FLYNN v. Chippewa Cnty.
| Decision Date | 18 January 1944 |
| Citation | 12 N.W.2d 683,244 Wis. 455 |
| Parties | FLYNN v. CHIPPEWA COUNTY. |
| Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Chippewa County; Clarence E. Rinehard, Judge.
Affirmed.
This action was commenced on August 27, 1942, by John M. Flynn, plaintiff, against Chippewa County, defendant, to recover for damages sustained as a result of structural defect of the county jail premises. The action is grounded upon the safe place statute. The action was tried to the court without a jury. Findings of fact and conclusions of law were duly made and entered and judgment ordered for defendant on February 5, 1943, dismissing plaintiff's complaint. The material facts will be stated in the opinion.
Stafford & Stafford, of Chippewa Falls, for appellant.
Ronald F. North, Dist. Atty., of Chippewa Falls, for respondent.
The facts in this case are not in dispute. Plaintiff was committed to the county jail of Chippewa county to serve a sentence for nonsupport. The injury to plaintiff occurred during his incarceration. The county jail faced south. In the front of the building are the living and business quarters of the sheriff. In the rear of the building are the cells for prisoners. A stairway inside the jail portion of the structure leads to the basement which extends only under the front portion of the building. In the basement is a furnace room with exit or stairway leading to an enclosed yard. Some prisoners, including plaintiff, are sentenced to hard labor, which is done in this yard. The only way to reach the yeard is to walk down the stairway from the cell block into the basement, go through the furnance room and up the stairway leading out doors. Plaintiff and other trusties were allowed the liberty of going from the jail block into the basement at will and also did chores about the building such as carrying ashes outside from the basement exit. They made a practice of using the furnance room as a lounging room.
On January 12, 1942, plaintiff who had been lounging in the furnance room, went up the exit stairway for the purpose of ‘getting a breath of air’. In attempting to secure the door at the top of the stairway by pulling it and fastening it from the inside, the door handle gave way and he fell down the stairs, sustaining injuries to his foot. The stairway had no railing, platform or lights and concededly violated the safety orders of the Industrial Commission. The amount of damages was stipulated.
Upon the foregoing facts the trial court held that the portion of the building where the injury occurred was not a public building and that plaintiff was a trespasser while in and about the lounging room.
Section 101.06, Stats., requires every owner of a public building to construct, repair and maintain it so as to render it safe. Section 101.01(13) includes in its definition of ‘owner’ state, county, town, city, etc. Section 101.01(12), Stats., defines ‘public building’ as ‘any structure used in whole or in part as a place of resort, assemblage, lodging, trade, traffic, occupancy, or use by the public, or by three or more tenants.’
In Sullivan v. School District, 179 Wis. 502, 191 N.W. 1020, this court held that a school district was not liable under the safe place statute as it then stood for an injury sustained by a pupil as a result of failure to maintain the school as a safe place. The legislature has since changed that rule by amendments to the foregoing sections specifically including the state, county, city, etc. In Heiden v. Milwaukee, 226 Wis. 92, 275 N.W. 922, 114 A.L.R. 420, we held that a student could recover for injury sustained under circumstances similar to those in the Sullivan case. In the Heiden case the contention was that the safe place statute is in derogation of common law and should be strictly construed but the court held that the amendment of section 101.01(13), Stats., specifically includes cities and school districts within the definition of ‘owner’ and clearly imposed the liability.
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