Foley v. George A. Douglas & Bro., Inc.

• Decision Date: 14 May 1936
• Parties: FOLEY v. GEORGE A. DOUGLAS & BRO., Inc., et al.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

185 A. 70

121 Conn. 377

FOLEY v. GEORGE A. DOUGLAS & BRO., Inc., et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

May 14, 1936

Appeal from Superior Court, Fairfield County; Ernest A. Inglis Judge.

Action by Philip A. Foley against George A. Douglas & Bro., Inc. and others. From a judgment of the superior court erasing the case from the docket of that court, the plaintiff appeals.

No error.

Ellsworth B. Foote, John Clark FitzGerald, and David E FitzGerald, all of New Haven, for appellant.

Harry B. Dinerstein, Joseph G. Shapiro, and Harry Allison Goldstein, all of Bridgeport, for appellee.

Argued before MALTBIE, C.J., and HINMAN, BANKS, AVERY, and BROWN, JJ.

MALTBIE, Chief Justice.

This action was returned to court on the first Tuesday of June, 1926. The defendants filed answers, the last on January 3, 1927. The record shows no further action in the case until the annual call of the docket in 1931, when it was discontinued. On May 14, 1934, a motion to restore the case was filed. In it certain reasons for failure to prosecute the action were given, and it was stated that, previous to the call of the docket in 1931, counsel for the plaintiff mailed a letter to the clerk of the court requesting that the case be retained on the docket, but the clerk had no record of its receipt; that counsel had no record of the receipt of any notice that the case was discontinued at the annual call; that previous to the annual call in 1932 counsel again wrote the clerk asking to have the case continued on the docket; and that only when arrangements were being made for the trial of the case in the spring of 1934 was the fact that it had been discontinued discovered by them. On the same day as the motion to restore the case to the docket, a further motion to set aside the order of discontinuance and for a new trial under the provisions of section 5701 of the General Statutes was filed, stating substantially the same facts as in the motion to restore. Both motions were denied by the trial court in May, 1934. But a docket entry appears under date of June 22, 1934: " Judgment opened, vacated and set aside and case restored to the docket," and the same day judgment was formally rendered reciting that the parties had appeared and been heard on the motion to restore the case to the docket and that the motion was granted. On June 7, 1935, one of the defendants moved to erase the case from the docket on the ground that, in granting the motion to restore, the trial court acted beyond its jurisdiction. The trial court thereupon rendered judgment that the order of June 22, 1934, restoring the case to the docket, be set aside and the case erased, and from that judgment the plaintiff has appealed.

We are not here concerned with the motion for relief under section 5701 of the General Statutes because the denial of that motion stands unquestioned upon the record and the trial court acted affirmatively only upon the motion to restore the case to the docket. The order of the trial court in 1931 discontinuing the case was a final judgment, Jarvis v. Martin, 77 Conn. 19, 21, 58 A. 15; Glazer v. Rosoff, 120 Conn. 120, 122, 179 A. 407. With certain exceptions not now material, a court is without power to vacate a judgment or modify its terms in other than clerical matters after the expiration of the term in which it was rendered. Jarvis v. Martin, supra; Ferguson v. Sabo, 115 Conn. 619, 621, 162 A. 844; Kalinick v. Collins Co., 116 Conn. 1, 7, 163 A. 460. This is because of the fact that after the expiration of the term the court ordinarily lacks jurisdiction to proceed further with the case and any judgment it renders is void. Bronson v. Schulten, 104 U.S. 410, 26 L.Ed. 797; Phillips v. Negley, 117 U.S. 665, 672, 6 S.Ct. 901, 29 L.Ed. 1013; In re Metropolitan Trust Co., 218 U.S. 312, 320, 31 S.Ct. 18, 54 L.Ed. 1051; Woods Brothers Construction Co. v. Yankton County (C.C.A.) 54 F.(2d) 304; Browning v. Waldrip, 169 Ark. 261, 273 S.W. 1032; People v. Davis, 143 Cal. 673, 77 P. 651.

That result does not follow, however, from the mere fact that a final judgment has been entered, else the court would have exhausted its power as soon as the judgment was rendered even during the term; nor can it be because of a lack of jurisdiction of the subject-matter or the issues involved, else the court would not have had jurisdiction to render the judgment. The lack of jurisdiction rests upon the fact that the parties are no longer amenable to judicial process in the action, and the basis of the rule essentially is that in the interest of the public as well as that of the parties there must be fixed a time after the expiration of which the controversy is to be regarded as settled and the parties freed of obligation to act further...