Fluckey v. City of Plymouth, 50
| Citation | 358 Mich. 447,100 N.W.2d 486 |
| Decision Date | 01 October 1959 |
| Docket Number | No. 50,50 |
| Parties | R. Ralph FLUCKEY and Alberta M. Fluckey, his wife, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. CITY OF PLYMOUTH, a Michigan municipal corporation, and Charles H. Garlett, Treasurer of the City of Plymouth, Michigan, Defendants-Appellants. , |
| Court | Supreme Court of Michigan |
Shirley T. Johnson, Detroit, for plaintiffs and appellees.
Harry N. Deyo, Detroit, for defendants and appellants, Miller, Canfield, Paddock & Stone, Detroit, of counsel.
Before the Entire Bench.
The case before us involves the validity of special assessments levied upon certain residential lots owned by the plaintiffs. These lots abut on Sheldon road, in the city of Plymouth. Before the improvements recently made, Sheldon road had a black-top pavement some 22 feet in width.
In the year 1956 the city of Plymouth annexed a tract of land on the west side of Sheldon road, just south of the Chesapeake & Ohio Railway, and immediately north and west of plaintiffs' properties. Subsequent thereto the Western Electric Company caused to be erected upon this property, so annexed, a substantial structure which will eventually employ several hundred workmen, and will be operated as a distribution and repair center for products used by the Michigan Bell Telephone Company.
In the course of the survey made by employees of the Bell Telephone Company for the purpose of determining available truck routes to and from the plant it was discovered that Sheldon road had been posted with lightweight limitations and it was felt that such restrictions might seriously impede the operation of the new plant. Western Electric officials accordingly 'reviewed with the city of Plymouth what next step could be taken and what step would be taken, if any, in connection with providing a proper road.' A contract was eventually entered into between the city and the Board of County Road Commissioners providing for the construction of a Class A road, a 48-foot reinforced concrete pavement 9 inches in thickness, with integral curb and appurtenances, on Sheldon road from Ann Arbor trail to C&O railway.
The cost of the project was estimated at $234,000, of which the city of Plymouth was to pay $80,000 as its share of the expenses. The proper officials of the city then determined that of such sum, 47% thereof should be borne by the city of large and the remainder, or 53%, by the properties fronting on the improvement, 1 residential properties being assessed at $10 per front foot, side residential lots at $5 per side foot, and commercially and industrially zoned and used properties at $13.69 per front foot, with credits to certain residential property owners of $1.50 per front foot.
We now come to the gist of the action. It was the claim of the plaintiffs that the special assessments so made were for a project not beneficial to their properties, but on the contrary detrimental thereto, and that the special assessments so made were a fraud in law entitling plaintiffs to relief in a court of equity. We are at pains to emphasize, as did the trial court, that no charges of actual fraud on the part of the responsible officials were made or are justified upon the record. In more detail, plaintiffs assert that the conversion of the road in front of their homes from a 22-foot black top to a 48-foot reinforced concrete pavement, designed and suitable for year-round heavy truck traffic, changed Sheldon from a peaceful country road to a 'four-lane thoroughfare built to accommodate, [and which] is handling, and is attracting truck traffic and car traffic in greater volume,' with the result that the value of their properties has been depreciated. The defendants, on the other hand, assert that Sheldon road, being the most westerly of the paved north and south roads in Wayne county, has for some time borne an increasingly heavy burden of traffic, that it is a quarter-section line road, which for years, the Board of County Road Commissioners of Wayne county had planned to widen, and, so far as its widening is concerned, that the board has a policy that the paving on all such roads shall be 48 feet in width. In addition, they point out that the new width contributes to safety at street intersections and the railroad, also 'in connection with the Nellie Bird School, situated on the west side of Sheldon road,' that it eliminates the ditches along the old road, and that the increased width in the pavement lessens dust in the area. In short, that Sheldon road 'is no longer a rural highway,' but has fallen prey to progress, its widening and strengthening being required 'because of general traffic increases and the requirements thereof and for the purposes of safety.' The erection of the Western Electric plant, they say, was merely one of the factors. Sooner or later the old Sheldon road would have to go. Moreover, they argue, the determination and apportionment of benefits for special assessments is a legislative function with which the courts should not interfere, at least in the absence of clear proof of fraud, bias, or discrimination, none of which, it is asserted, has been shown in this case.
With much of defendants' argument we are in complete agreement, but much of it is beside the point. It may well be that traffic and industrial conditions in a community justify the conversion of a sleepy country road into a 4-lane thoroughfare for heavy traffic. In event the change is made in timely response to such demand the responsible public officials will be commended for their appreciation of the problem and their vigor and foresight in its solution. The congestion of heavy traffic in narrow streets is eliminated, the operations of industry are facilitated, and the community as a whole is benefited.
But does the home owner whose property abuts the new highway receive a special benefit for which he should pay a special assessment? The contrary would seem to be more accurate. Specifically, and in the situation before us the opinion of the trial...
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...equity will not substitute its judgment and "weigh the benefits, if, in truth, there are benefits to be weighed", Fluckey v. Plymouth, 358 Mich. 447, 100 N.W.2d 486 (1960), and will intervene only where there is an absence of benefit. Fluckey, supra; Brill v. Grand Rapids, 383 Mich. 216, 17......
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