Fontham v. McKeithen
Decision Date | 07 December 1971 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 71-2631. |
Citation | 336 F. Supp. 153 |
Parties | Michael R. FONTHAM et al. v. John J. McKEITHEN, Governor of the State of Louisiana and Member of the Board of Voter Registration, et al. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana |
Michael R. Fontham, New Orleans, La., for plaintiffs.
Weldon A. Cousins, Asst. Atty. Gen., State of Louisiana, New Orleans, La., for defendants McKeithen, Aycock, Garrett, Gremillion, Papale and Bankston.
John Mamoulides, Jacob J. Amato, Jr., Asst. Dist. Attys., Parish of Jefferson, Gretna, La., for defendant, Altobello.
Before WISDOM, Circuit Judge, and WEST and GORDON, District Judges.
A three-judge court was convened in this matter to consider the constitutionality of various Louisiana durational residency requirements as pre-conditions for voter eligibility in a State general election. Plaintiffs seek to enjoin officers of the State of Louisiana from enforcing State statutes which are allegedly in violation of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the United States Constitution.
Louisiana maintains durational residency requirements for voting in State elections. In order to be eligible to register to vote, a prospective voter must have been a resident of the State for one year and of the Parish for six months preceding the election in which he seeks to vote.1 Plaintiffs satisfy all other requirements for voter eligibility except durational residency.2
Louisiana law also provides for a temporary suspension of voter eligibility upon a change of political party affiliation.3 A voter who changes party affiliation is not permitted to vote for a period of six months in any primary held by the party to which he has changed. However, an independent, a person registered to vote without declaration of party affiliation, may change his registration and vote immediately in the primary election of his new party without becoming subject to the six month suspension of voter eligibility.
Plaintiffs' complaint, therefore, attacks the requirements of (1) one year state residency; (2) six month parish residency; and (3) six month suspension of voter eligibility upon change of party affiliation. Particularly, it is alleged that Louisiana has no compelling state interest in imposing the requirements complained of, and that the requirements are violative of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses in that they unduly restrict the right to vote and the right to travel guaranteed by the United States Constitution. It is the decision of this Court that plaintiffs' attacks on the statutes in question fail to overcome the presumption of constitutionality afforded the statutes and that the relief sought by plaintiffs should be denied.
The matters to be determined herein, stated simply, are whether (1) the Legislature of Louisiana had the legal right to provide that a person coming into this State to reside should wait for a period of one year and a person moving from one parish to another should wait for a period of six months before becoming eligible to vote in State and local elections; and (2) the Legislature of Louisiana had the legal right to provide that a registered voter who changes his political party affiliation should wait for a period of six months before becoming eligible to vote in the primary elections of his new party.
The underlying concept in this case is that a resident of a State does not have a right to vote in State elections; there is no inherent right to vote, but a privilege to vote, which privilege is granted by the State and is not derived from citizenship of the United States, nor granted by the federal Constitution or any of its Amendments. Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162, 22 L.Ed. 627 (1875).
The privilege to vote in a State election Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621, 24 S.Ct. 573, 48 L.Ed. 817 (1904).
Thus, the United States Supreme Court has held that the following conditions of suffrage could be imposed without constitutional objection upon its residents: age, Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 91 S.Ct. 260, 27 L.Ed.2d 272 (1971); literacy, Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 79 S.Ct. 985, 3 L.Ed.2d 1072 (1959); and lack of previous criminal record, Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 10 S.Ct. 299, 33 L.Ed. 637 (1890).
Directly on point, and we believe controlling in the instant case, is the decision of the Supreme Court in Pope v. Williams, quoted above, in which it was held that a Maryland law, requiring persons coming into the State to reside to make a declaration of intention to become citizens and residents of the State as a prerequisite to the right to be registered as voters, was not violative of the federal Constitution.
Thus, the principle is well established that the States have "long been held to have broad powers to determine the conditions under which the right of suffrage may be exercised . . . absent of course the discrimination which the Constitution condemns." Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 50, 79 S.Ct. 985, 989, 3 L.Ed. 2d 1072, 1076 (1959).
This principle was reaffirmed recently by the Supreme Court in Oregon v. Mitchell, wherein Mr. Justice Black, citing Pope v. Williams, expressed the view of the majority of the Court that Congress was unauthorized by the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause to lower the voting age in State and local elections from twenty-one to eighteen.4 The Court stated, at 400 U.S. 125, 91 S.Ct. 265, 27 L.Ed.2d 281:
Of course, State standards regulating the rights of voters in State and local elections are not immune from challenges that they offend federally protected rights. However, the Supreme Court has traditionally exercised restraint in reviewing State legislation creating classifications of voters in order to promote legitimate State interests. The general standard for reviewing State legislation challenged under the Equal Protection Clause is known as the "rational relation" test. The test was defined by Mr. Chief Justice Warren in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 1105, 6 L.Ed.2d 393, 399 (1961) as follows:
There is no federal constitutional right to vote in State and local elections, and for that reason the Court must test the constitutionality of the residency requirements by application of the "rational relation" test, as did the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio in Howe v. Brown, 319 F.Supp. 862, 866 (N.D.Ohio, 1970) in upholding the validity of Ohio's one year residency requirement:
Likewise, in Cocanower v. Marston, 318 F.Supp. 402 (D.Ariz.1970), a three-judge court held that Arizona's one year residency requirement for voting in State elections did not violate the Privileges and Immunities...
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