Jarvis v. Martin

• Decision Date: 14 June 1904
• Citation: 77 Conn. 19,58 A. 15
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: JARVIS v. MARTIN et al.

58 A. 15

77 Conn. 19

JARVIS

v. MARTIN et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

June 14, 1904.

Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Fairfield County; Howard J. Curtis, Judge.

Action by William H. Jarvis, Jr., against James T. Martin and others. From a judgment for defendants, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

The complaint alleges, in substance, the following facts: At the annual call of the docket of the court of common pleas in Fairfield county in June, 1902, a case therein pending, being one brought by the present plaintiff against the present defendant Martin, was stricken from the docket under the rules. The present defendant Williams had given special bail for the defendant in said action. Counsel for the plaintiff knew of the discontinuance, but through his mistake, arising from his confusing said action with another between the same parties, and having the same title, in which he also appeared, supposed that the case discontinued was said other case, and not the case in question. Counsel did not discover his mistake until in November following. Meanwhile, owing to his mistake, he made no motion to restore the case upon motion day, as provided by the rules or thereafter. December 24th he brought these proceedings. The defendant Williams demurred to the complaint, the demurrer was sustained, and judgment of dismissal followed.

Howard W. Taylor, for appellant.

Frederick W. Holden, for appellee.

PRENTICE, J. (after stating the facts). The plaintiff contends that upon the facts alleged by him in his complaint he is entitled to the relief he asks. He also claims that the demurrer does not set out with the necessary precision and definiteness any ground of objection which can be successfully urged against his contention. The soundness of the claim as to the insufficiency of the demurrer depends largely upon the correctness of legal propositions which the exigencies of this case do not require us to consider. The circumstances of the case are such that the plaintiff can obtain no substantial benefit from our action unless his main contention is well made. We may therefore properly consider the case upon its broad general features, and without regard to possible technical aspects of the pleadings. The plaintiff does not rest his application entirely upon the provisions of section 815 of the General Statutes of 1902, providing for the granting of new trials for reasonable cause. On the contrary, he relies especially upon the general equity powers inherent in the court to which his complaint is addressed. The power thus invoked is that which was under discussion in Tyler v. Aspinwall, 73 Conn. 493, 47 Atl. 755, 54 L. R. A. 758, and Goldreyer v. Croman, 76 Conn. 113, 55 Atl. 594. In Smith v. Hall, 71 Conn. 427, 42 Atl. 86, we said that new trials might be granted for equitable cause where no legal ground for such relief is shown, and that the power to grant them is inherent in courts of equity, and confirmed by statute. The plaintiff points to this case, to which he might have added Carrington v. Holabird. 17 Conn. 530, as furnishing authority for his contention that the court of common pleas had the power to grant the relief he seeks. If this be assumed, the plaintiff still remains besot with insurmountable difficulties. It is a well-established principle that courts of equity will not relieve against the operation of judgments rendered through the negligence or inattention of the party claiming to be aggrieved or his attorney. Crim v. Handley, 94 U. S. 653, 24 L. Ed. 216; Trustees of Amherst College v....