Folsom v. Century Life Assurance Co.
| Citation | 502 P.3d 1121 |
| Decision Date | 05 November 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 118,920 |
| Parties | Vickie L. FOLSOM, individually, and as surviving spouse of Roger G. Folsom, Deceased, Plaintiff/appellee, v. CENTURY LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant/Appellant. |
| Court | United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma |
Johnny R. Blassingame, THE RUDNICKI FIRM, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma and Joe M. Hampton, HAMPTON BARGHOLS PIERCE, PLLC, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendant/Appellant,
Mellissa S. Hedrick, HEDRICK LAW FIRM, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, and Joe E. White, Jr., Charles C. Weddle, III, Kate C. Thompson, WHITE & WEDDLE, PC, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff/Appellee.
OPINION BY THOMAS E. PRINCE, JUDGE:
¶1 Century Life Assurance Company ("Appellant") appeals the trial court's June 22, 2020 Order, which awarded Vickie L. Folsom ("Appellee") an attorney fee award in the sum of $885,630.00 in a bad-faith insurance case that ended after Appellee accepted Appellant's $125,000.00 offer to confess judgment. The trial court entered its judgment after an evidentiary hearing on Appellee's application for attorney fees and costs and a review of Appellant's response and other documents and exhibits. The trial court found that the lodestar attorney fee to which Appellee was entitled was $221,407.50. The trial court also found that Appellee was entitled to a $664,222.50, or 300%, fee enhancement-resulting in a total attorney fee award of $885,630.00. Based on the record and applicable law, we: modify the trial court's lodestar calculation; affirm the trial court's finding that an enhancement was warranted; and modify the enhancement and reduce the total attorney fee award to $230,263.80.
BACKGROUND
¶2 The record in this case begins in June 2017, when Appellee filed this action after Appellant's bad-faith refusal to honor an $11,000.00 accidental death insurance policy obtained by Roger G. Folsom, deceased. In the Petition, Appellee prayed for judgment in her favor against Appellant for: breach of contract damages in excess of $75,000.00; actual damages in excess of $75,000.00; and punitive damages in excess of $75,000.00. Undergirding Appellee's Petition and the litigation described more fully below were Appellee's allegations that, on January 1, 2015, Roger Folsom, deceased, and his wife, Appellee, were shopping at a Dillard's department store at a Tulsa mall when Mr. Folsom tripped and fell on a transition
piece between the edge of the concrete flooring and the tiled aisle walkway. As a result of the fall, Mr. Folsom fractured his right humeral head and dislocated fingers on his left hand. Mr. Folsom was rushed to St. Francis Hospital, where he underwent surgery and was hospitalized until January 5, 2015. On January 7, 2015, Mr. Folsom returned to St. Francis allegedly due to septic shock and acute renal failure. He began dialysis on January 8, 2015, and remained on dialysis until his death on November 13, 2015.
¶3 Effective April 1, 2013, Appellee's decedent, Mr. Folsom, had a contract for accidental death and dismemberment insurance with Appellant in the amount of $11,000.00 for injuries or losses sustained in a common accident. Mr. Folsom's contract with Appellant was in full force and effect at the time of his death in November 2015. Because Mr. Folsom allegedly died as a result of his January 1, 2015 accidental fall, Appellee made a claim on the accidental death and dismemberment policy, which Appellant denied in a letter dated June 22, 2016. The June 22, 2016 letter stated, among other things, that "[Appellant] must respectfully advise you [Appellee] that since death by natural causes is not a covered loss under the policy, we will not be making payment on this claim." As a result of Appellant's allegedly improper conduct, Appellee filed this lawsuit.
¶4 The record here shows that this case was both highly contested and brought to resolution by the parties in a timely and prompt manner. On December 27, 2017, an Agreed Scheduling Order was entered. Following an initial round of discovery, eight months into the litigation (on February 26, 2018), Appellant made an offer to confess judgment in the amount of $33,000.00, "exclusive of any costs and attorney fees incurred by Plaintiff to the date of [the o]ffer." See Appellant's [First] Offer of Judgment. Despite Appellant's offer to confess judgment, Appellee continued to litigate, allowing the $33,000.00 offer to expire by operation of law. See 12 O.S. § 1101.1(B) ().
¶5 After the expiration of Appellant's first offer to confess, Appellee's counsel took depositions; retained a bad-faith insurance expert; and engaged in extensive motion practice, which was to be expected in a bad-faith insurance case in which the insured's cause of death was disputed. On May 21, 2018, during the course of discovery, Appellee dismissed her breach of contract claim without prejudice, leaving only the bad-faith insurance claim. On December 18, 2018, Appellant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment ("MSJ"), to which Appellee responded on January 9, 2019. A disposition docket occurred on January 2, 2019, setting the matter for pretrial conference on February 6, 2019. Both sides subsequently filed multiple Motions in Limine, to which both sides filed timely responses. The trial court heard argument on Appellant's MSJ on February 6, 2019. The record does not reveal that a ruling was made thereon prior to the announced settlement of the case. On February 8, 2019, just two days after the trial court heard argument on Appellant's MSJ (and just seventeen (17) days before the start of trial), Appellant filed a second offer to confess judgment in the amount of $125,000.00, again "exclusive of any costs and attorney fees incurred by Plaintiff to the date of [the o]ffer." See Appellant's [Second] Offer of Judgment; see also 12 O.S. § 1101.1(B) (). Appellee accepted.
¶6 By accepting Appellant's offer, Appellee became the prevailing party, entitling her--by statute--to make application to recover reasonable attorney fees and costs. See 36 O.S. § 3629(B) (attorney fees); 12 O.S. § 928 (costs). Appellant does not dispute this. See June 22, 2020 Order at 2 (). In March 2019, Appellee filed her fee application. Numerous documents and exhibits, including Appellant's response and objection to the fee application, were subsequently filed of record. Appellee's fee application included the affidavit of attorney Kent R. McGuire. In his Affidavit, Mr. McGuire stated, among other things, that Appellee's "attorneys possessed the requisite skills and experience to perform the work efficiently and properly as evidenced by outcome obtained." Aff. Kent R. McGuire at 2. Mr. McGuire also stated that, pursuant to State ex rel. Burk v. City of Oklahoma City , 1979 OK 115, 598 P.2d 659, "it [was] his opinion that the Court should enhance the [lodestar] amount" by utilizing "a multiplier of four (4) [because it] would fully, fairly, and equitably compensate counsel for their fees." Aff. Kent R. McGuire at 2. In June 2019, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on Appellee's fee application, at which both parties appeared by their attorneys. Mr. McGuire did not appear at the hearing. However, Appellee presented the in-person testimony of Charles C. Weddle, III, who sponsored Appellee's exhibits documenting the time spent, rates charged, and services rendered by Mr. Weddle and his colleagues. Appellant, by contrast, presented the in-person testimony of Christopher Woods, a licensed Oklahoma attorney who offices in Tulsa. Mr. Woods presented testimony supporting the reasons he set forth in his affidavit as to why the lodestar attorney fee should be reduced rather than enhanced. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court reserved ruling on the attorney fee motion until the parties submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.
¶7 The trial court thereafter reviewed the proposed findings, conclusions, and orders, as well as Appellee's application for attorney fees, the Appellant's response, and other documents and exhibits. In its June 22, 2020 Order, the trial court made a detailed finding that the appropriate lodestar attorney fee to which Appellee was entitled was $221,407.50.1 Upon consideration of the factors set forth in Burk , 1979 OK 115, 598 P.2d 659, the trial court also found that Appellee was entitled to an astonishing $664,222.50, or 300%, fee enhancement-resulting in a total attorney fee award of $885,630.00.2 See June 22, 2020 Order at 3 () (cleaned up). Although the trial court's Order suggests that the trial court considered the in-person and written testimony of Mr. Woods, Appellant's fee expert, the trial court ultimately concluded that there should be no reduction in the lodestar attorney fee, and adopted the lodestar calculation set forth in Appellee's application.
¶8 This appeal timely followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶9 A trial court's award of attorney fees is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Parsons v. Volkswagen of America, Inc. , 2014 OK 111, ¶ 9, 341 P.3d 662, 666 ; Burk , 1979 OK 115, ¶ 22, 598 P.2d 659 (). "To reverse a trial court on the ground of abuse of discretion it...
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