Strong v. Quest Diagnostics Clinical Labs., Inc.

• Decision Date: 02 February 2021
• Docket Number: No. 19-CV-4519,19-CV-4519
• Parties: THELMA STRONG, Plaintiff, v. QUEST DIAGNOSTICS CLINICAL LABORATORIES, INC., a Delaware corporation, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

THELMA STRONG, Plaintiff, v. QUEST DIAGNOSTICS CLINICAL LABORATORIES, INC.,

a Delaware corporation, Defendant.

No. 19-CV-4519

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

February 2, 2021

Judge John J. Tharp, Jr.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Thelma Strong sued her former employer, Quest Diagnostics Clinical Laboratories, Inc. ("Quest") for violations of the ADA, FMLA, and Title VII. Quest moves to dismiss the complaint in its entirety. For the reasons discussed below, Quest's motion to dismiss is granted.

BACKGROUND

For the purposes of this motion, the court accepts all of the plaintiff's factual allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in her favor. Ms. Strong began working at Quest as a Patient Services Representative in 2005. Compl. ¶ 10, ECF No. 1. In her thirteen years at Quest, she suffered a series of injuries, both in the workplace and outside of it, resulting in three periods of leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"). In 2012, Quest approved Strong's first FMLA leave for her recovery following foot surgery. Id. ¶ 12. Upon her return, after 12 weeks of leave, Strong was informed that a new employee had filled her position and that she would be transferred to Quest's Saint Elizabeth Hospital location. Id. ¶ 15.

In August 11, 2014, Strong fell off a chair that broke at work and was diagnosed three days later with a consequent lower-back injury as well as carpal tunnel from her routine work. Id. ¶¶ 16, 18. The complaint does not allege that her doctor indicated that she should not or could not return to work, or that she needed any accommodations to do so, but Strong requested medical leave and reasonable accommodations for her back injury and carpal tunnel. Quest denied that request, informing Strong that she would be terminated if she took time off work. Id. ¶ 20.

While at work a week later, on August 21, 2014, Strong was accidentally punctured with a needle that had been used for a patient's sexually transmitted disease testing. Id. ¶ 21. Although the allegations of the complaint are not clear on this point, it appears that the clinic where Strong was taken for blood testing performed the wrong test, prolonging the period of uncertainty Strong had to endure with respect to whether she had been infected. Id. ¶ 22. The complaint does not allege that Strong was infected, or how long it took to confirm the lack of infection, but Strong alleges that the anxiety she experienced as a result of this incident caused "severe depression that greatly affected her sleep, resulting in medication prescriptions." Id. ¶ 23. On August 23, 2014, two days after the incident, a psychiatrist diagnosed Strong as suffering from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder ("PTSD") and recommended 12 weeks of medical leave. Id. ¶¶ 26-27. Following her PTSD diagnosis, Quest approved Strong's request to take FMLA leave to recover. Id. ¶ 27.¹

In November 2014, Strong submitted a workers' compensation claim related to her recent workplace injuries, which Quest denied a month later. Id. ¶¶ 29, 33. Strong returned to work in December 2014. Id. ¶ 31. She alleges that she "was able to continue her daily tasks despite recent injuries," id. ¶ 31, but "continued to suffer mental health and physical impairments, including but not limited to a lower back disability, carpal tunnel syndrome and loss of sleep relative to PTSD,"id. ¶ 32. Strong continued to work at Quest's Oak Park facility for the next year.² In December 2015, Strong's supervisor, David White, informed her that she would be transferred to Quest's Wabash Avenue location due to a colleague's complaint about her. Id. ¶ 35. The complaint does not describe the nature of the complaint, but Strong alleges, on information and belief, that she was transferred "because her immediate colleagues were unwilling to accommodate her PTSD and workplace injuries." ¶ 36.

In November 2017, Quest granted Strong's request to take 12 weeks of FMLA leave due to her mother's declining health and death. Id. ¶ 38. In March 2018, Cigna contacted Strong to notify her that her FMLA leave was concluding soon and that she needed to return to work. Id. ¶ 39. Two weeks after her return from leave, on March 28, 2018, Strong's supervisor, Latisha Martin, presented her with a document listing Strong's prior discipline due to instances of disruptive behavior in 2016 and 2017.³ Id. ¶ 40. These instances included alleged tardiness for work, use of a cell phone while drawing a patient's blood, allowing Strong's daughter to run around the laboratory while patients were present, and taking personal calls while patients were waiting to be seen. Id. On May 23, 2018, Martin issued Strong with written discipline after Strong was reportedly seen placing confidential patient information in the trash. Id. ¶ 41. On August 7, 2018, Martin issued Strong with written discipline for the same offense. Id. ¶ 42. The next day, August 8, 2018, Quest informed Strong that she was being terminated. Id. ¶ 44. Quest did not provide anywritten documentation or formal reason for the termination. Id. Strong maintains that she was a stellar employee. Id. ¶ 43.

On April 4, 2019, Strong filed a charge with the EEOC, alleging disability-based discrimination and retaliation against Quest. Pl.'s Ex. 1, ECF No. 1-1. After receiving her right-to-sue notice from the EEOC, Strong filed the present suit on July 3, 2019.

DISCUSSION

As an initial matter, it is necessary to clarify two points that inform whether Strong's complaint may proceed. First, the parties' briefs do not distinguish between "claims" and "counts." A "claim" is 'the aggregate of operative facts which give rise to a right enforceable in the courts.'" Florek v. Village of Mundelein, 649 F.3d 594, 599 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Original Ballet Russe v. Ballet Theatre, 133 F.2d 187, 189 (2d Cir. 1943)). Claims "explain the plaintiff's grievance and demand relief," whereas counts "describe theories by which those facts purportedly give rise to liability and damages." Volling v. Antioch Rescue Squad, 999 F. Supp. 2d 991, 996 (N.D. Ill. 2013). Under the federal rules, a court may dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim but may not strike individual legal theories from the complaint. Zurbriggen v. Twin Hill Acquisition Co., 455 F. Supp. 3d 702, 719 (N.D. Ill. 2020); see also BBL, Inc. v. City of Angola, 809 F.3d 317, 325 (7th Cir. 2015) ("A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) doesn't permit piecemeal dismissals of parts of claims; the question at this stage is simply whether the complaint includes factual allegations that state a plausible claim for relief.") What is at issue in a 12(b)(6) motion is the plausibility of the claim (or claims) under some theory—whether or not expressly identified in the complaint—not the viability of each legal theory identified in the complaint. Thus, to grant a motion to dismiss, the court must find that no legal theory plausibly supports the claim being challenged.

Second, a complaint must provide a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2). A claim "may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint," but a "formulaic recitation" of a cause of action's elements will not suffice. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 563 (2007). Put simply, though detailed factual allegations are not required, "to survive a motion to dismiss, a claim must be plausible." Divane v. Northwestern University, 953 F.3d 980, 987-88 (7th Cir. 2020).

Strong's facts give rise to three potential claims against Quest: disability-based discrimination, retaliation for taking FMLA leave and filing a worker's compensation claim, and being subjected to a hostile work environment. Strong brings four counts based on these claims: disability discrimination in violation of the ADA (Count I); violation of the FMLA (Count II); Title VII hostile work environment (Count III); and Title VII retaliation (Count IV). The Court addresses each count in the context of its associated claim, rather than chronologically.

1. ADA Discrimination

Strong alleges that Quest discriminated against her in violation of the ADA. To set forth an ADA discrimination claim, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that "(1) he is 'disabled'; (2) he is qualified to perform the essential function of the job either with or without reasonable accommodation; and (3) he suffered an adverse employment action because of his disability." Gogos v. AMS Mechanical Systems, Inc., 737 F.3d 1170, 1172 (7th Cir. 2013).

As an initial mater, Strong's ADA claim is governed by a 300-day statute of limitations, meaning that Strong was required to file her EEOC charge within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory action. Stepney v. Naperville School Dist. 203, 392 F.3d 236, 239 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting that because the ADA's enforcement provision incorporates that of Title VII, ADAdiscrimination claims are also subject to the same 300-day statute of limitations). Strong filed her EEOC charge on April 4, 2019, rendering June 8, 2018 the cut-off date for any actionable ADA discrimination. The complaint alleges only two actions by Quest after that date: the "written discipline" Strong received on August 7, 2018, after she was reportedly seen improperly discarding confidential patient information and Strong's termination the next day, on August 8, 2018.

Quest argues that Strong has failed to establish she was disabled within the meaning of the ADA in the eight months leading up to and at the time of her termination. A plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to plausibly show she is disabled. Gogos, 737 F.3d at 1172. Under the ADA, a disability is defined as either "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities," "a record of such impairment," or "being regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(...