Fluellen v. Miller
| Docket Number | 23AP-472 |
| Decision Date | 25 January 2024 |
| Citation | 2024 Ohio 265 |
| Parties | Zanteea Fluellen, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Mark S. Miller, et al., Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas C.P.C. No 23CV-40263
On brief:
Zanteea Fluellen, pro se.
DECISION
{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, Zanteea Fluellen, appeals pro se, from the July 11, 2023 judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas dismissing her complaint against defendants-appellees, Mark S. Miller, Bethel Barker, Ken Barker, and K&B Investments of Grove City, LLC pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6). The controversy arose out of the parties' landlord-tenant relationship. For the foregoing reasons, we reverse, in part, and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this decision.
{¶ 2} On June 6, 2023, Ms. Fluellen initiated a civil action in the lower court seeking damages and declaratory relief from appellees-identified as the owners, managers, and/or operators of the townhouse in which Ms. Fluellen resided. (See June 6, 2023 Compl. at ¶ 1-2.) In her complaint, Ms. Fluellen alleged that after she made numerous complaints about the condition of her premises-namely "frequent plumbing issues"-to appellees, her monthly rent amount increased multiple times (from $685 to $780, then to $955) over an unspecified timeframe. (Compl. at ¶ 4-6.) And after receiving notice that appellees would be increasing her monthly rent amount to $1,350, Ms. Fluellen alleged she had no choice but to move out. (See Compl. at ¶ 6.) Ms. Fluellen also claimed that after she moved out, appellees retained her deposit "even though [she] left the premises in the similar form as when she first occupied the premises." (Compl. at ¶ 7.)
{¶ 3} In addition to claiming the rent increases were retaliatory (Compl. at ¶ 6), Ms. Fluellen alleged in her complaint that Bethel Barker promised that her initial monthly rent amount ($685) "would be consistent with no drastic increases" (Compl. at ¶ 3). Thus, she also asserted breach of contract and promissory estoppel claims against appellees individually and/or under a vicarious liability theory. (See Compl. at ¶ 1, 9.)
{¶ 4} On June 12, 2023, appellees moved to dismiss Ms. Fluellen's complaint under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Ms. Fluellen did not file any written response to that motion.
{¶ 5} The trial court issued an entry granting appellees' motion to dismiss on July 11, 2023. Ms. Fluellen timely appealed from that judgment and asserts the following two assignments of error for our review:
{¶ 6} A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) is a procedural test of a civil complaint's sufficiency. Cool v. Frenchko, 10th Dist. No. 21AP-4, 2022-Ohio-3747, ¶ 13, quoting Morrow v. Reminger & Reminger Co. LPA, 183 Ohio App.3d 40, 2009-Ohio-2665, ¶ 7 (10th Dist.). Dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6) is appropriate "only if it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling the plaintiff to recovery." Bullard v. McDonald's, 10th Dist. No. 20AP-374, 2021-Ohio-1505, ¶ 11. In determining whether dismissal is appropriate, the trial court "must presume all factual allegations contained in the complaint to be true and must make all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff." Id. "The court need not, however, accept as true any unsupported and conclusory legal propositions advanced in the complaint." Id.
{¶ 7} We review a trial court's dismissal pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6) de novo. State ex rel. Ohio Civ. Serv. Emps. Assn. v. State, 146 Ohio St.3d 315, 2016-Ohio-478, ¶ 12, citing Perrysburg Twp. v. Rossford, 103 Ohio St.3d 79, 2004-Ohio-4362, ¶ 5. When reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), we are mindful that Civ.R. 8(A) provides for notice pleading, which requires only a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the party is entitled to relief, and * * * a demand for judgment for the relief to which the party claims to be entitled." Accordingly, "[a] judgment granting a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss may be affirmed only when there is no set of facts under which the nonmoving party could recover." Dunlop v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 10th Dist. No. 16AP-550, 2017-Ohio-5531, ¶ 10, citing O'Brien v. Univ. Community Tenants Union, Inc., 42 Ohio St.2d 242 (1975), syllabus.
{¶ 8} In her first assignment of error, Ms. Fluellen claims the trial court prematurely ruled on appellees' motion to dismiss. Specifically, she contends she should have been given a "valid opportunity" to respond to appellees' motion and a chance to prove her claims through discovery before the trial court issued its judgment. We disagree.
{¶ 9} Civ.R. 6(C)(1) establishes a 14-day period for a nonmoving party to respond to all motions except those brought under Civ.R. 56. And, it is well-established that "trial courts have inherent authority to manage their own dockets and the cases before them." (Citations omitted.) Lupo v. Columbus, 10th Dist. No. 13AP-1063, 2014-Ohio-2792, ¶ 20. As such, the trial court was permitted to rule on appellees' motion to dismiss at any point after Ms. Fluellen's 14-day response period expired on June 26, 2023. After that date passed, the trial court had no obligation to wait for her response. The trial court issued its decision on July 11, 2023, in clear accordance with that rule.
{¶ 10} Ms. Fluellen also maintains that she did not receive a copy of appellees' motion because the clerk's office failed to record the change of address notice she purportedly mailed to the clerk. (Brief of Appellant at 5.) While not explicitly argued in her brief, we infer that she intends to contend that such failure deprived her of due process because she did not receive appellees' motion to dismiss and thus was prevented from responding to it. This argument is not well-taken.
{¶ 11} Although Ms. Fluellen insists she mailed the clerk's office written notice of her new address, the record before us does not contain the written notice she allegedly sent. Our review is limited to the record of the proceedings at trial; thus, we cannot rely on factual assertions outside the record to review the trial court's ruling on appellees' motion to dismiss. See Freeh v. Hill, 10th Dist. No. 13AP-377, 2014-Ohio-3929, ¶ 19, quoting Colley v. Colley, 10th Dist. No. 09AP-333, 2009-Ohio-6776, ¶ 12, quoting Morgan v. Eads, 104 Ohio St.3d 142, 2004-Ohio-6110, ¶ 13, citing App.R. 9 and 12(A)(1)(b).
{¶ 12} In any event, appellees' counsel-not the clerk's office-was responsible for sending a copy of the motion to Ms. Fluellen. See Civ.R. 5(A). The certificate of service states that a copy of appellees' motion to dismiss was sent to Ms. Fluellen via regular U.S. mail at her Sawbury address on June 12, 2023. (See June 12, 2023 Mot. to Dismiss at 5.) And, we note the address in that certificate of service is identical to the address Ms. Fluellen provided in the complaint she filed on June 6, 2023. Under Civ.R. 5(B)(2)(c), a document is properly served when it is "mail[ed] to the person's last known address by United States mail, in which event service is complete upon mailing." Ms. Fluellen does not claim she notified appellees' counsel of her new address at any point during the six-day period between the filing of her complaint and the mailing of appellees' motion. Thus, we do not find Ms. Fluellen's due process argument compelling.
{¶ 13} Finally, Ms. Fluellen argues it was error for the trial court to rule on appellees' motion to dismiss before the parties had engaged in discovery. (Brief of Appellant at 5.) But, she misunderstands the precise function of Civ.R. 12(B)(6). A motion to dismiss under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), as explained above, is directed solely at the pleadings. See, e.g., Assn. for Defense of Washington Local School Dist. v. Kiger, 42 Ohio St.3d 116, 117 (1989); Hughes v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 10th Dist. No. 15AP-94, 2015-Ohio-5119, ¶ 10-12. "It is axiomatic that discovery under the Civil Rules is generally outside the scope of the pleadings." Winkle v. Southdown, Inc., 2d Dist. No. 92-CA-107, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 4295, *13 (Sept. 3, 1993), citing Poulos v. Parker Sweeper Co., 44 Ohio St.3d 124 (1989). Thus, when ruling on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6), discovery documents and evidence not contained in the pleadings are generally irrelevant to the trial court's determination of whether the allegations contained in the complaint are sufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.[1] We reject Ms. Fluellen's contention otherwise.
{¶ 14} Based on the foregoing, we do not find any reason to conclude the trial court prematurely ruled on appellees' motion to dismiss. Accordingly, Ms. Fluellen's first assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 15} In her second assignment of error, Ms. Fluellen contends the trial court erred in granting appellees' Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion and dismissing all claims alleged in her complaint....
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