Flynn v. Dick Corp.

• Decision Date: 29 July 2005
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 03-1718 (AK).
• Parties: John FLYNN, et al, Plaintiffs, v. DICK CORPORATION, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

Page 189

384 F.Supp.2d 189

John FLYNN, et al, Plaintiffs, v. DICK CORPORATION, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 03-1718 (AK).

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

July 29, 2005.

Ira R. Mitzner, Dickstein, Shapiro, Morin & Oshinsky, LLP, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.

Christopher A. Weals, Seyfarth & Shaw, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

KAY, United States Magistrate Judge.

Pending before the Court are the Defendant's motion for summary judgment ("Def.Mot.")[20], the Plaintiffs' opposition ("Pl.Opp'n")[25], and the Defendant's reply ("Def.Reply")[27], as well as the Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment ("Pl.Mot.")[21], the Defendant's opposition ("Def.Opp'n")[24], and the Plaintiffs' reply ("Pl.Reply")[29]. On April 22, 2005, the Court heard oral argument on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment.

This is an action brought by the Trustees of the Bricklayers & Trowel Trades International Pension Fund ("IPF" or "Fund"), a multi-employer employee benefit plan under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2005), against the Dick Corporation to collect employee benefit contributions under § 515 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1145. The Plaintiffs claim that the Defendant, a general contractor which performed work in 2003 and 2004 on two construction projects in Florida, is bound by the terms of a Florida collective bargaining agreement to make contributions to the IPF, the Florida Pension Fund ("FPF"), the Florida Health Fund ("FHF"), and the Local 1 App. Fund. The Plaintiffs claim that they are authorized under ERISA to effect collections on behalf of the International Masonry Institute ("IMI"), the International Union of Bricklayers and Allied Craft Workers ("BAC"), the IPF, the FPF, the FHF, and the Local 1 App. Fund for all covered masonry work performed by the Defendant's employees.

I. BACKGROUND

On December 1, 1989 the Defendant signed an "Independent Agreement" ("1989 Agreement") with the Bricklayers and Allied Craft workers Local 3 Massachusetts for work performed by the Defendant in the geographic area of the Local 3 union. On September 20, 2000, the Defendant signed an "Independent Agreement" ("2000 Agreement") with the Bricklayers and Allied Craft Workers Local 1 Massachusetts for work performed by the Defendant in the geographic area of the Local 1 union.

The 1989 Agreement references a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") dated August 1, 1989 between the Bricklayers and Allied Craftsmen Eastern Massachusetts District Counsel Local Unions and the Building Trades Employers' Association of Boston and Eastern Massachusetts, Inc. and the Mason Contractors Association of Massachusetts, Inc. ("1989 CBA").¹

The 2000 Agreement references a CBA dated September 1, 1992 ("1992 CBA") between the Bricklayers & Allied Craftsmen District Council of Western Massachusetts and the Building Trades Employers' Association of Boston and Eastern Massachusetts, Inc. and the Mason Contractors' Association of Massachusetts, Inc., as well as a CBA dated August 1, 1994 between the Bricklayers and Allied Craft workers Local 1 Massachusetts and the Building Trades Employers (Labor Policy Division) Construction Industry Association of Western Massachusetts, Inc.² Plaintiffs claim that the 1989 and 2000 Agreements bind the Defendant to the terms of the 1989 CBA and 1992 CBA respectively, makes it a party thereto, and binds it to all successor CBAs. It is the Plaintiffs' position that two agreements signed on August 1, 2002 ("August 2002 CBA") and September 1, 2002 ("September 2002 CBA") are the ultimate successor agreements to the 1989 CBA and the 2000 CBA. Each of the later CBAs contains a traveling contractor's clause which, according to the Plaintiffs, binds the Dick Corporation, when working outside of the geographic area of the local CBA, to abide by the terms of the CBA in the work jurisdiction or, if none exists, by the home CBA. (Pl. Mot at 12-13.)

It is the Plaintiffs' contention that for work performed between January 2003 and October 2004 in the State of Florida, the Defendant was bound to the contemporaneous CBA between the International Union of Bricklayers and Allied Craftsman ("BAC"), the Local No. 1 Florida of the BAC, and signatory contractors ("Florida CBA"). Under the terms of the Florida CBA, according to the Plaintiffs, the Defendant is required to make contributions to the IPF, the IMI, the BAC, the FPF, the FHF, and the Local 1 App. Fund for all covered work performed by the Defendant's employees, including any subcontractors' employees.

II. DISCUSSION

Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). If a reasonable jury could find in favor of the non-movant, then a genuine issue for trial exists, and summary judgment is not appropriate. Id., 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. In making this determination, the Court must resolve all factual ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Id., at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. In this case, wherein cross-motions for summary judgment have been filed, the Court will draw all reasonable inferences regarding assertions made in a light most favorable to the non-asserting party.

A. Standing

This lawsuit is brought pursuant to ERISA § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3), which authorizes fiduciaries to bring a claim for payment to an employee pension fund. Under ERISA § 3(21)(A), a "person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent (i) he exercised any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management of such plan or exercises any authority or control respecting management or disposition of its assets, (ii) he renders investment advice for a fee or other compensation, direct or indirect, with respect to any moneys or other property of such plan, or has any authority or responsibility to do so, (iii) he has any discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration of such plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1002. Fiduciaries include, inter alia, trustees of the employer employee benefit plans, in this case, the Bricklayers & Trowel Trades International Pension Fund. See James F. Jorden & Waldemar J. Pfepsen, Jr., & Stephen H. Goldberg, HANDBOOK ON ERISA LITIGATION § 3.02[A][2] (2nd ed.2003).

Although the Plaintiffs have standing to sue under ERISA, they must still demonstrate a constitutional "injury" required under Article III. Id. at § 1.03, n. 85; See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). To satisfy Article III, the Plaintiffs must first demonstrate an injury in fact — an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized; and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of — the injury has to be fairly traceable "to the challenged action of the defendant, and not ... the result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court." Id., quoting Simon v. Eastern Key Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 41-42, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976). Third, it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, "that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision." Id., See Simon, 426 U.S. at 38, 43, 96 S.Ct. 1917; See also Horvath v. Keystone Health Plan East, Inc., 333 F.3d 450 (3rd Cir.2003).

Although the Article III standing inquiry clearly subsumes constitutional requirements, it also imbues "prudential considerations." Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Am. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471, 102 S.Ct. 752, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982); See also Warth, 422 U.S. at 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197 (standing "involves both constitutional limitations on federal-court jurisdiction and prudential limitations on its exercise"). Under Article III, "[t]he actual or threatened injury ... may exist solely by virtue of `statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing.'" Warth, 422 U.S. at 500, 95 S.Ct. 2197, (quoting Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n. 3, 93 S.Ct. 1146, 35 L.Ed.2d 536 (1973)); see also Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 152, 71 S.Ct. 624, 95 L.Ed. 817 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("standing may be based on an interest created by the Constitution or a statute"). The prudential considerations are subject to the limitations of Congress, which "may override prudential limits by statute." Erwin Chemerinsky, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 2.3 (3rd ed.1999); see, e.g., Warth, 422 U.S. at 501, 95 S.Ct. 2197 ("Congress may grant an express right of action to persons who otherwise would be barred by prudential standing rules"); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732 & n. 3, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972). ERISA clearly accomplishes this result. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1988) (enumerating persons empowered to bring a civil action under ERISA). As written, Section 1132 empowers fiduciaries to bring a civil action to redress any violation of the statute's fiduciary requirements.

This statutory grant of authorization for fiduciaries to bring suit satisfies the requirements of Article III standing. See Fin. Inst. Ret. Fund v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 964 F.2d 142 (2nd Cir.1992).

B. Venue

ERISA § 502(e)(2) states that venue is proper, inter alia, in the district where the plan is administered. 29 U.S.C. § 1132. In this case it is not in dispute that the IPF is administered in the District of Columbia. Therefore, this court provides a proper venue for the present action.

C. ERISA § 515

The Plaintiffs' claim is based on Section 515 of ERISA, which...