Foote v. Manchester Sch. Dist.

• Decision Date: 07 September 2005
• Docket Number: No. 2005–093.,2005–093.
• Citation: 883 A.2d 283,152 N.H. 599
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court
• Parties: William FOOTE and another. v. MANCHESTER SCHOOL DISTRICT and another.

152 N.H. 599

883 A.2d 283

William FOOTE and another.

v.MANCHESTER SCHOOL DISTRICT and another.

No. 2005–093.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

Argued: July 13, 2005.

Opinion Issued: Sept. 7, 2005.

The Law Office of Mark A. Stull, of Manchester (Mark A. Stull on the brief and orally), for the petitioners.

Wadleigh, Starr & Peters, P.L.L.C., of Manchester (Dean B. Eggert on the brief and orally), for respondent Manchester School District.

Wadleigh, Starr & Peters, P.L.L.C., of Manchester (Eugene M. Van Loan, III on the brief and orally), for respondent Bedford School District.

GALWAY, J.

The petitioners, Bedford taxpayers William Foote and Raymond C. Dugdale, appeal the order of the Superior Court (Conboy , J.) denying their summary judgment motion and granting the cross-motions for summary judgment filed by the respondents, the Manchester School District (MSD) and the Bedford School District (BSD). We affirm.

The trial court accepted the following facts as undisputed, many of which were derived from our opinion in a related appeal. See Bedford Chapter—Citizens for a Sound Economy v. Sch. Admin. Unit # 25, 151 N.H. 612, 867 A.2d 414 (2004). Historically, BSD has not had its own high school. Id. For more than seventy years, it has sent its students to Manchester high schools. Id. at 612–13, 867 A.2d 414. The school districts of Auburn, Candia and Hooksett have also traditionally sent their students to Manchester high schools. Id. at 613, 867 A.2d 414.

In the spring of 2001, MSD gave BSD and the other school districts two-year notice that the existing twenty-year tuition contract between MSD and these school districts would terminate at the conclusion of the 2002–2003 school year. This meant that, absent a new agreement, BSD could no longer send its students to Manchester high schools.

MSD and the school boards of BSD and the other school districts began negotiating the terms of a new twenty-year tuition agreement. Id. These negotiations were completed in 2002. In spring of 2003, the school boards submitted a proposed new twenty-year agreement to their respective school districts at their annual meetings. Id. Although Auburn, Candia, Hooksett and Manchester voters approved the agreement, BSD voters did not. Id. Because BSD voters rejected the proposed twenty-year contract, BSD had no contract or any other arrangement for the education of its high school students at the end of the 2002–2003 school year.

MSD and the school board of BSD then began negotiating a three-year agreement. Id. The school board and MSD entered into such an agreement in July 2003. Id. Under this agreement, BSD agreed to enroll and MSD agreed to accept all BSD public high school students for the 2003–2004, 2004–2005, and 2005–2006 school years, in exchange for a per pupil tuition payment. Id. The per pupil tuition payment had an operating expense component and a capital expense component. Id. The agreement provided that if BSD voters ratified the proposed twenty-year tuition agreement by June 1, 2004, the twenty-year agreement would supersede the three-year agreement. Id.

The BSD school board executed the three-year agreement on July 1, 2003. The State Board of Education approved it on July 16, 2003.

At the BSD's March 2004 annual meeting, BSD voters approved a warrant article to raise a $1.8 million deficit appropriation for the 2003–2004 school year to fund the capital component of the first year's tuition under the three-year agreement. See id. BSD voters also approved a general budget that included the entire tuition payment for the 2004–2005 school year. This tuition payment included a $4.4 million appropriation to fund the capital component. See id.

In June 2004, the petitioners brought the instant action against BSD and MSD challenging the validity of the three-year agreement and the validity of the March 2004 votes. In addition to seeking a declaration that the three-year agreement was void, the petitioners sought an injunction to bar BSD from paying the capital component of the tuition payment in the future and an order requiring MSD to return to BSD capital expenses already paid, with interest.

The petitioners moved and the respondents cross-moved for summary judgment. The trial court denied the petitioners' motion and granted the respondents' cross-motions. See id.

On appeal, the petitioners argue that the school board was required to receive voter approval before it could enter into the three-year agreement. Absent prior voter approval, they contend that the agreement was invalid, which, they assert, entitles them to an injunction barring payment of the capital component of the tuition payment in the future and entitles BSD to restitution of the capital expenses already paid. They concede that even if the agreement is void, payment of per pupil operating costs was lawful. See RSA 194:27 (1999).

The petitioners rely upon RSA 194:22 (1999), RSA 194:21–a, :21–b (1999) and RSA 32:6, :8 (2000) to support their arguments. We address each statute in turn.

We review the trial court's statutory interpretation de novo . Blackthorne Group v. Pines of Newmarket, 150 N.H. 804, 806, 848 A.2d 725 (2004). We are the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole. Bedford Chapter, 151 N.H. at 614, 867 A.2d 414. We first examine the language of the statute, and, where possible, we ascribe the plain and ordinary meanings to the words used. Id. When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, we need not look beyond it for further indication of legislative intent. Id. We refuse to consider what the legislature might have said or add language that the legislature did not see fit to incorporate in the statute. Blackthorne Group, 150 N.H. at 806, 848 A.2d 725. Moreover, we interpret statutes in the context of the overall statutory scheme and not in isolation. Id. By so doing, we are better able to discern the legislature's intent and to interpret statutory language in light of the policy or purpose sought to be advanced by the statutory scheme. Id.

A. RSA 194:22

The petitioners first argue that RSA 194:22 required the BSD school board to obtain prior approval from BSD voters before entering into the three-year agreement. We disagree.

RSA 194:22 provides:

Any school district may make a contract with a[ ] ... high school ... located in this ... state, and raise and appropriate money to carry the contract into effect. If the contract is approved by the state board the school with which it is made shall be deemed a high school maintained by the district.

As we recognized in Bedford Chapter, 151 N.H. at 617, 867 A.2d 414, " RSA 194:22 is silent as to the procedure the school district must follow to raise and appropriate money to carry the contract into effect." RSA 194:22 likewise is silent as to the procedure the school district must follow to make the contract in the first place. Nothing in RSA 194:22 requires voter approval before the contract may be made.

The petitioners argue that RSA 194:22 requires prior voter approval because they interpret the term "school district" to mean the voters within that district. In support of this assertion, they mistakenly rely upon Kondrat v. Freedom School Board, 138 N.H. 683, 685, 650 A.2d 316 (1994).

Kondrat concerned the interpretation of RSA 194:10 (1999), which provides:

At its annual meeting each school district shall determine the salaries of its school board and other district officers, and the district clerk shall certify the same to the selectmen.

We held that the "plain language of the statute designates the ‘school district,’ i.e. , the voters, as the body responsible for determining the salary of the auditor, and the annual meeting as the proper time for making such determination." Kondrat, 138 N.H. at 685, 650 A.2d 316.

The petitioners argue that because in Kondrat we held that the term "school district" in RSA 194:10 referred to the district's voters, the term must have the same meaning in RSA 194:22. In RSA 194:10, however, the term "school district" is modified by the phrase "[a]t its annual meeting." In context, therefore, the term "school district" as used in RSA 194:10 refers to district voters who meet annually "for raising and appropriating money for the support of schools ..., for the transaction of other district business and ... for the choice of district officers." RSA 197:1 (1999).

The petitioners also contend that in Bedford Chapter , we held that the term "school district" in RSA chapter 194 (1999 & Supp.2004) means the voters of the district and not the school board. The petitioners misconstrue our holding in that case.

At issue in Bedford Chapter was whether a warrant article presented at a special meeting of the BSD involved a vote to raise and appropriate money. If the warrant article involved such a vote, then the article could not pass unless the votes cast at the special meeting equaled at least one-half of the number of BSD voters entitled to vote at the BSD 2004 annual meeting. Bedford Chapter, 151 N.H. at 614, 867 A.2d 414; see RSA 197:3 (1999). If the warrant article did not involve such a vote, then it could pass by a simple majority of voters present. Bedford Chapter, 151 N.H. at 614, 867 A.2d 414.

The warrant article at issue asked BSD voters to authorize the BSD school board to enter into a new twenty-year tuition agreement with MSD. Id. We held that asking for prior voter authorization to enter into the tuition agreement was akin to asking for an appropriation and, thus, the warrant article involved a vote to raise and appropriate money. See id. at 615–16, 867 A.2d 414.

The only argument regarding RSA 194:22 that we directly addressed in Bedford Chapter was the appellants' assertion that the tuition agreement required approval only by the State Board of Education. Id. at 617, 867 A.2d 414. In rejecting this argument we construed the plain language of RSA 194:22 to permit the school district, not the State Board of Education,...