Folmsbee v. Tech Tool Grinding & Supply, Inc.

• Decision Date: 31 March 1994
• Citation: 417 Mass. 388,630 N.E.2d 586
• Parties: , 9 IER Cases 789 Beverly FOLMSBEE v. TECH TOOL GRINDING & SUPPLY, INC., & another. 1
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 586

630 N.E.2d 586

417 Mass. 388, 9 IER Cases 789

Beverly FOLMSBEE v. TECH TOOL GRINDING & SUPPLY, INC., & another. ¹

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,

Berkshire.

Argued Jan. 6, 1994.

Decided March 31, 1994.

Thomas J. Curley, Jr., Pittsfield, for plaintiff.

Diane M. DeGiacomo, Pittsfield, for defendants.

Gail S. Strassfeld, Newton, & Sarah Wunsch, Boston, for Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

Before LIACOS, C.J., and WILKINS, ABRAMS, LYNCH and O'CONNOR, JJ.

ABRAMS, Justice.

The plaintiff, Beverly Folmsbee, an employee of the defendant corporation, refused to participate in a mandatory employee drug testing program and left her employment. The plaintiff then filed a complaint against her employer, Tech Tool Grinding & Supply, Inc., alleging: (1) violation of G.L. c. 12, §§ 11H & 11I (1992 ed.), the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act (count I); (2) violation of her right to privacy under G.L. c. 214 (1992 ed.) (count II); (3) wrongful termination in violation of public policy (count III); (4) wrongful termination in violation of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing (count IV); and (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress (count V). Folmsbee agreed to summary judgment in favor of the defendants on counts IV and V. On cross motions for summary judgment, the Superior Court judge allowed summary judgment to the defendants on counts II and III. The remaining count was tried before another judge in the Superior Court, who dismissed count I, and entered judgment for the defendants. Folmsbee appeals the judgment on counts I through III. We allowed the parties' application for direct appellate review and now affirm.

We summarize the relevant facts. The plaintiff, Beverly Folmsbee, is a former employee of Tech Tool Grinding & Supply, Inc. (Tech Tool). The defendant Tech Tool is a Massachusetts corporation in the business of manufacturing industrial cutting tools. The defendant Robert Morin is vice president and part-owner of Tech Tool. Morin oversees the day to day operation of the plant.

Folmsbee began work at Tech Tool as a tool grinder in August, 1988. She worked full time, approximately 55 hours per week, until April 12, 1990. During her employment, she received regular raises and bonuses. She was never reprimanded concerning her job performance. The parties stipulated that Tech Tool never had any probable cause to believe that Folmsbee ingested illegal drugs nor any reasonable suspicion that she did so.

The work at Tech Tool requires the employees to be well trained, constantly alert, and extremely careful. The tools manufactured by the company are razor sharp and must be handled with great care in order to avoid injury to the Tech Tool employees and to persons using them after they have been manufactured and shipped.

Over several years, Morin was concerned about drug use by Tech Tool's employees. Two employees had been arrested on drug charges, and another had been sent to a twenty-one day drug rehabilitation program. In addition, Morin smelled marihuana smoke and found marihuana cigarette butts in the company rest room. On March 12, 1990, Tech Tool posted a handwritten notice to inform the employees that it was initiating a drug testing program to begin on April 12, 1990.

On April 11, 1990, Morin held a meeting to discuss the drug testing procedures with Tech Tool's employees. Morin told the employees that he had selected a local walk-in medical center to perform the testing. All full-time employees, including Morin and the company president, were to be tested. ² The walk-in medical center adheres to the following procedure. The employee who is being tested disrobes in a private room and dresses in a hospital gown. A medical assistant of the same sex as the employee examines the employee to ensure that no vials of urine have been brought into the room by the employee. The employee then goes alone to the bathroom to produce a urine sample, while the medical assistant waits outside. The specimen is then sealed and hand delivered to the testing laboratory.

Folmsbee saw the notice on March 12, 1990, and attended the April 11 meeting. When she heard about the testing procedures, the fifty-four year old employee became very upset. The following morning, she told Morin that she found the testing procedure degrading and would not take the test. She was particularly distressed by the visual inspection, which she characterized as a "strip search." Morin told Folmsbee that she would have to take the test if she wanted to continue on as an employee. Folmsbee responded, "You've just fired me." Morin denied he was firing her, but continued to insist that she submit to drug testing. Folmsbee left the premises, and did not return to work. She did not take the drug test. She returned to Tech Tool a week later to pick up her tool kit and her check. As of the date of the trial, Folmsbee was working as a part-time housekeeper, about eight hours a week.

1. Massachusetts Civil Rights Act. ³ Folmsbee claims that the defendants have violated G.L. c. 12, § 11H, by interfering with her right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Folmsbee correctly does not allege a constitutional violation. Because Tech Tool is a private employer, Folmsbee's rights under art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution are not implicated. See Bally v. Northeastern Univ., 403 Mass. 713, 717 n. 3, 532 N.E.2d 49 (1989).

Folmsbee did not prove any interference or attempted interference with any right secured by the Constitution or laws of either the United States or of the Commonwealth. There was no error.

2. Right of privacy. ⁴ The question presented is whether Tech Tool's drug testing policy constituted an "unreasonable, substantial, or serious" interference in violation of G.L. c. 214, § 1B. ⁵ The Superior Court judge evaluated the policy under the balancing test set forth in Bratt v. International Business Machs. Corp., 392 Mass. 508, 520-521, 467 N.E.2d 126 (1984), and concluded the policy was reasonable. In Bratt, we said, "the employer's legitimate interest in determining the employees' effectiveness in their jobs should be balanced against the seriousness of the intrusion on the employees' privacy." Bratt, supra at 520, 467 N.E.2d 126, citing Cort v. Bristol-Myers Co., 385 Mass. 300, 308, 431 N.E.2d 908 (1982). Previously, in evaluating drug testing by a public employer, we balanced the employee's interest in privacy against the employer's competing interest in determining whether police cadets were using drugs. See O'Connor v. Police Comm'r of Boston, 408 Mass. 324, 330, 557 N.E.2d 1146 (1990). ⁶

We have recognized that requiring an employee to submit to urinalysis involves a significant invasion of privacy. See O'Connor, supra at 328, 557 N.E.2d 1146; Horsemen's Benevolent & Protective Ass'n, Inc. v. State Racing Comm'n, 403 Mass. 692, 704, 532 N.E.2d 644 (1989). The act of urination is inherently private. Moreover, Tech Tool's medical tester required the employees of Tech Tool to submit to a visual inspection by either a doctor or medical assistant, in order to ensure that the employee had not concealed any vials of urine.

On the other side of the balance is Tech Tool's legitimate business interest. The nature of Tech Tool's business requires extreme alertness and precision. Even a slight error could result in serious harm to both employees and customers. Morin had a strong basis for suspecting that Tech Tool employees were using drugs. ⁷ Thus, he was concerned for the safety of both Tech Tool's employees and its customers.

Tech Tool provided thirty days' notice prior to initiating any testing. All full-time employees, including the two owners, were required to take the test. Morin promised that anyone who tested positive would not be fired, but would be retested in thirty days and given an opportunity to undergo drug counselling at company expense.

Folmsbee did not object to drug testing per se. The parties stipulated that Tech Tool never had any probable cause to believe that Folmsbee ingested illegal drugs nor reasonable suspicion that she did so. Folmsbee objected to the visual inspection procedure employed by the medical center. ⁸

The center is an established medical facility with experience in drug testing. The person being tested goes alone into the examining room to disrobe in privacy. A doctor or medical assistant of the same sex as that person performs a brief visual inspection. The judge found that a visual inspection was necessary because vials of urine intended for the purpose of frustrating drug testing are commercially available. The person then goes alone to produce the urine specimen, while the doctor or medical assistant waits outside. The Superior Court judge ruled that the procedures were not unnecessarily intrusive. ⁹ We agree.

In light of the nature of Tech Tool's business, the evidence of employee drug use, and the procedural safeguards to guarantee privacy employed by the medical center, the judge correctly determined that the drug testing policy was reasonable. Balancing the competing interests, we conclude that Tech Tool's drug testing policy did not violate G.L. c. 214, § 1B.

3. Wrongful termination in violation of public policy. The general rule is that an employment-at-will contract can be terminated at any time for any reason or for no reason at all. See Gram v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 384 Mass. 659, 668 n. 6, 429 N.E.2d 21 (1981). As an exception to the general rule, we have permitted employees in certain circumstances to seek redress for terminations in violation of public policy....