Fontanillas-Lopez v. Morel Bauza Cartagena & Dapena LLC, Civ. No. 12–1206PG.

• Decision Date: 18 November 2014
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 12–1206PG.
• Citation: 59 F.Supp.3d 420
• Parties: Lourdes Del Rosario FONTANILLAS–LOPEZ, Plaintiff, v. MOREL BAUZA CARTAGENA & DAPENA LLC, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

59 F.Supp.3d 420

Lourdes Del Rosario FONTANILLAS–LOPEZ, Plaintiff

v.MOREL BAUZA CARTAGENA & DAPENA LLC, et al., Defendants.

Civ. No. 12–1206PG.

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

Signed Nov. 18, 2014.

Ruben T. Nigaglioni, Nigaglioni Law Offices PSC, Monica L. Vega–Quintana, Monica Vega Law Offices PSC, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff.

Raymond E. Morales–Ortiz, Rosangela O. Sanfilippo–Resumil, Morell, Bauza, Cartagena & Dapena, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

JUAN M. PEREZ–GIMENEZ, District Judge.

Before the court is the defendants' motion for attorney fees (Docket No. 98,) the plaintiff's response (Docket No. 103) and the defendants' reply thereto (Docket No. 106). For the reasons explained below, the court GRANTS IN PART the defendants' request.

I. BACKGROUND

On March 23, 2012, plaintiff Lourdes del Rosario Fontanillas–Lopez (hereinafter “Plaintiff” or “Fontanillas”), along with her parents Mildred Milagros Lopez and Luis Alfredo Fontanillas,¹ filed the above-captioned claim pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”), against Plaintiff's former employer Morell, Bauzá, Cartagena & Dapena (“MBCD” or “the Firm”) and individual defendants Pedro Antonio Morell (“Morell”), Antonio Bauzá (“Bauzá”), Edgardo Cartagena (“Cartagena”), Ramon E. Dapena (“Dapena”), and Lourdes M. Vázquez (“Vázquez”) (collectively referred to as “Defendants”). The Plaintiff alleged she was the victim of discrimination on the basis of gender, a hostile work environment and retaliation for engaging in protected conduct. See Docket No. 1. The Plaintiff also invoked supplemental jurisdiction over her state law claims under several statutes.

On February 7, 2014, 995 F.Supp.2d 21 (D.P.R.2014), the court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed Plaintiff's claims under Title VII with prejudice, and the supplemental state law claims without prejudice. See Docket No. 94. Having prevailed, the Defendants now seek to recover the attorney fees and costs incurred in their defense of Plaintiff's claims. See Docket No. 98. The Plaintiff opposed their motion arguing that the settlement negotiations that took place evince that her claim was not unfounded, frivolous or otherwise unreasonable; that the amount requested is excessive; and, that the request is inadequately documented. See Docket No. 103. The Defendants replied in turn. See Docket No. 106.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Attorney Fees

1. Fee Entitlement

Per the so-called “American Rule,” litigants must generally bear their own attorney fees and costs. See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 415, 98 S.Ct. 694, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978) ; Bercovitch v. Baldwin School, 191 F.3d 8, 10 (1st Cir.1999). However, Congress has created an exception for prevailing parties in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title VII cases, authorizing the award of attorney fees as part of the costs. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1988 and 2000e–5(k) ; see also Christiansburg Garment Co., 434 U.S. at 422, 98 S.Ct. 694 ; Tejada–Batista v. Fuentes–Agostini, 263 F.Supp.2d 321, 326 (D.P.R.2003). Insofar as this was an action under Title VII, the relevant statute provides that:

[i]n any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the Commission or the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee ... as part of the costs,....

42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(k).

“[A]n award of fees in favor of a prevailing plaintiff in a civil rights suit is ‘the rule, whereas fee-shifting in favor of a prevailing defendant is the exception.’ ” Lamboy–Ortiz v. Ortiz–Velez, 630 F.3d 228, 235–236 (1st Cir.2010) (citing Casa Marie Hogar Geriatrico v. Rivera–Santos, 38 F.3d 615, 618 (1st Cir.1994) ); see also Irving v. Town of Camden, No. 12–1850, 2013 WL 7137518, at *1 (1st Cir. April 17, 2013). “The Supreme Court has held in a Title VII employment discrimination case that attorney's fees may not be awarded to a prevailing defendant unless there is a ‘finding that the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation’ or that ‘plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so.’ ” Bercovitch, 191 F.3d at 10 (citing Christiansburg Garment Co., 434 U.S. at 421, 98 S.Ct. 694 ). See also Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 n. 2, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983) (“A prevailing defendant may recover an attorney's fee only where the suit was vexatious, frivolous, or brought to harass or embarrass the defendant.”). Notwithstanding, the Supreme Court has cautioned district courts to “resist the understandable temptation to engage in post hoc reasoning by concluding that, because a plaintiff did not ultimately prevail, his action must have been unreasonable or without foundation.” Christiansburg Garment Co., 434 U.S. at 421–422, 98 S.Ct. 694.

In the case at hand, the Defendants clarify in their reply that their request for attorney fees is not grounded on the argument that the Plaintiff's suit was frivolous from the beginning. Instead, the Defendants contend that it became clear once discovery ensued that the Plaintiff's claim held no water. See Docket No. 106 at page 2 n. 1. Hence, the Defendants only seek to recover the attorney fees incurred for the work performed after they sent the Plaintiff a letter pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.² See id.

When considering the reasonableness of a plaintiff's decision to continue to litigate after a claim has clearly become frivolous, unreasonable or groundless as the basis for an attorney fees award, the First Circuit has held that a court must find, at a minimum, that “following the filing of the claim, circumstances changed to such an extent that a reasonable person could not help but conclude that the claim was no longer viable.” Lamboy–Ortiz, 630 F.3d at 242. “Such a change would include, for example, the receipt of evidence in the course of discovery establishing a complete defense, or a development in the controlling law that foreclosed the claim.” Id. In the course of this analysis, however, “[g]reat caution must be taken in assessing whether a claim ‘clearly’ became untenable prior to the close of suit because of the particular danger of hindsight logic.” Id. at 241.

The complaint in this case contained allegations stating that the Plaintiff was the victim of sex discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII on the part of the Defendants. After discovery commenced, the Defendants requested that Plaintiff voluntarily dismiss her Title VII claims against the individual co-defendants during a status conference held on December 18, 2012. See Docket No. 36. The court granted the Plaintiff until January 15, 2013 to do so. Id. However, the deadline elapsed and Plaintiff failed to move for such a dismissal. The individual co-defendants were thus forced to file a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure insofar as it is clearly-established law that there is no individual employee liability under Title VII. See Docket No. 41.

Shortly after granting the dismissal of these claims, see Docket No. 53, the court met with the parties and discussed the content of several motions for sanctions that were on record. During the course of this conference on April 5th, 2013, the court expressed its dissatisfaction with Plaintiff's litigation tactics and threatened her with sanctions. See Docket No. 54.

After the conclusion of discovery proceedings, the Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on July 26, 2013. See Docket No. 63. The court notes that the arguments set forth of this motion are indeed very similar to the content of the Rule 11 letter the Defendants sent to the Plaintiff seven months earlier and now attach to their motion for attorney fees, see Docket No. 98–2. After careful review, the court later discussed the merits of the pending motion for summary judgment with the parties during a pre-trial conference held on September 24th, 2013. The court forewarned the Plaintiff of the possibility that her claims be summarily dismissed and that attorney fees be awarded to the Defendants upon dismissal. See Docket No. 84. And although the court encouraged the parties to entertain a settlement transaction that would put an end to the litigation before the court engaged in the time-consuming effort of rendering an opinion and order on the pending motion, their efforts proved fruitless. Instead, the Plaintiff attempted to bypass this court's instructions and filed a motion requesting the dismissal with prejudice of her claims without the imposition of costs and attorney fees, see Docket No. 86, before formally rejecting the Defendants' proposed stipulation of dismissal, see Docket No. 88. However, she knew all too well that the Defendants were unwilling to have her claims be dismissed and waive the possibility of recovering attorney fees. Yet she proceeded anyways. See Docket No. 89.

Upon learning of the Defendants' opposition to have her claims be dismissed on such terms, the court denied the Plaintiff's request for voluntary dismissal, see Docket No. 90, and eventually granted the Defendants' motion for summary judgment, see Docket No. 94. In fact, the court found that the Plaintiff was unable to establish a prima facie case of either discrimination based on sex or retaliation under Title VII. See id.

When determining if the Plaintiff here continued to litigate her suit beyond the point when it clearly became frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation, the court must acknowledge that the survival of summary judgment “has some value in determining whether a claim was or became unreasonable or without foundation.” Lamboy–Ortiz, 630 F.3d at 242.

Where fees are sought by a prevailing defendant against an unsuccessful plaintiff in a civil rights case, one relevant factor will often be whether the plaintiff succeeded in making out a prima facie case—a circumstance which may well prompt a reviewing tribunal to ask

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