Forbush v. Leonard

• Decision Date: 01 January 1863
• Citation: 8 Minn. 267
• Parties: CALVIN FORBUSH vs. AMOS D. LEONARD et al.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

8 Minn. 267

CALVIN FORBUSH vs. AMOS D. LEONARD et al.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Appeal from order of district court, Blue Earth County.

Franklin H. Waite, for appellant.

Willard & Barney, for respondents.

EMMETT, C. J.

This is an appeal from an order denying a motion made in the case by Franklin H. Waite, Esq., the attorney for the plaintiff, on behalf of himself as such attorney, and of Waite and Burt, who had rendered services to the plaintiff as attorneys in another action commenced by Wilkinson and Burt, his attorneys, and out of which the present action seems remotely to have arisen. The object of the motion was to enforce an attorney's lien on the judgment rendered in this action, for the services rendered by said several attorneys, in this and the other action referred to.

The lien of an attorney, whatever it may have been at common law, is in this state regulated by statute, and we must accordingly confine the parties to such only as the statute recognizes and enforces. The provision of statute regulating these matters is contained in section 16, chapter 82 of the Compiled Statutes, which is in the following words: "Sec. 16. An attorney has a lien for his compensation, whether specially agreed upon or implied, as provided in this statute: 1. Upon the papers of his client, which have come into his possession, in the course of his professional employment; 2. Upon money in his hands belonging to his client; 3. Upon money in the hands of the adverse party, in an action or proceeding in which the attorney was employed, from the time of giving notice of the lien to that party; 4. Upon a judgment to the extent of the costs included therein; or, if there be a special agreement, to the extent of the compensation specially agreed on, from the time of giving notice to the party against whom the judgment is recovered. This lien is, however, subordinate to the rights existing between the parties to the action or proceeding."

It is evident from the above, that where the lien is given upon money in the hands of the adverse party, or upon a judgment, that it is for services rendered in the particular action or proceeding in which the judgment was rendered, or money found to be in the hands of the adverse party. The attorney, therefore, would have no right to include therein any other claim for similar services rendered in another case. He should have enforced his lien for such services, if at all, in the case in which they were rendered. Nor has he any right to join therewith the claims of other attorneys for services rendered in another action or proceeding.

Waite is the only attorney known in this case. Waite & Burt and Wilkinson & Burt were attorneys, and rendered services in another action. They may, from the facts stated in the affidavits, have a valid claim to the amount stated by them; and, under the circumstances detailed, they may be part owners of the judgment in this action to the extent of their said claim; but that right or ownership cannot be established or settled by simple motion of this kind; much less does it amount to an attorney's lien under the statute. They settled the judgment in which their services were rendered, by taking the note on which this action was brought. If they had, as they claim, an interest in the judgment thus settled, equal to the costs and disbursements included therein, they had a proportionate interest in the note received in payment thereof; but I do not see how their interest in said note, or in the judgment subsequently obtained thereon in the name of the plaintiff, who was jointly interested with them, can be tortured into an attorney's lien; or indeed how they can justly claim any preference in the proceeds of the judgment over the plaintiff. We are of opinion, therefore, that, so far as any claim of lien for...