Fluty v. School-District No. 11

• Decision Date: 23 April 1887
• Citation: 4 S.W. 278
• Parties: FLUTY and others <I>v.</I> SCHOOL-DISTRICT NO. 11.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

4 S.W. 278

FLUTY and others

v. SCHOOL-DISTRICT NO. 11.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

April 23, 1887.

Appeal from circuit court, Baxter county.

Z. M. Horton, for appellants.

SMITH, J.

Fluty, in August, 1883, entered into a written contract with the directors of the school-district, by the terms of which he undertook to build a school-house according to a certain plan and specifications agreed upon, at such point as the directors should designate. He was paid $190 in advance, and was to be paid the further sum of $307.50 on the first of February, 1885; the builder to retain a lien on the house for the deferred payment. The building was to be completed before June 1, 1884. For the due performance of this contract, Fluty executed a bond, with sureties, in the sum of $1,000. He laid the foundations of the building, and hauled some materials to the place designated. But, some dissatisfaction existing among the inhabitants of the district about the location of the school-house site, he quit work and referred the matter to the annual school-meeting of May, 1884, offering to go forward with his contract if the meeting should approve the selection of the site, and vote a tax for building. But the meeting took no action in the premises. The school-district now brought an action on the bond against Fluty and his sureties. The defenses were: (1) That the directors, in locating the school-house site, in making the contract, and in taking the bond, had transcended their powers; that these proceedings were had in pursuance of an authority conferred at a special school-meeting held on a certain day of June, 1883, whereas such authority could be lawfully given only at the regular annual school-meeting, the time for which is fixed by law for the third Saturday in May; and (2) that the land, upon which the contractor was directed to erect the house, was not the property of the school-district; so that, if he had built the house, he would have no security for his outlay. To the defendant's answer the court sustained a general demurrer. The cause was then submitted to the court, for the purpose, as we suppose, of assessing the plaintiff's damages by reason of the breach of the covenants contained in the bond; and there were a finding and judgment against the principal and sureties for $190, with lawful interest from the date that Fluty received that sum.

It is probable that a mechanic who builds a public school-house has no lien for his work and materials, even though he may contract for one, as in this case. Such a lien can be enforced only by judgment, execution, and sale of the property. But a school-district is a public corporation, and its property is not liable to seizure and sale. Mansf. Dig. § 2999; Leonard v. City of Brooklyn, 71 N. Y. 498, 27 Amer. Rep. 80; Loring v. Small, 50 Iowa, 271, 32 Amer. Rep. 136; Charnock v. District Tp. of Colfax, 51 Iowa, 70, 33 Amer. Rep. 116; Board Ed. v. Neidenberger, 78 Ill. 58; Quinn v. Allen, 85 Ill. 39. But this matter of lien or no lien is unimportant in the present case. At the utmost it amounts only to a mutual mistake of law, not going to the essence of the contract, and furnishes no sufficient reason why Fluty should not be held to perform his contract, if it was valid.

But had the contract any validity or obligatory force upon the parties whom it purported to bind? Corporations possess only the powers that are specifically granted to them, and such as are necessary to carry into effect the powers so granted; and those powers must be exercised in the mode pointed out by the charter or constituent act. An executory contract, made without authority, cannot be enforced. Argenti v. San Francisco, 16 Cal. 255; Field, Ultra Vires, 352....