Foisy v. Wyman
| Decision Date | 25 October 1973 |
| Docket Number | No. 42605,42605 |
| Citation | 515 P.2d 160,83 Wn.2d 22 |
| Parties | Ronald D. FOISY and Marilyn E. Foisy, his wife, Respondents, v. Richard Kent WYMAN, a single man, Appellant. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Legal Services Center, Steve Frederickson, Seattle, for appellant.
Thomas J. Isaac, Seattle, for respondents.
This is an unlawful detainer action in which the plaintiff (respondent), Ronald D. Foisy, is seeking the possession of his real property, unpaid rent and damages. The defendant (appellant), Richard Kent Wyman, appeals from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
In his complaint, the plaintiff alleged in effect: (1) That on December 31, 1970, the defendant took possession of a house which the plaintiff is seeking to recover, pursuant to a 6-month lease requiring $300 to be paid for said term, plus water and other utility charges; (2) that during the term of the lease the defendant paid the sum of $95, leaving $205 still owing for the 6-month period; (3) That the defendant remained upon the premises after the expiration of the lease; (4) That the rental payment after the expiration of the lease was to be $75 per month; (5) That after the defendant refused to pay the accrued rent, the plaintiff served a 3-day notice to pay rent or vacate upon the defendant on August 27, 1971; (6) That the defendant failed to pay any of the amounts owing after the 3-day notice was served upon him.
The defendant's answer raised several affirmative defenses including breach of implied warranty of habitability.
During trial the defendant testified that he took possession of the house on March 3, 1971. It appears that the parties executed the lease in question on March 8, 1971, although the lease was dated December 31, 1970, and was to cover a term of six months, which was to commence on January 1, 1971, and end on June 30, 1971.
The lease in question also contained an option to purchase. The testimony of the defendant indicates that he thought he was purchasing the house rather than renting it. His testimony also indicates that the house contained a number of defects when he entered into the lease and it indicates that he was aware of some of the defects when he agreed to rent the house, but not all of them.
The trial court concluded that the defendant was guilty of unlawful detainer of the premises rented to him by the plaintiff. However, it refused to enforce the provisions of what it termed the 'purported lease.' It found that the reasonable rental for the period of occupancy of the premises was the sum of $50 per month commencing with March 3, 1971, until such time as the defendant removed himself. In effect, the court held the lease was invalid. The court also held that a writ of restitution should issue to the sheriff to require the surrender of possession if the defendant did not voluntarily withdraw and that damages for the period March 3, 1971, through April 3, 1972, were to be doubled if the defendant did not surrender the premises by April 3, 1972. The defendant appeals, although the plaintiff does not cross-appeal from the court's findings.
The primary contention raised by the defendant is that the trial court erred in refusing to accept evidence as to his affirmative defense of breach of implied warranty of habitability. The defendant argues that the plaintiff's failure to maintain the premises in a habitable condition constitutes a failure of consideration upon the part of the plaintiff and relieves the defendant of his obligation to pay rent. We agree that the tenant should have been permitted to introduce evidence at trial in support of this theory of defense.
The premises in question, according to the testimony of the defendant, contained a number of defects including a lack of heat, no hot water tank, broken windows, a broken door, water running through the bedroom, an improperly seated and leaking toilet, a leaking sink in the bathroom, broken water pipes in the yard and termites in the basement. No objection was made to the introduction of this testimony. The testimony of the defendant also indicates that he painted the interior and made repairs upon the premises, but ceased making repairs when he learned of a municipal court action being initiated against the plaintiff as a result of numerous housing code violations within the house. In addition, the record reveals that the landlord was informed of the defects and was prosecuted successfully for violations of the Seattle housing code.
During the trial the defendant attempted to introduce the testimony of two housing inspectors as to the housing code violations which existed on the premises. The trial court sustained the plaintiff's objections to this testimony upon the theory that the condition of the premises was not relevant to the issue before the court. We disagree with the reasoning of the trial court in refusing to accept the evidence as to the condition of the premises, although it should be stated that this issue has not been heretofore specifically addressed in this jurisdiction in relation to our unlawful detainer statutes.
Throughout the United States, the old rule of caveat emptor in the leasing of premises has been undergoing judicial scrutiny.
In Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis.2d 590, 596, 111 N.W.2d 409, 412 (1961), the court stated:
To follow the old rule of no implied warranty of habitability in leases would, in our opinion, be inconsistent with the current legislative policy concerning housing standards. The need and social desirability of adequate housing for people in this era of rapid population increases is too important to be rebuffed by that obnoxious legal cliche , Caveat emptor. Permitting landlords to rent 'tumbledown' houses is at least a contributing cause of such problems as urban blight, juvenile delinquency and high property taxes for conscientious landowners.
See Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268
(1969); Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970); Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Haw. 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969); Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 138 U.S.App.D.C. 369, 428 F.2d 1071 (1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925, 91 S.Ct. 186, 27 L.Ed.2d 185 (1970), and Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill.2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972).
In Lemle v. Breeden, Supra, the court reviewed the rule of caveat emptor and the current trend toward finding an implied warranty of habitability in leases, and stated on page 433, 462 P.2d 474:
The application of an implied warranty of habitability in leases gives recognition to the changes in leasing transactions today. It affirms the fact that a lease, is, in essence, a sale as well as a transfer of an estate in land and is, more importantly, a contractual relationship. From that contractual relationship an implied warranty of habitability and fitness for the purposes intended is a just and necessary implication. It is a doctrine which has its counterparts in the law of sales and torts and one which when candidly countenanced is impelled by the nature of the transaction and contemporary housing realities. Legal fictions and artificial exceptions to wooden rules of property law aside, we hold that in the lease of a dwelling house, such as in this case, there is an implied warranty of habitability and fitness for the use intended.
(Footnote omitted.)
In Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., Supra, the court analyzed the various exceptions to the common law rule that the lessor has no duty to repair and stated on page 1078:
These as well as other similar cases demonstrate that some courts began some time ago to question the common law's assumptions that the land was the most important feature of a leasehold and that the tenant could feasibly make any necessary repairs himself. Where those assumptions no longer reflect contemporary housing patterns, the courts have created exceptions to the general rule that landlords have no duty to keep their premises in repair.
It is overdue for courts to admit that these assumptions are no longer true with regard to all urban housing.
Today's urban tenants, the vast majority of whom live in multiple dwelling houses, are interested, not in the land, but solely in 'a house suitable for occupation.' Furthermore, today's city dweller usually has a single, specialized skill unrelated to maintenance work; he is unable to make repairs like the 'jack-of-all-trades' farmer who was the common law's model of the lessee. Further, unlike his agrarian predecessor who often remained on one piece of land for his entire life, urban tenants today are more mobile than ever before. A tenant's tenure in a specific apartment will often not be sufficient to justify efforts at repairs. In addition, the increasing complexity of today's dwellings renders them much more difficult to repair than the structures of earlier times. In a multiple dwelling repair may require access to equipment and areas in the control of the landlord. Low and middle income tenants, even if they were interested in making repairs, would be unable to obtain any financing for major repairs since they have no long-term interest in the property.
We find the reasoning of these cases extremely persuasive. Any realistic analysis of the lessor-lessee or landlord-tenant situation leads to the conclusion that the tenant's promise to pay rent is in exchange for the landlord's promise to provide a livable dwelling. As Judge Skelly Wright stated in the Javins case on page 1074:
When American city dwellers, both rich and poor, seek 'shelter' today, they seek a well known package of goods and services--a package which includes not merely walls and ceilings, but also adequate heat, light and ventilation, serviceable plumbing facilities, secure windows and doors, proper sanitation, and proper maintenance.
(Footnote omitted.) Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 138 U.S.App.D.C. 369, 428 F.2d 1071 (1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925, ...
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