Flynn v. Cent. R. Co. of New Jersey

• Decision Date: 05 June 1894
• Citation: 142 N.Y. 439,37 N.E. 514
• Parties: FLYNN v. CENTRAL R. CO. OF NEW JERSEY.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

142 N.Y. 439

37 N.E. 514

FLYNN

v.CENTRAL R. CO. OF NEW JERSEY.

Court of Appeals of New York.

June 5, 1894.

Appeal from superior court of New York city, general term.

Action by Thomas Flynn against the Central Railroad Company of New Jersey. From a judgment of the general term (22 N. Y. Supp. 383) affirming a judgment for plaintiff (15 N. Y. Supp. 328), defendant appeals. Reversed.

George Holmes, for appellant.

Edmund R. Terry, for respondent.

BARTLETT, J.

The plaintiff sues to recover damages for alleged personal injuries. The case was tried in the superior court of the city of New York, a jury finding a verdict of $2,500 for the plaintiff. The judgment entered upon the verdict was affirmed by the general term. A preliminary point was taken at the trial, and argued on this appeal, challenging the jurisdiction of the superior court of the city of New York, either of the defendant or the subject of the action. It is claimed that as the plaintiff, at the date of commencing the action, was a resident of the city of Brooklyn, the defendant a foreign corporation, and the cause of action one that accrued in New Jersey, the court, under section 263, subd. 7, of the Code of Civil Procedure, had no jurisdiction. This section deals with the jurisdiction of superior city courts. Subdivision 7 extends it ‘to an action by a resident of that city against a foreign corporation, either (1) to recover damages for the breach of a contract, express or implied, or the sum payable by the terms of a contract, express or implied, where the contract was made, executed or delivered within the state; or (2) where a warrant of attachment granted in the action has been actually levied within that city upon property of the corporation; or (3) where the summons is served by delivery of a copy thereof, within that city, to an officer of the corporation, as prescribed by law.’ It is sufficient answer to this objection that the jurisdiction of the superior court of the city of New York is defined by article 6, § 12, of the constitution of this state, which reads in part as follows: ‘The superior court of the city of New York [and three other courts named] are continued with the powers and jurisdiction they now severally have, and such further civil and criminal jurisdiction as may be conferred by law.’ This article of the constitution was ratified by the people in November, 1869, and took effect in 1870. At that time the superior court of the city of New York had jurisdiction in an action by a resident of this state for any cause of action against a corporation created by or under the laws of any other state, government, or country. Code Proc. § 427. Any legislation limiting this jurisdiction is unconstitutional. This court, in Popfinger v. Yutte, 102 N. Y. 38, 6 N. E. 259, held subdivision 5 of section 263 of the Code of Civil Procedure unconstitutional, as being in conflict with the provision of the constitution already cited. We hold the superior court of the city of New York had jurisdiction of this action. We now come to the consideration of this appeal on the merits.

The plaintiff, a grain shoveler, at the time of his injury, was employed by the firm of Edward Annan & Co. on board of one of their grain elevators, engaged in transferring grain from a canal boat to the cars of the defendant's road. The elevator was made fast to one of defendant's piers in Jersey City, and the canal boat at the side of the elevator, away from the pier, while the cars on which the grain was being loaded stood on a track of defendant's said piers. Between these cars and the side of the pier to which the elevator was secured was another track, on which stood empty cars, which were in the control of defendant, but with which pl...