Folsom v. Summer, Locatell & Co., 35253

• Decision Date: 27 September 1954
• Docket Number: No. 1,No. 35253,35253,1
• Citation: 90 Ga.App. 696,83 S.E.2d 855
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals
• Parties: W. J. FOLSOM, Sr., v. SUMMER, LOCATELL & CO., Inc

Page 855

83 S.E.2d 855

90 Ga.App. 696

W. J. FOLSOM, Sr., v. SUMMER, LOCATELL & CO., Inc.

No. 35253.

Court of Appeals of Georgia, Division No. 1.

Sept. 27, 1954.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. The law does not prohibit corporations from using the title 'architect.'

2. The contract sued on is not too vague and indefinite to be enforceable; therefore the court did not err in overruling the demurrers to the amended petition.

Summer, Locatell & Company, Inc. sued W. J. Folsom, Sr., for architectural fees allegedly due under a contract between the parties. The petition alleges that the plaintiff has completed its part of the contract, which is attached as an exhibit, and is entitled to the fees. It further alleges by amendment that its three executive officers are registered architects under the laws of Georgia, that the architectural services performed under the contract were under the personal direction and supervision of one or more of such executive officers; and that the specifications and general wroking drawings produced under the contract bear the individual signature and seal of one of said officers where required.

The defendant demurred to the amended petition on the ground that in the contract the plaintiff used the title 'architects,' which use was prohibited by law and constituted a misdemeanor, and that the illegal use of the word vitiated the contract and rendered it void; and on the ground that the contract is too vague and indefinite to be enforceable. The court overruled the demurrers, and the defendant excepts.

Hurt, Gaines & Baird, Atlanta, for plaintiff in error.

Smith, Field, Doremus & Ringel, Atlanta, for defendant in error.

FELTON, Chief Judge.

1. Code Ann.Supp. § 84-302, Ga.L.1952, pp. 457-461, provides: 'Except as otherwise provided in this Chapter, no person shall practice architecture in the State of Georgia or use the title 'architect' or 'registered architect' or any words, letters, figures, or any other device indicating or intending to imply that he or she is an architect without having qualified as required by this Chapter.' It is contended that this law prohibits the use of the word 'architect' by a corporation. We do not so construe the law. While the word 'person' may include a corporation, Code, § 102-103, that word as used in this instance is modified by the pronouns 'he' and 'she,' which restricts the meaning of the word as used in the law and which compels the construction that the word 'person' used in its context means natural persons only. If the General Assembly had intended to include corporations in the meaning of the word 'person' as used, it could have easily included the pronoun 'it' with the pronouns 'he' and 'she' or it could have, instead of using any pronouns at all, used the words 'such person.' It would be stretching the meanings of the unambiguous personal pronouns 'he' and 'she' to hold that they include an artificial person, especially when we all have at our disposal...