Mellon v. Goodyear
Decision Date | 28 May 1928 |
Docket Number | No. 131,131 |
Citation | 72 L.Ed. 906,277 U.S. 335,48 S.Ct. 541 |
Parties | MELLON, Director General of Railroads, etc., v. GOODYEAR |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Messrs. Luther Burns, of Topeka, Kan., M. L. Bell and W. F. Dickinson, both of Chicago, Ill., T. P. Littlepage, of Washington, D. C., J. E. Du Mars, of Topeka, Kan., and W. D. Vance, of Belleville, Kan., for petitioner.
Messrs. Edwin C. Brandenburg, of Washington, D. C., and John F. McClure, of Belleville, Kan., for respondent.
While employed in interstate commerce by the Director General of Railroads at Belleville, Kan., July 31, 1919, Lewis Goodyear sustained serious personal injuries for which he claimed the right to recover damages under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (35 Stat. 65, c. 149 (45 USCA §§ 51-59; Comp. St. §§ 8657-8665); 36 Stat. 291 (45 USCA §§ 56, 59; Comp. St. §§ 8662, 8665)). On March 16, 1920, he settled with the employer, accepted the agreed sum, and executed a general release, which, among other things, recites:
'I do hereby compromise said claim, and do respectively release and forever discharge said Director General of Railroads, operating Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad, and his successor or successors as such, the United States of America, the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company, the owner of said railroad, and all railway companies whose lines are leased to said railway company or have been operated by it, but are now oper- ated by said Director General, and their respective agents and employees, from any and all liability for all claims and demands for all damages resulting from the injuries received by me at the time and place above stated, including such injuries as may hereafter develop, as well as those now apparent, and also do release and discharge them, and each of them, of all suits, actions, causes of action, and claims for damages on account of injuries to my person, as well as damages to my property, if any, which I have or might have arising from, growing out of, or in any wise connected with the accident above referred to, and do hereby acknowledge full satisfaction of all such liability and causes of action. * * *
'It is further expressly understood and agreed that this release shall be deemed to be and shall be a complete bar to any action which might otherwise be brought, either by law, or under any state or federal Workmen's Compensation Act, Employers' Liability Act, Labor Law, or any other statute, for the recovery of compensation or damages on account of said injuries (or of resulting death, if this be executed by an administrator or administratrix of the estate of said person), for the benefit of any person whomsoever or estate whatsoever.'
May 4, 1920, Goodyear died. April 19, 1921, relying upon the Federal Employers' Liability Act, his widow, as administratrix and in behalf of herself and her children, brought this action for damages against the Director General in the district court, Republic county, Kan. She alleged that her husband's death resulted from the injuries suffered July 31, 1919. As a bar to the action, the answer set up the settlement and release above referred to; and the administratrix replied that the beneficiaries had a separate cause of action for their pecuniary damage which the decedent could not release.
The cause was twice tried and twice considered by the Supreme Court of Kansas. At the first trial, the jury was told:
'You are instructed that the law favors a compromise and settlement of disputes, and, when parties in good faith enter into an agreement based on good consideration, neither is afterwards permitted to deny it.'
Judgment for the Director General was reversed by the Supreme Court. It held the quoted instruction erroneous. The opinion shows care and research, and forcefully sets out the argument against the power of an injured employee to destroy the right of dependents to recover in event of his death. Goodyear v. Davis, 114 Kan. 557, 220 P. 282, 39 A. L. R. 563; Id., 115 Kan. 20, 220 P. 1049, 39 A. L. R. 563.
At the second trial, the court instructed the jury:
Answering special questions, the jury found that no fraud attended the settlement; Goodyear was mentally capable of transacting business at the time; there was no mutual mistake as to his physical condition; the release was not given under the mistaken belief that the material results of his injuries had disappeared; and nothing was allowed for funeral expenses.
Upon a verdict in her favor for $5,000, judgment went for the administratrix, which the Supreme Court af- firmed, definitely approving the instruction last quoted. Goodyear v. Davis, 121 Kan. 392, 247 P. 446. She died July 10, 1926, and Edward Goodyear was duly substituted by order of Supreme Court of Kansas.
The question for our decision is whether the settlement between Goodyear and the employer, made advisedly and in good faith, barred an action by dependents for their pecuniary damages through his death.
The Liability Act, approved April 22, 1908, 35 Stat. 65, c. 149, provided:
45 USCA § 51; Comp. St. § 8567.
The amending Act of April 5, 1910, 36 Stat. 291, c. 143, added the following:
45 USCA § 59; Comp. St. § 8665.
In Michigan Central Railroad Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U. S. 59, 65, 67, 68, 69, 70, 33 S. Ct. 192, 57 L. Ed. 417, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 176, an action by the administrator to recover for loss cuffered by the wife by reason of her husband's wrongful death, this court considered the original statute (1908) and held that the employee's right of action to recover such damages as would compensate for expenses, loss of time, suffering, and diminished earning power did not survive his death, also that the mere existence of such a right in the employee's lifetime did not destroy the dependent's right under the statute to recover for pecuniary damages consequent upon the death. By Mr. Justice Lurton, the court said:
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