Flynn v. New York Co
| Decision Date | 23 March 1931 |
| Docket Number | No. 235,235 |
| Citation | 75 L.Ed. 837,51 S.Ct. 357,72 A.L.R. 1311,283 U.S. 53 |
| Parties | FLYNN v. NEW YORK, N. H. & H. R. CO |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Messrs. Wm. F. Geenty and Thomas R. Fitz Simmons, both of New Haven, Conn., for petitioner.
Mr. Edward R. Brumley, of New York City, for respondent.
[Argument of Counsel from pages 54-55 intentionally omitted] Mr. Justice HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a suit under the Employers' Liability Act (45 USCA §§ 51-59) for negligently causing the death of Edward L. Flynn, brought on May 15, 1929, by Flynn's executor for the benefit of Flynn's dependent widow and children. It is alleged that the injury was suffered on December 4, 1923, and that it caused Flynn's death on September 1, 1928. The defendant, respondent here, demurred to the declaration on the ground that more than two years having elapsed since the date when Flynn's cause of action accrued his right to sue was barred, and that therefore the suit could not be maintained. Act of April 22, 1908, c. 149, §§ 1, 6, 35 Stat. 65, 66; Act of April 5, 1910, c. 143, § 1, 36 Stat. 291; Code, tit. 45, §§ 51, 56 (45 USCA §§ 51, 56). The demurrer and judgment for the defendant were sustained by the Supreme Court of Connecticut. 111 Conn. 196, 149 A. 682. A writ of certiorari was granted by this Court. 282 U. S. 821, 51 S. Ct. 30, 75 L. Ed. —.
The Act of 1908 gives a right of action to the employee or, in case of his death, to his personal representative for the benefit of the widow and children and provides that no action shall be maintained 'unless commenced within two years from the day the cause of action accrued.' Section 6 (45 USCA § 56). Obviously Flynn's right of action was barred, but it is argued that the right on behalf of the widow and children is distinct; that their cause of action could not arise until Flynn's death, and that therefore the two years did not begin to run until September 1, 1928. But the argument ome § too late. It is established that the present right, although not strictly representative, is derivative and dependent upon the continuance of a right in the injured employee at the time of his death. Michigan Central R. R. Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U. S. 59, 70, 33 S. Ct. 192, 57 L. Ed. 417, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 176. On this ground an effective release by the employee makes it impossible for his administrator to recover. Mellon v. Goodyear, 277 U. S. 335, 344, 48 S. Ct. 541, 72 L. Ed. 906. The running of the two years from the time when...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Alfone v. Sarno
...River Railroad Co., 212 N.Y. 207, 105 N.E. 824, and the very recent case of Flynn v. New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Co., 283 U.S. 53 (51 S.Ct. 357, 75 L.Ed. 837) (11 N.J.Misc. at 7, 163 A. 661.) Double recovery of damages presents a staggering problem in New Jersey, where it is w......
-
Services, Inc v. Gaudet 8212 1019
...action may be brought. See, e.g., Mellon v. Goodyear, 277 U.S. 335, 48 S.Ct., 541, 72 L.Ed. 906 (1928); Flynn v. NewYork, N.H. & H.R. Co., 283 U.S. 53, 51 S.Ct. 357, 75 L.Ed. 837 (1931); Walrod v. Southern Pacific Co., 447 F.2d 930 (CA9 1971); Seaboard Air. Line R. Co. v. Oliver, 261 F. 1 (......
-
Ecker v. Town of West Hartford
...123 Conn. 446, 454, 197 A. 85 (1937); Flynn v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 111 Conn. 196, 200, 149 A. 682 (1930), aff'd, 283 U.S. 53, 51 S.Ct. 357, 75 L.Ed. 837 (1931); Korb v. Bridgeport Gas Light Co., 91 Conn. 395, 397, 99 A. 1048 (1917); DeMartino v. Siemon, 90 Conn. 527, 528, 97 A. 765 (......
-
Deggs v. Asbestos Corp.
...to avoid allowing a double recovery”).2 The court in Grant said Calhoun was factually similar to Flynn v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 283 U.S. 53, 51 S.Ct. 357, 75 L.Ed. 837 (1931), the only difference being that the decedent in that case died without bringing any personal inju......