Flyte ex rel. Flyte v. Summit View Clinic, Corp.
| Decision Date | 18 July 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 48278-9-II,48278-9-II |
| Parties | KENNETH FLYTE, as personal representative of THE ESTATE OF KATHRYN FLYTE, on behalf of their son JACOB FLYTE, and as personal representative of THE ESTATE OF ABIGAIL FLYTE, Respondents/Cross Appellants, v. SUMMIT VIEW CLINIC, a Washington corporation, Appellant/Cross Respondent. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
WORSWICK, P.J. — Kenneth Flyte sued Summit View Clinic (the Clinic) following the death of his wife, Kathryn,1 from the H1N1 influenza virus2 in August 2009. A jury found that the Clinic failed to provide Kathryn informed consent. Both parties appeal.
The Clinic appeals the judgment of $13,350,000, arguing that the trial court erred in denying a motion for mistrial, a motion to dismiss two jurors, and motions for new trial and that the jury's damages award was so excessive as to show it was the result of passion or prejudice. The Flytes cross-appeal, arguing that the trial court erred in reducing the jury's damages award by offsetting the amount of the Flytes' prior settlement with another health care provider.
We hold that the trial court did not err in denying the motions for mistrial, to dismiss jurors, or for new trial and that the jury's damages award was not the result of passion or prejudice. We further hold that the trial court erred in reducing the damage award by offset. Consequently, we remand to the trial court with instructions to enter judgment for the Flytes for the full amount of the jury's verdict against the Clinic.
On June 23, 2009, Kathryn, who was seven months pregnant, began feeling ill. She visited the Clinic the morning of June 26. In the months preceding Kathryn's visit, the Clinic had received public health alerts from authorities about the swine flu pandemic. Kathryn's symptoms were consistent with influenza, and although the health alerts recommended treating pregnant women exhibiting flu symptoms with the drug Tamiflu, the Clinic's staff did not inform Kathryn about the pandemic or available treatment.
As Kathryn's condition deteriorated, she received treatment from other medical providers, including those within the Franciscan Health System. Kathryn and Kenneth's daughter, Abbigail, was delivered by caesarean section on June 29. Kathryn died on August 11, and Abbigail died six months later.
Before filing their claim against the Clinic, the Flytes entered into a settlement agreement with Franciscan Health Systems for $3.5 million. The trial court did not hold a reasonableness hearing regarding this settlement.3 Kenneth then sued the Clinic, alleging that the Clinic failedto adhere to standards of care and that it breached its duty of informed consent.4 The matter proceeded to a jury trial resulting in a verdict in favor of the Clinic. The Flytes appealed, and we reversed and remanded the case for a new trial. Flyte v. Summit View Clinic, 183 Wn. App. 559, 562, 333 P.3d 566 (2014). Before the second trial, the Flytes dismissed with prejudice all claims of medical negligence, as well as all claims arising from Abbigail's death.
The Clinic filed a number of motions in limine. First, the Clinic moved to limit evidence regarding Abbigail's death. The trial court stated that it would determine the admissibility of the evidence in context as the trial progressed but that Kenneth could testify that Abbigail was born prematurely and that she passed away. In addition, the trial court granted the Clinic's motion in limine to exclude testimony regarding its violation of standards of care because the Flytes dismissed all medical negligence claims. Despite the absence of a reasonableness hearing, and without evidence of joint and several liability, the trial court also granted the Clinic's motion to offset any potential damages award with the Flytes' prior $3.5 million settlement agreement with Franciscan Health Systems.
In opening argument, the Flytes' counsel stated that Abbigail "never really seemed to the level of health as other children, in [Kenneth's] observations, and her health turned for the worse." 3 Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) at 459. The Clinic objected. The trial court determined the statements were "somewhat beyond the scope" and asked the Flytes' counsel to limit his discussion of Abbigail's death. 3 VRP at 460. The Flytes' counsel continued: 3 VRP at 472. The Clinic asked that the statement be stricken, and the trial court instructed the jury to disregard counsel's statement.
During Kenneth's testimony, his counsel asked the following questions:
4 VRP at 653. The Flytes' counsel also made statements and asked a number of questions about diagnosing H1N1 and about the Clinic's operations.
During trial, juror 8 notified a judicial assistant that a chart detailing the distinctions between symptoms for a cold, the seasonal flu, and H1N1 was taped to a bookcase in the jury room. The trial court questioned the jurors. Juror 8 said that she did not read the chart or discuss it with other jurors. Juror 8 also stated that the chart would not affect her view of the case because she had "been told to disregard anything outside of the courtroom." 5 VRP at 791. Juror 4 said that she did not read the information on the chart and was still able to listen to the case fairly and impartially. Only jurors 4 and 8 noticed the H1N1 chart.
Following the jurors' disclosures, the Clinic moved for mistrial, arguing juror misconduct based on jurors 4 and 8's exposure to extrinsic evidence. The trial court denied the Clinic's motion, stating that there would be no prejudice to the jury's verdict because jurors 4 and 8 did not actually read the chart. After the trial court denied the Clinic's motion for mistrial, the Clinicmoved to excuse jurors 4 and 8. The trial court denied the Clinic's motion, and the parties continued with trial.
In closing argument, the Flytes' counsel stated:
So [Kenneth], I submit to you for the loss of his wife, and all of the loss he experienced, the range that would be appropriate is also 1 to 5 million. But [Kenneth] has given me an instruction, and I'm bound by it because he's my client, he's told me to recommend that the jury award him a dollar. Because he doesn't care about the money; he cares about accountability. He cares about proving the point that the [Clinic] is responsible.
13 VRP at 2041. The Clinic objected, arguing that the Flytes' counsel was arguing for exemplary damages. The trial court overruled the Clinic's objection.
The jury returned a special verdict, finding that the Clinic failed to provide informed consent to Kathryn. The jury also awarded $16.7 million in damages: $5 million to the estate of Kathryn, $5 million to Kenneth, and $6.7 million to Jacob. Based on its prior ruling, the trial court reduced the Flytes' damages award by his $3.5 million settlement with Franciscan Health Systems.5
Following the jury's verdict, the Clinic filed a motion for new trial, arguing that the trial court erred by failing to order a mistrial or excuse jurors 4 and 8 after they reviewed the H1N1 chart, the Flytes' counsel engaged in flagrant misconduct by arguing and presenting evidence in violation of an order in limine and by asking the jury to award exemplary damages, and the damages award was so excessive as to unmistakably show it was the result of the jury's passionor prejudice. The trial court denied the Clinic's motion. The Clinic appeals the judgment, and the Flytes cross-appeal the trial court's reduction of the jury award.
The Clinic first contends the trial court erred by denying (a) its motion for mistrial because the court made a subjective inquiry into the actual effect of extrinsic evidence on the jury, (b) its motion to dismiss jurors 4 and 8, and (c) its related motion for new trial because the jurors were inadvertently exposed to extrinsic evidence. We disagree.
The Clinic argues the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard in denying its motion for mistrial after jurors 4 and 8 were exposed to extrinsic evidence. Specifically, the Clinic contends that the trial court made a subjective inquiry into the actual effect of the evidence on the jurors instead of an objective inquiry into whether the jurors could have been prejudiced. We disagree.
We review a trial court's denial of a motion for mistrial for abuse of discretion. Smith v. Orthopedics Int'l, Ltd., 149 Wn. App. 337, 341, 203 P.3d 1066 (2009). A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is "'manifestly unreasonable, or exercised on untenable grounds, or for untenable reasons.'" Breckenridge v. Valley Gen. Hosp., 150 Wn.2d 197, 203-04, 75 P.3d 944 (2003) (quoting State ex rel. Carroll v. Junker, 79 Wn.2d 12, 26, 482 P.2d 775 (1971)). A trial court "necessarily abuses its discretion if it applies the incorrect legal standard." Gillett v. Conner, 132 Wn. App. 818, 822, 133 P.3d 960 (2006).
To determine whether a mistrial is warranted because of juror misconduct, we first decide "whether the alleged information actually constituted misconduct and, second, if misconduct did occur whether it affected the verdict." Richards v. Overlake Hosp. Med. Ctr., 59 Wn. App. 266, 270, 796 P.2d 737 (1990). A jury's consideration of novel or extrinsic evidence is...
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