Foltz v. Pullman, Inc.
| Decision Date | 15 April 1974 |
| Citation | 319 A.2d 38 |
| Parties | Mary E. FOLTZ v. PULLMAN, INCORPORATED, a Delaware corporation, Successor by Merger to Swindell-Dressler Corporation, a former Pennsylvania corporation, and the Carborundum Company, a Delaware corporation, Successor by Merger to the Pangborn Company. |
| Court | Delaware Superior Court |
This is a wrongful death action arising our of the death of the plaintiff's husband. The defendants are Pullman, Inc., and the Carborundum Company. 1 Plaintiff alleges that defendants are responsible for the design, production, and installation of a new type of furnace system at the Phoenix Steel Corporation plant in Claymont, Delaware, where the decedent was employed. It is plaintiff's contention that the defendants' negligence in connection with the new furnace system caused the system to adversely affect the environmental conditions at the plant and that her husband's death was brought about on account of his exposure to these bad environmental conditions. Carborundum has moved for summary judgment contending that this action is barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel in that this action necessarily involves the litigation and determination of the question whether or not the employee died as a result of working conditions within the plant, a question which has previously been litigated and decided against the plaintiff.
On October 8, 1970, the plaintiff filed a petition with the Industrial Accident Board against her husband's employer seeking to recover workmen's compensation benefits for the 'dependents of a deceased worker.' A hearing was held on April 11, 1973. The plaintiff contended that her husband's death was due to an occupational disease which he had contracted as a result of the working conditions at the Phoenix Steel plant. In its decision of May 14, 1973, the Board denied the plaintiff's workmen's compensation claim against Phoenix Steel on the ground that she had failed to meet her burden of proving that her husband's death was due to his exposure to the working conditions at the plant. No appeal was taken from the Board's decision.
On September 30, 1971, which was a year and a half before the Industrial Accident Board rendered its decision, the plaintiff instituted this action for wrongful death. Assuming for the purposes of this motion for summary judgment that there could be an eventual finding in this case that negligence on the part of Carborundum resulted in the existence of adverse environmental conditions within the Phoenix Steel plant, Carborundum contends that the issue of proximate cause, i.e., whether or not the working conditions which were caused by defendants' alleged negligence actually resulted in the decedent's death, would still have to be litigated and decided. Carborundum argues that a determination as to proximate cause would necessarily involve the litigation and determination of whether or not the decedent's death was caused by any conditions within the plant. As this precise question has already been raised and decided against the plaintiff in her workmen's compensation claim against Phoenix Steel, Carborundum contends that the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel preclude the plaintiff from relitigating the question in this case.
Although the decisions of the Industrial Accident Board are res judicata under the provisions of 19 Del.C. § 2349 unless appealed within twenty days, General Motors Corporation v. Morgan, Del.Super., 286 A.2d 759 (1971), the effect, if any, which the Board's decision may have upon this case will be through the applicability of the doctrine of collateral estoppel rather than res judicata.
Res judicata and collateral estoppel are often used interchangeably due to the fact that they are both doctrines of public policy designed to put an end to litigation once a party has had his day in court and a full opportunity to present his case. There are, however, significant distinctions between the two doctrines. Under the doctine of res judicata, a judgment in a prior suit involving the same parties, or persons in privity with them, bars a second suit on the same cause of action. Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, on the other hand, a judgment in a prior suit does not operate to bar a subsequent cause of action but rather precludes in a subsequent suit on a different cause of action the relitigation of a factual issue which was litigated and decided in the prior suit between the same parties or persons in privity with them. See Tyndall v. Tyndall, Del.Supr., 238 A.2d 343 (1968). A further distinction between the two doctrines is that the bar of res judicata extends to all issues which might have been raised and decided in the first suit as well as to all issues that actually were decided whereas the bar of collateral estoppel is limited solely to those issues which were actually litigated and decided in the first suit.
Although Carborundum was not a party to the hearing before the Industrial Accident Board, it contends that it may assert the bar of collateral estoppel against the plaintiff, who was a party, inasmuch as Carborundum was in privity with the employer, which was a party-defendant before the Board. Carborundum also contends that it may raise the bar of collateral estoppel even if the Court were to rule that there was no privity between Carborundum and the employer since Delaware has abandoned the requirement of privity in cases where the bar is asserted by a stranger to the first suit, i.e., one who was neither a party to the first suit nor in privity with such a party, against a person who was either a party, or in privity with a party, to the prior suit.
The concept of privity pertains to the relationship between a party to a suit and a person who was not a party but whose interest in the action was such that he will be bound...
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