Fontana v. Jones

• Decision Date: 12 July 2017
• Docket Number: Case No. 3:15cv494/RV/CJK
• Parties: JOSEPH CHRISTIAN FONTANA, Petitioner, v. JULIE JONES, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida

JOSEPH CHRISTIAN FONTANA, Petitioner, v. JULIE JONES, Respondent.

Case No. 3:15cv494/RV/CJK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA PENSACOLA DIVISION

July 12, 2017

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Before the court is a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1). Respondent filed an answer, submitting relevant portions of the state court record. (Doc. 18). Petitioner replied. (Doc. 22). The matter is referred to the undersigned magistrate judge for report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 72.2(B). After careful consideration of all issues raised by petitioner, the undersigned concludes that no evidentiary hearing is required for the disposition of this matter. Rule 8(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. The undersigned further concludes that the pleadings and attachments before the court show that petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief, and that the petition should be denied.

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On November 15, 2010, petitioner was charged in Santa Rosa County Circuit Court Case No. 09-CF-803, with sexual battery of a child while in a position of familial or custodial authority (Counts 1, 2 and 3); lewd or lascivious molestation of a child less than 16 years of age (Count 4); lewd or lascivious exhibition in the presence of a child less than 16 years of age (Count 5); lewd or lascivious conduct (Count 6); and solicitation of a child to commit sexual battery while in a position of familial or custodial authority (Counts 7 and 8). (Doc. 18, Ex. A, pp. 195-98).¹ The charges stemmed from petitioner's sexually abusing a boy, T.M.E., over a three-year period.

Petitioner went to trial on December 7, 2011. (Exs. J, K, L). After the State rested, the trial court granted a judgment of acquittal on Count 6. (Ex. K, pp. 316-21 (trial transcript); Ex. E, p. 845 (judgment)). The jury found petitioner guilty as charged of the remaining seven offenses. (Ex. E, pp. 820-21). Petitioner was sentenced as a sexual predator to consecutive terms of 30 years in prison on Counts 1, 2 and 3; 15 years in prison on Counts 4 and 5; and 5 years in prison on Counts 7and 8, for a total of 130 years in prison. (Ex. E, pp. 845-51). Petitioner's sentences were ordered to run consecutive to the sentences imposed in Case No. 09-CF-804, a case involving petitioner's sexual abuse of the victim's half-brother. (Id.). The Florida First District Court of Appeal (First DCA) affirmed the judgment on March 22, 2013, per curiam and without a written opinion. Fontana v. State, 109 So. 3d 209 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (Table) (copy at Ex. O).

On April 4, 2014, petitioner filed in the First DCA a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. (Ex. P). The First DCA per curiam denied the petition on April 28, 2014, in a one-sentence opinion stating: "The petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is denied on the merits." Fontana v. State, 138 So. 3d 507 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (copy at Ex. Q).

On May 15, 2014, petitioner filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, which he amended on February 18, 2015. (Doc. 1, p. 3; Doc. 18, Ex. R). The state circuit court denied relief without an evidentiary hearing. (Ex. R, p. 19 - Ex. S, p. 337). The First DCA summarily affirmed, per curiam and without a written opinion. Fontana v. State, 175 So. 3d289 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (Table) (copy at Ex. T). The mandate issued October 27, 2015. (Ex. T).

Petitioner filed his federal habeas petition on October 30, 2015. (Doc. 1, p. 1). The petition raises four claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Respondent asserts that petitioner is not entitled to relief, because the state court's rejection of his claims was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, nor was the state court's decision based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence in the state court record. (Doc. 18, pp. 15-34).

RELEVANT LEGAL STANDARDS

Section 2254 Standard of Review

Federal courts may issue habeas corpus relief for persons in state custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). Pub. L. 104-32, § 104, 110 Stat. 1214, 1218-19. Section 2254(d) provides, in relevant part:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim-(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2011).

The United States Supreme Court explained the framework for § 2254 review in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 146 L. Ed. 2d 389 (2000).² The appropriate test was described by Justice O'Connor as follows:

Under the "contrary to" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the "unreasonable application" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.

Id., 529 U.S. at 412-13 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

Employing the Williams framework, on any issue raised in a federal habeas petition upon which there has been an adjudication on the merits in a state court proceeding, the federal court must first ascertain the "clearly established Federal law," namely, "the governing legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court render[ed] its decision." Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72, 123 S. Ct. 1166, 155 L. Ed. 2d 144 (2003). The law is "clearly established" only when a Supreme Court holding at the time of the state court decision embodies the legal principle at issue. Thaler v. Haynes, 559 U.S. 43, 47, 130 S. Ct. 1171, 175 L. Ed. 2d 1003 (2010); Woods v. Donald, 575 U.S. —, —, 135 S. Ct. 1372, 1376, 191 L. Ed. 2d 464 (2015) ("We have explained that clearly established Federal law for purposes of § 2254(d)(1) includes only the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of this Court's decisions." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

After identifying the governing legal principle(s), the federal court determines whether the state court adjudication is contrary to the clearly established Supreme Court case law. The adjudication is not contrary to Supreme Court precedent merely because it fails to cite to that precedent. Rather, the adjudication is "contrary" only if either the reasoning or the result contradicts the relevant Supreme Court cases.Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8, 123 S. Ct. 362, 154 L. Ed. 2d 263 (2002) ("Avoiding th[e] pitfalls [of § 2254(d)(1)] does not require citation to our cases - indeed, it does not even require awareness of our cases, so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts them."). Where there is no Supreme Court precedent on point, the state court's conclusion cannot be contrary to clearly established federal law. See Woods, 135 S. Ct. at 1377 (holding, as to claim that counsel was per se ineffective in being absent from the courtroom for ten minutes during testimony concerning other defendants: "Because none of our cases confront the specific question presented by this case, the state court's decision could not be contrary to any holding from this Court." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). If the state court decision is contrary to clearly established federal law, the federal habeas court must independently consider the merits of the petitioner's claim. See Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 954, 127 S. Ct. 2842, 168 L. Ed. 2d 662 (2007).

If the "contrary to" clause is not satisfied, the federal habeas court next determines whether the state court "unreasonably applied" the governing legal principles set forth in the Supreme Court's cases. The federal court defers to the state court's reasoning unless the state court's application of the legal principle(s)was "objectively unreasonable" in light of the record before the state court. Williams, 529 U.S. at 409; see Holland v. Jackson, 542 U.S. 649, 652, 124 S. Ct. 2736, 159 L. Ed. 2d 683 (2004) (per curiam). In applying this standard, the Supreme Court has emphasized:

When reviewing state criminal convictions on collateral review, federal judges are required to afford state courts due respect by overturning their decisions only when there could be no reasonable dispute that they were wrong. Federal habeas review thus exists as "a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal." Harrington, supra, at 102-103, 131 S. Ct. 770 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Woods, 135 S. Ct. at 1376 (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 131 S. Ct. 770, 178 L. Ed. 2d 624 (2011)).

Section 2254(d) also allows federal habeas relief for a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court where that adjudication "resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). The "unreasonable determination of the facts" standard is implicated only to the extent the...