Flynn v. Beisel
| Decision Date | 08 April 1960 |
| Docket Number | No. 37748,37748 |
| Citation | 257 Minn. 531,102 N.W.2d 284 |
| Parties | Edward P. FLYNN et al., Respondents, v. Walter E. BEISEL et al., Defendants, Township of Paynesville, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Since evidence indicated doubt that user of easement include a greater width than 20 feet, it cannot be said that the finding of the trial court on that issue was manifestly against the evidence.
2. Dedication rests upon intent and not upon prescription.
3. There being no indication of a contrary intention, the conclusion in the instant case is inevitable that the grant or dedication herein was intended to enable the public to get to the water for the better enjoyment of the public right of navigation.
4. When one road commences or terminates at another road, it is intended to furnish a passage from and to that other; and the same rule applies to a road terminating at a navigable body of water.
5. Term 'in common' and not the term 'joint ownership' applies in describing the relationship of fee owners to the public with respect to their interests in riparian rights growing out of an easement for ingress to and egress from a navigable body of water.
6. The essentials of a common-law dedication of a roadway are the landowner's intent--express or implied--to have his land appropriated and devoted to the public use and an acceptance of that use by the public. The intent to dedicate is the same in all cases, and the user to establish that intent may be of short or long duration; and common user by the public is the very highest kind of evidence of public acceptance of a dedication.
7. The evidence compels a finding that the roadway involved has been established by common-law dedication and public acceptance, the public and the defendant town as representative of the public thereby acquiring possession of riparian rights, including the reasonable use and maintenance of dock facilities, to be enjoyed in common with the plaintiffs.
Order modified.
Curry & Peterson, Minneapolis, for appellant.
Phillips & Donohue, St. Cloud, Edward P. Flynn, Paynesville, for respondents.
Action brought by Edward P. Flynn and Loretta H. Flynn to enjoin Walter E. Beisel, Clifford S. Heitke, Elaine A. Heitke, and the township of Paynesville from erecting and maintaining a dock at the termination of a public easement abutting on Lake Koronis, a navigable body of water situated in Stearns County, Minnesota.
Plaintiffs admit that the public has easement rights of ingress to and egress from Lake Koronis but allege that those rights arise by prescription and not by dedication or grant and are restricted to travel only and not to use of navigable waters extending beyond the water's edge.
Defendant township of Paynesville alleges that, as representative of the public, it is owner of an easement of way for ingress to and egress from Lake Koronis and that as such it possesses riparian rights where the easement abuts the lake and that plaintiffs have no riparian rights therein except those which they enjoy in common with others as members of the public.
The trial court held that the easement rights of ingress and egress do not include the right to maintain a dock at the foot of the easement; that the plaintiffs are the owners in fee of Lot 10, Block 4, Crescent Beach, Lake Koronis, Stearns County, less the easterly 5 feet thereof, subject only to an easement in the public for the right of passage only, to be enjoyed with the plaintiffs, from the public road to Lake Koronis, said passageway not being of any greater width at any point than 20 feet; that no owner of Lot 10 ever granted, conveyed, dedicated, or otherwise transferred to defendants or to the public any riparian rights appurtenant to Lot 10; and that the property of the plaintiffs fronts and abuts on Lake Koronis, a navigable body of water. The court also found that the plaintiffs are the owners and possessed of all the riparian rights appurtenant to said real estate and that not any of the defendants, or the public, including the township of Paynesville, in either a proprietary or governmental capacity, is the owner or possessed of any riparian rights on Lake Koronis at any point on or opposite said lot, save only the limited right of ingress to and egress from Lake Koronis over the passageway in question.
The court below ordered that the defendants, and each of them, and all persons acting under them, including the officers, agents, servants, and employees of the township of Paynesville, be permanently enjoined from erecting or maintaining any dock or other obstruction extending from any part of plaintiffs' premises or the passageway across the same into the lake and from interfering with or impairing the riparian rights of the plaintiffs.
Defendant village appealed from an order denying a motion for a new trial and assigned the following errors:
(1) The court erred in making the finding of fact that the width of the easement was 20 feet.
(2) The court erred in its conclusions of law to the effect that the right to maintain a dock at a point where a public easement of ingress to and egress from a navigable body of water terminates was not a right attendant upon the possession of the easement.
(3) The court erred in the use and term 'joint' to describe the relationship of plaintiffs to the public with reference to their respective interests in the easement of ingress and egress to the lake.
This court must determine here whether the evidence as a whole reasonably tends to support the findings of the court below and in doing so must apply the rule that, when an action is tried by the court without a jury, its findings of fact are entitled to the same weight as the verdict of a jury and will not be reversed on appeal unless they are manifestly and palpably contrary to the evidence, and this rule applies whether the appeal is from a judgment or from an order granting or denying a new trial, and whether the evidence is oral or documentary. 1 Dunnell, Dig. (3 ed.) §§ 410, 411; State, by Peterson, v. Bentley, 245 Minn. 334, 71 N.W.2d 780; Alsdorf v. Svoboda, 239 Minn. 1, 57 N.W.2d 824; Marquardt v. Stark, 239 Minn. 107, 58 N.W.2d 273. This rule, however, does not relieve the appellate court from the duty of giving the evidence in every case careful examination and consideration in its determination of the question whether the evidence brings the case fairly within the rule. 1 An appellate court will not be bound by, and will review, the findings of the trial court, even though they may be supported by the weight of the evidence, if such findings are manifestly controlled or influenced by errors of law. 2
The following facts seem pertinent to the disposition of the aforesaid questions: Long prior to plaintiffs' acquiring the ownership of Lot 10, Block 4, Crescent Beach, all of Crescent Beach was owned by one Dr. P. C. Pilon who on April 21, 1923, executed a plat, not filed until 1941. Dr. Pilon originally designated a roadway 20 feet wide called Frank's Lane, which easement ran in a southeasterly direction across a lot to the left of plaintiffs' upon which buildings have since been erected. In 1920, however, Dr. Pilon staked out a new roadway to the east of the platted lane, and the latter roadway is the subject of this controversy. Fence posts and wire fences were constructed along both sides of the substitute roadway in the early 1920's, and the new Frank's Lane has been in use by the public ever since. Several witnesses testified regarding the use to which the latter passageway or easement was put from 1920, without interruption, to the present date. One of the main purposes for which it was used consisted of public travel over the passageway to and from the lake. This public use included parking cars on the roadway and using it as an access to the lake for a swimming, boating, and landing boats where the easement abuts on the lake. Docks have been maintained by members of the public, such docks maintained, however, between the boundary lines of the easement. Being able to use the passageway for ingress and egress, the public swam and fished in the lake; placed ice-fishing houses along the west fence during the winter, parking their cars on the easement area.
All of Crescent Beach was subsequently acquired by Mr. William Landgraf. He purchased Lot 10 on August 7, 1946, and sold it the following day. Plaintiff Edward Flynn, an attorney at law, drew the deed for Mr. Landgraf when he sold the property on August 8, 1946. Mr. Flynn suggested to Mr. Landgraf that Lot 10 be conveyed subject to the easement and suggested that the deed include the words, 'subject to an easement for the purpose of ingress and egress to and from Lake Koronis, on over and across the westerly side of Lot 10 as the same is now used and traveled over and across.'
Mr. Landgraf testified that the public had used the easement for such purposes as hauling wood off the island, for swimming, for parking cars, for fishing, and for leaving their boats by the docks and fishing off the docks which were maintained by certain members of the public. He also testified that while he owned the property it was his intention that the public should have the right to use the full width between the boundary lines of the easement
Through mesne conveyances the plaintiffs acquired title to Lot 10 on July 28, 1949. The deed contained the same easement reservation that Mr. Flynn had suggested Mr. Landgraf include in the deed when he sold the property August 8, 1946.
With respect to the use that the public has made of the easement, Mr. Flynn testified:
'During my occupancy and ownership it has been used by those who use the lake for harvesting ice, for fishing in summer, all seasons of the year, for access to the lake, for fishing and boating and water sports, landing boats, and bringing their boats back, and leaving off passengers.'
1. It appears to be the rule in cas...
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