Fonseca v. Spraying Sys. Co.

• Decision Date: 11 June 2020
• Docket Number: Case No. 18 CV 7779
• Parties: Maria G. FONSECA, Plaintiff, v. SPRAYING SYSTEMS CO., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

466 F.Supp.3d 834

Maria G. FONSECA, Plaintiff,

v.SPRAYING SYSTEMS CO., Defendant.

Case No. 18 CV 7779

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.

Signed June 11, 2020

Anthony J. Peraica, Joseph Peter DiPasquale, Anthony J. Peraica & Associates, Ltd., Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff.

Arthur M. Holtzman, Donald J. Moran, Naureen Amjad, Pedersen & Houpt, P.C., Chicago, IL, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

John Robert Blakey, United States District Judge Plaintiff Maria Fonseca sues her former employer, Spraying Systems Co., alleging disability discrimination (Count I), retaliation in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (Count II) and Title VII (Count III), and breach of contract (Count IV). See [1]. Defendant moves for summary judgment on all counts, [34]. For the reasons explained below, this Court grants Defendant's motion.

I. BACKGROUND ¹

A. Plaintiff's Job and Performance

Defendant Spraying Systems designs and manufactures spray technology, including spray nozzles and accessories. [36] at ¶ 2; [40-2] at 9. Plaintiff worked for Defendant from July 13, 1981 until February 16, 2017 as a machine operator or "Assembler/Utility Operator" (hereinafter, Assembler). [36] at ¶¶ 1, 15. Assemblers work within the Boom Components Department, a department Defendant characterizes as "light duty," as numerous employees with medical restrictions work there. Id. at ¶ 19.

In her capacity as an Assembler, Plaintiff set up training and operated machines such as the QJ360 flow line. Id. at ¶ 20. The job required her to stand, observe, and operate controls constantly; to walk and lift or carry occasionally; to push or pull, bend or stoop, and reach periodically; and to talk frequently. Id. at ¶ 20. She reported directly to Bill Larsen. Id. at ¶ 18.

During Plaintiff's employment, Defendant maintained a Policies and Procedures Manual, which contained, among other provisions, an "Employment at Will" provision, stating that:

[e]mployment at will provides that the employment relationship is deemed to be for an indefinite duration and may be terminated by either party at any time, for any reason or for no reason at all. No oral or written promises regarding any terms or conditions of employment can be made, or should be relied on, except for those made in writing by a designated officer of the organization.

Id. at ¶ 6; [37-4] at 3. The Manual also contained a "disclaimer," stating that it was "not intended to create any contractual rights in favor of [the employee] or the company," and a reservation, whereby Defendant reserved the right "to change the terms of these policies and procedures at any time." [36] at ¶ 7.

Defendant's Manual also contained a discipline provision, which provided that employees: "may be separated from the Company with or without recourse to the following disciplinary procedures": (1) verbal warning of supervisor; (2) written warning of supervisor and Human Resources Department – copy to be placed in employee's file; (3) written report with days off with or without pay – copy to be placed in employee's file; or (4) discharge. Id. at ¶ 9. The provision further provided that all "violations of Company rules are subject to any of the above-mentioned penalties depending on their severity." Id. The Manual lists various "personal conduct violations" including but not limited to "insubordination," "misconduct," "repeated violation of shop or safety rules," "nonproductive performance violations," including but not limited to "refusal to perform assigned tasks," "lack of cooperation with management and co-workers," and "any violations of commonly accepted principles" or "commonly accepted job responsibilities" not listed above. Id. at ¶ 10.

Plaintiff received Defendant's Manual upon hire and signed acknowledgment forms specifically stating that she read and understood the Disciplinary Procedures Policy and Rules for Personal Conduct. Id. at ¶ 11. Plaintiff knew that violations of Defendant's policies were "subject to any of the progressive disciplinary steps, but not necessarily all of steps in every circumstance." Id. at ¶ 14.

In addition, Plaintiff, like all other employees in her division, signed a Manufacturing Center/Flowline Team Member's Agreement ("Team Member Agreement"). Id. at ¶ 12. The Team Member Agreement listed certain "commitments" made by the team member (employee) and certain "commitments" made by the company, both "in the spirit of developing mission driven manufacturing center flowline teams." [37-6] at 2.

Throughout her employment, Plaintiff received numerous performance reviews noting issues with attendance and low productivity. [36] at ¶ 16. Plaintiff does not dispute that she received such reviews but does dispute that she deserved them. See [39] at ¶ 16. Likewise, throughout her employment, Plaintiff received verbal and written warnings for performance issues such as carelessness, incorrectly shipping an order, leaving her work area, low production with an assembly rate less than 50 percent, and disobedience. [36] at ¶ 17. Again, Plaintiff does not dispute that she received such warnings, but she disputes that she deserved them. [39] at ¶ 17. In the record before this Court, however, she does not explain why she thinks her negative performance evaluations and warnings were undeserved; nor does she otherwise properly support such opinions with evidence.

B. Plaintiff's Injury & Work Restrictions

In July or August 2013, Plaintiff injured her right arm while working the QJ17560 machine.² [36] at ¶ 21. Afterward, she filed a workers’ compensation claim and advised Defendant about the injury. Id. at ¶ 22. Defendant accommodated Plaintiff by providing her with six weeks of paid leave in 2013, during which time Plaintiff sought medical treatment. Id. at ¶ 23.

Plaintiff's doctors recommended a course of treatment involving cortisone injections, physical therapy, a brace, pain relievers, and anti-inflammatory ointment; and later, her treaters recommended surgery, though they never expected surgery to cure Plaintiff's condition completely. Id. at ¶¶ 26–27. In July 2016, Plaintiff had surgery, followed by months of physical therapy. Id. at ¶ 28. Defendant accommodated Plaintiff in 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2016 by giving her light duty work, and accommodated her in 2016 by providing her with several months of leave after her surgery. Id. at ¶ 29. Plaintiff returned to work November 16, 2016. Id.

During the period from her injury in July or August of 2013 to the time she returned to work in late 2016, Plaintiff saw at least eight different physicians for treatment. Id. at ¶ 24. Defendant claims that Plaintiff would switch to a new doctor every time she disagreed with her doctor's recommendations for restrictions or a return to work. Id. at ¶ 25. Plaintiff disputes this, contending that she saw some doctors of her own choosing and other doctors because the company insisted upon it. [39] at ¶ 25. Plaintiff testified at her deposition, however, that she saw numerous doctors because she "wouldn't believe what they were telling [her] about the tendon." [37-3] at 23.

During this same period, Plaintiff's doctors issued various medical restrictions, with certain of her restrictions becoming permanent in November 2016. [36] at ¶ 30. On November 16, 2016, Plaintiff's treating physician, Dr. Erling Ho, released Plaintiff to return to work with permanent restrictions as follows: no lifting 37 lbs. or more; no pushing or pulling 37 lbs. or more; and no over the shoulder work greater than 17 lbs. Id. at ¶ 31; [37-19] at 8. Dr. Ho's November 16, 2016 note also referenced Plaintiff's "FCE," which everyone agrees refers to the FCA Summary Report dated November 2, 2016; that report indicated that Plaintiff could "attempt a return to work within the FCA guidelines from a functional standpoint, pending physician recommendations." [37-19] at 18. The FCA Summary Report includes Plaintiff's physical therapist's determination that Plaintiff should functionally be limited to occasional bending/stooping, squatting, crawling, crouching, balancing, and simple, firm, and fine grasping with her right hand; according to the FCA, she could perform all grasping frequently with her left hand. Id. at 18–19.

On January 16, 2017, Dr. Ho issued another note, releasing Plaintiff to return to work with permanent restrictions that remained largely the same as those specified in the November 16, 2016 note, with a couple of additions. [36] at ¶ 32; [37-19] at 10. The new note added a restriction on repetitive work with her right hand/arm and also said that Plaintiff "should refrain from using machine[s] and air guns." [37-19] at 10. Plaintiff's supervisor, Bill Larsen, indicated that, when he saw this note, he thought "this covers everything we do." [40-2] at 31.

Rather than giving up on Plaintiff, Defendant's human resources administrator, Dana Dixon, reached out to Dr. Ho for clarification, to determine whether the "no machines" restriction included "even just pushing a button." [36] at ¶ 33; [40-6] at 19–20. Dixon testified that the company operated several different types of machines and needed to know whether Plaintiff really could not work on any of them, or if she could work on some that the company considered "light duty" or "very light duty." [40-6] at 20. Dixon testified that the company needed to know Plaintiff's restrictions so it could properly accommodate her medical needs. Id. at 21.

In response to Dixon's inquiry, Dr. Ho issued another note on January 20, 2017 clarifying that Plaintiff could operate machines as long as the "machine work" complied with her permanent restrictions and the restrictions in the FCA Summary Report. [37-19] at 16; [36] at ¶ 34. The note reiterated, however, that Plaintiff could not use "any air guns." [37-19] at 16. Dixon testified that, consistent with this note, the company believed Plaintiff could use machines, as long as such use fell within her FCA and restrictions. [40-6] at 21.

In an...