Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court
Decision Date | 21 May 2019 |
Docket Number | OP 19-0099 |
Court | Montana Supreme Court |
Parties | FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Petitioner, v. MONTANA EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, Elizabeth Best, Respondent. |
For Petitioner: Ian McIntosh, Marcia Davenport, Crowley Fleck, PLLP, Bozeman, Montana, Vaughn A. Crawford, Snell & Wilmer, Phoenix, Arizona
For Plaintiff Charles S. Lucero : Dennis P. Conner, Keith D. Marr, James R. Conner, Conner & Marr, PLLP, Great Falls, Montana, Daniel P. Buckley, Buckley Law Office, PC, Bozeman, Montana
¶1 Ford Motor Company (Ford) petitions this Court for a writ of supervisory control following an order of the Eighth Judicial District Court, Cascade County, in Charles Lucero v. Ford Motor Company , ADV-18-247(b), denying its motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. We accept supervisory control, conclude Montana has specific personal jurisdiction over Ford in this case, and accordingly affirm the District Court’s order. This Opinion and Order addresses the following issue:
Does Montana have specific personal jurisdiction over Ford regarding Lucero’s design defect, failure to warn, and negligence claims when the vehicle accident occurred in Montana but the vehicle was not designed, manufactured, or first sold by Ford in Montana?
¶2 Markkaya Jean Gullett, a Montana resident, drove a 1996 Ford Explorer. Ford did not design or manufacture the Explorer in Montana. Ford assembled the Explorer in Kentucky and sold it for the first time to a dealer in Washington. Over ten years later, the Explorer was resold and registered in Montana. In 2015, as Gullett drove the Explorer on the interstate in Montana, one of the Explorer’s tires suffered a tread/belt separation. The vehicle lost stability, rolled into a ditch, and came to rest upside down. Gullett died at the scene. Gullett’s personal representative, Charles Lucero (Lucero), filed this suit against Ford in Montana state district court on behalf of Gullett and her heirs. The complaint alleges three claims against Ford: strict liability for design defect, strict liability for failure to warn, and negligence. Lucero seeks compensatory and punitive damages.
¶3 Defendant Ford moved to dismiss, arguing Montana does not have specific personal jurisdiction over Ford regarding Lucero’s claims and specifically reasoning that there is no link between Ford’s Montana contacts and Lucero’s claims. The District Court disagreed and ultimately concluded it had specific personal jurisdiction over Ford.
¶4 Ford now asks this Court to exercise supervisory control over the District Court, conclude no specific personal jurisdiction exists, and dismiss the case against Ford. Ford faults the District Court for resting its analysis on Ford’s in-state contacts and the fact that Gullett was injured in Montana, arguing the court erred when it failed to identify a link between Ford’s contacts with Montana and Lucero’s claims. Lucero asserts the court’s exercise of specific personal jurisdiction is appropriate in this case.
¶5 This Court has supervisory control over Montana courts. Mont. Const. art. VII, § 2 (2); see also Great Falls Clinic LLP v. Mont. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court , 2016 MT 245, ¶ 6, 385 Mont. 95, 381 P.3d 550. Supervisory control is an extraordinary remedy and we determine whether to use it on a case-by-case basis. M. R. App. P. 14(3). We may exercise supervisory control when "urgency ... mak[es] the normal appeal process inadequate," "the case involves purely legal questions," and "[c]onstitutional issues of state-wide importance are involved." M. R. App. P. 14(3)(b).
¶6 This Court reviews a personal jurisdiction ruling de novo. Tackett v. Duncan , 2014 MT 253, ¶ 16, 376 Mont. 348, 334 P.3d 920.
¶7 We accept Ford’s petition for supervisory control to resolve the issue of whether a Montana state court may exercise specific personal jurisdiction over Ford regarding Lucero’s design defect, failure to warn, and negligence claims. Urgency makes the normal appeal process inadequate in this case involving personal jurisdiction, because the District Court must have power over the parties in a proceeding to afford adequate relief. The question is purely legal and of state-wide constitutional importance: Ford’s due process rights are at issue and this decision will clarify when persons injured in Montana may appropriately file suit in Montana courts. We accordingly accept supervisory control and, for the following reasons, affirm the District Court’s decision finding that Montana may exercise specific personal jurisdiction over Ford in this case.
¶8 Personal jurisdiction—a court’s power over the parties in a proceeding—may be general (all-purpose) or specific (case-linked). DeLeon v. BNSF Ry. Co. , 2018 MT 219, ¶ 7, 392 Mont. 446, 426 P.3d 1. "General personal jurisdiction is premised upon the defendant’s relationship to the forum state, while specific personal jurisdiction is premised upon the defendant’s relationship to both the forum state and the particular cause of action." DeLeon , ¶ 7. Ford is undisputedly not subject to general personal jurisdiction in Montana. See BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell , 581 U.S. ––––, ––––, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1559, 198 L.Ed.2d 36 (2017). The question in this case, therefore, is whether Montana may exercise specific personal jurisdiction over Ford regarding Lucero’s design defect, failure to warn, and negligence claims.
¶9 Specific personal jurisdiction exists when the suit itself "arises from the specific circumstances set forth in Montana’s long-arm statute, M. R. Civ. P. 4(b)(1)." Buckles v. Cont'l Res., Inc. , 2017 MT 235, ¶ 15, 388 Mont. 517, 402 P.3d 1213. A Montana court’s exercise of specific personal jurisdiction "depends on whether the defendant’s ‘suit-related conduct’ created a substantial connection with" Montana. Tackett , ¶ 19 (quoting Walden v. Fiore , 571 U.S. 277, 284, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1121, 188 L.Ed.2d 12 (2014) ). The defendant’s relationship with the forum and the litigation must relate to contact the defendant itself created with the forum. Tackett , ¶ 32. Accordingly, exercising specific personal jurisdiction over a defendant is only appropriate when both the defendant and the underlying controversy are appropriately affiliated with Montana. Tackett , ¶ 19 ( ).
¶10 We apply a two-step test to determine whether a Montana court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. DeLeon , ¶ 10 (citing Milky Whey, Inc. v. Dairy Partners, LLC , 2015 MT 18, ¶ 18, 378 Mont. 75, 342 P.3d 13 ; Tackett , ¶ 22 ). First, we determine whether personal jurisdiction exists under Montana’s long-arm statute, M. R. Civ. P. 4(b)(1). Milky Whey , ¶ 18. If the first step is satisfied, we then determine whether exercising personal jurisdiction is constitutional; that is, whether it conforms with "the traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice embodied in the due process clause." Cimmaron Corp. v. Smith , 2003 MT 73, ¶ 10, 315 Mont. 1, 67 P.3d 258.
¶11 First, in considering whether specific personal jurisdiction exists under Montana’s long-arm statute, we turn to M. R. Civ. P. 4(b)(1) which provides, in pertinent part: "[A]ny person is subject to the jurisdiction of Montana courts as to any claim for relief arising from ... the commission of any act resulting in accrual within Montana of a tort action." M. R. Civ. P. 4(b)(1)(B). In this case, Lucero’s claims for relief arise from Ford’s alleged actions of design defect, failing to warn, and negligence. Lucero alleges those actions resulted in the accrual of a tort action in Montana: Gullett was driving the Explorer in Montana when the accident occurred. Accordingly, we conclude Lucero’s claims for relief arise from Ford’s actions allegedly resulting in a tort action accruing within Montana. See Bunch v. Lancair Int'l, Inc. , 2009 MT 29, ¶ 40, 349 Mont. 144, 202 P.3d 784 ( ).1 Step one is satisfied; Ford’s conduct falls under Montana’s long-arm statute.
¶12 We next turn to the question of whether exercising personal jurisdiction over Ford is constitutional. A Montana court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant is limited by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. U.S. Const. amend. XIV. A defendant must have "certain minimum contacts [with Montana] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ " Tackett , ¶ 18 (quoting Walden , 571 U.S. at 283, 134 S. Ct. at 1121 (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington , 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S. Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945) )). The concept protects a defendant from having to litigate in a distant forum and allows a defendant to reasonably anticipate where he may be haled into court. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson , 444 U.S. 286, 297, 100 S. Ct. 559, 567, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980). The primary focus "is the defendant’s relationship to the forum State." Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., S.F. Cty. , 582 U.S. ––––, ––––, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1779, 198 L.Ed.2d 395 (2017). To determine if exercising personal jurisdiction over a defendant comports with due process, we consider whether: (1) the nonresident defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in Montana, thereby invoking Montana’s laws; (2) the plaintiff’s claim arises out of or relates to the defendant’s forum-related activities; and (3) the exercise of personal jurisdiction is reasonable. Simmons v. State , 206 Mont. 264, 276, 670 P.2d 1372, 1378 (1983). Once ...
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