Fonda v. St. Paul City Ry. Co.

• Citation: 77 Minn. 336
• Decision Date: 01 August 1899
• Docket Number: Nos. 11,646 - (141).,s. 11,646 - (141).
• Parties: JAMES M. FONDA v. ST. PAUL CITY RAILWAY COMPANY.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

77 Minn. 336

JAMES M. FONDA v. ST. PAUL CITY RAILWAY COMPANY.

Nos. 11,646 - (141).

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

August 1, 1899.

Action in the district court for Ramsey county to recover $50,000 for personal injuries. The case was tried before Bunn, J., and a jury, which rendered a verdict in favor of plaintiff for $20,000; and from an order denying a motion for a new trial, defendant appealed. Affirmed.

Munn & Thygeson, for appellant.

Stevens, O'Brien, Cole & Albrecht, for respondent.

BUCK, J.

This action was brought to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained by reason of the negligence of the defendant in operating its cars upon Seventh street, in the city of St. Paul, and when plaintiff was about to take passage on one of defendant's said cars. The injuries were serious, resulting in the loss of a portion of both legs. This case was before this court upon a former appeal, 71 Minn. 438, 74 N. W. 166, where the facts were quite fully examined, and the law applicable to the case stated, except such new questions as have arisen on the second trial and will be referred to further on in this opinion. In the former opinion it was held that the evidence made a case for the jury. Upon a retrial the jury rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of $20,000. The defendant appealed.

One of the principal questions raised by appellant upon the evidence is that the testimony of the plaintiff is so radically different, as given upon the retrial, from that given upon the former trial, that it now appears that plaintiff was guilty of such contributory negligence as necessarily to change the true conclusion upon the question, hence that plaintiff should stand charged with such negligence as to bar his recovery in this action. We do not agree with the defendant's contention in this respect. We are of the opinion that there is no substantial or material difference in the plaintiff's evidence. And this opinion is substantiated by the evidence which we herewith produce, and is as follows:

                          Former Trial.                          Present Trial
                Just as I left the sidewalk to cross     As I stepped off the sidewalk I
                Seventh, I looked up and looked both     looked up. I looked both ways. I
                ways. I see a car approaching from       see a car approaching from the east
                the east over a block away, and I also   about a block or more away. I also
                looked the other way towards the         see a car coming from the west. That
                west, and there was a car coming         car was coming down nearly to the
                from that way too; and I walked out      west crosswalk of Seventh street
                on the rails, and my intention was, as   — coming down the grade. I walked
                I walked out there, to get across the    out there with the intention of getting
                rails before the east-bound car got      on, — crossing those tracks to get
                down there (the car I was going to       on the south side to take my eastbound
                take). As I walked out on the track,     car. As I walked out there, I
                that east-bound car got down there,      see I couldn't cross in front of the
                and I couldn't cross it. So I hesitated  east-bound car, so I started to walk
                a minute as the car got down by          around the tail end of it. Just as I
                me. Then I started to walk around        started to turn and took a few steps
                the tail end. Just as I started to       this west-bound car came along and
                walk around the tail end, and took a     struck me, and knocked me down
                few steps, this west-bound car came      * * *
                along, and struck me, and knocked
                me down. * * * I signalled as I
                walked on to the track. I signalled
                the east-bound car for the car to stop,
                — waved my hands like that [indicating]
                to the motorman.
                

                      Cross-Examination.                           Cross-Examination.
                Q. When you saw the car coming              Q. At the same time, or just as
                from the west, was that as you left         soon as you looked towards the east,
                the curbstone also?                         you looked towards the west then, did
                                                            you?
                A. Yes, about the same time.
                                                            A. About the same time; yes, sir.
                Q. How far away was that car?
                                                            Q. And you saw the east-bound car
                A. Well, it was nearly down to the          as you have described it?
                corner.
                                                            A. Coming down.
                Q. It was nearly down to the corner?
                                                            Q. You saw the east-bound car, I
                A. To this side of the middle of the        say, coming?
                block nearly to the corner.
                                                            A. Yes, sir.
                Q. Nearly to Seventh street?
                                                            Q. Well, did you watch the east-bound
                A. Nearly to Walnut street.                 car from that time on, or did
                                                            you simply walk across the street?
                Q. Well, how near Walnut street
                was it? Was it up to the west crosswalk?    A. I simply walked out there.
                A. I don't think it was quite.              Q. Didn't you pay any further attention
                                                            to the east-bound car?
                Q. Was it nearly up to the west
                crosswalk?                                  A. No, sir; I walked out there, and
                                                            I signalled for it to stop.
                A. It was down that way this side
                of the middle of the block along down
                the grade there.
                Q. And how far west of Walnut
                street was it?
                A. Well, I couldn't tell. I should
                imagine it was this side of the middle
                of the block.
                Q. You mean it was about the middle
                of the block?
                A. A little this side of the middle of
                the block.
                Q. How near this side, — as near as
                you can fix it?
                A. Well, I couldn't tell just how
                far. I know it was this side of the
                middle of the block. It was nearly
                down to the crosswalk.
                Q. It was nearly down to the west
                crosswalk of Seventh street?
                A. Yes, sir.
                Q. You are sure about that?
                A. Quite certain about it; yes, sir.
                

Upon the legal questions raised, so far as they appear and are discussed in the memorandum of the trial court, we adopt it as part of this opinion, as follows:

"The first point urged as error by defendant is the overruling of its objection to the question asked the witness Pierce at page 194 of the record. The fault in the question is alleged to be that the witness was asked to base his opinion of the distance within which the car could be stopped partly upon `the other circumstances as you observed them there on that day.' It seems to me that, in view of the evidence that had already been given in the case, including the evidence given by this witness, and especially in view of the fact that there was no dispute as to what the circumstances were, this was not, in effect, `leaving the witness to determine upon what he would base his testimony.' There was absolutely no conflict as to what the `other circumstances were there on that day.' The only circumstance over which there was a dispute was the condition of the track, — whether it was good or bad; and the witness had testified that it was a good track. This disposes of the objections to the use of the words, `in the condition the track then was,' as it is clear that a good track was meant. While it is unquestionably the rule that the opinion of an expert witness must be based upon the testimony in the case, or, in the absence of that, upon facts which are disclosed to the court and jury, in order that the jury may know the facts upon which the witness bases his opinion, and thereby be able to give it the proper weight, depending on their decision of whether the facts are true or false, yet this rule is not merely technical, and, where the reason for its strict application does not exist, it cannot be error to fail to apply it strictly. In this case, granting that the question is technically faulty, because it referred to the facts observed by the witness, instead of the facts disclosed by the testimony, it seems to me to be a certainty, in view of the lack of conflict as to what the...