peremptory challenges was unconstitutional. The trial court responded that "based on the information which this court heard at voir dire, this court is not satisfied that there, in fact, was a breach as provided in the Neil case, but in light of the fact that the five strikes were in fact all blacks, I think that the State Attorney should be allowed to indicate for the record, what his reasons were for striking those prospective jurors." The prosecutor agreed that "a cautious approach" required him to state the reasons. They were as follows:
Number One
Ms. Roby in the back row is a student who has lived in Liberty City [a predominantly black community] for five years. She did not react one way or the other. I got no signs from that woman that anything was sinking in, that she was reacting, at all to the questions.
I generally do not, as a general rule, do not like having young students on my juries for superstitious reasons....
And, second one, Mr. Gamble I struck. He is a student, has been arrested for burglary.
Ms. Scott I struck and tried to get removed for cause because I felt like with her medical problems, her statement that she was trying to get out of jury service, she did not want to stick--she did not want to stay on a jury and her responses to [defense counsel] and the Court's questions repeatedly with regard to whether or not she would be able to stick to her guns and would be able to put her medical problems out of her mind, the best she could do, best was to say I will try.
With regard to Ms. McDaniel, [defense counsel] had a long, fairly long conversation with her, I believe about whether or not if she was the last hold out on the jury, whether or not she would be able to stick to her guns.
She seemed to me to be too eager to acquit the Defendant, too eager to go along with [defense counsel's] suggestions.
In fact, what I had written by her name on my voir dire sheet was too eager to acquit.
....
Finally, Ms. Alexander. The woman on the bottom row, first of all, she seemed very stupid to me.
Just a very dull woman. [Defense counsel] was asking her a question, do you believe that just because that state has filed a document charging Mr. Floyd with a crime, do you believe that he is guilty. Yes. [Defense counsel] then says do you believe he is charged that he is guilty. She finally says no.
She obviously was not paying attention or didn't have the capacity to appreciate the concept.
....
In moving that the entire panel be stricken the defendant argued that the prosecutor did not speak with the persons he struck from the jury as he did with the white jurors, suggesting that he had already determined to strike the black jurors before inquiry.
In denying the defendant's motion to strike the panel the trial concluded: "Based on what this court already indicated, certainly based upon what Mr. Ranck has indicated as were his bases for striking, the court will deny any request for relief under Neil."
We note at the outset that the defendant demonstrated on the record, at the time of the State's challenges, the race of the persons being challenged. It is also brought to our attention that the assistant state attorney in this case is the same one...
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...to voir dire questions, however, is not a reasonably clear and specific explanation for striking her from the jury. Floyd v. State, 511 So.2d 762, 764 (Fla.App.1987). Similarly, the prosecutor's questions and statements during voir dire were brief and perfunctory. State v. Gonzalez, supra, ......
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