Ford Motor Co. v. Cockrell

• Decision Date: 27 May 1968
• Docket Number: No. 44871,44871
• Citation: 211 So.2d 833
• Parties: FORD MOTOR COMPANY v. Will COCKRELL.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Page 833

211 So.2d 833

FORD MOTOR COMPANY v. Will COCKRELL.

No. 44871.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

May 27, 1968.

Rehearing Denied July 8, 1968.

Watkins & Eager, Hassell H. Whitworth, Jackson, for appellant.

Crisler, Crisler & Bowling, Francis S. Bowling, Jackson, George B. Grubbs, Mendenhall, for appellee.

ROBERTSON, Justice:

This is a strict liability in tort case against a manufacturer of automobiles and trucks and its authorized retail dealer. Will Cockrell brought suit against Ford Motor Company, and William Allen, d/b/a Mendenhall Motor Company, to recover damages for personal injuries sustained when the starter of a Ford truck, without human agency, became engaged, causing the motor to turn and the truck to move forward, and pinning the plaintiff against the rear of a parked truck, thereby severely injuring him.

The jury returned a verdict for $19,500 against Ford Motor Company only. Appellant thereupon perfected its appeal from the judgment of the Circuit Court of Simpson County based on the verdict of the jury.

On February 5, 1966, the Town of Mendenhall, Mississippi, bought a new 1966 Ford F600 chassis cab truck from Mendenhall Motor Company, the authorized Ford dealer in Endenhall. This truck had been purchased new by the dealer from Ford Motor Company, the manufacturer. Before delivery to the purchaser, the truck had been driven to Jackson and a dump body installed thereon.

The truck was bought to haul gravel and other road-building materials and had been used exclusively for this purpose. It was used during daylight hours only and at night was parked, along with other Town of Mendenhall trucks, on a street behind the Town Hall. As was the usual custom, the ignition key was left in the parked truck.

About 6:30 a.m. on June 15, 1966, Ellis Monk, Will Cockrell, and two other town workmen gathered back of the Town Hall to pick up their trucks and begin work for the day. Monk, the driver of the new 1966 Ford truck, put a tool box in the cab of his truck from the passenger's side and closed the door. Between one and two minutes later, as Monk rejoined the group, somebody noticed smoke coming from under the hood of Monk's truck. Will Cockrell, who was closest to the truck, ran over to the front of the truck to raise the hood. Before he could raise the hood, the starter became engaged, causing the motor to turn, and the truck, which had been parked in second gear, moved forward two or three feet, pinning Cockrell against the rear of another parked truck.

Monk, the regular driver, moved the gear from second to reverse, and backed it off of Cockrell. Even though the ignition key was in the 'off' position and Monk never attempted to start the truck, the motor continued to turn until the battery ran down some minutes later. The plaintiff suffered a broken right arm, injuries to his right shoulder, and several broken ribs.

Mendenhall Motor Company was contacted, pulled the truck in, removed the burnt and charred wiring, and installed new wiring underneath the hood and the fender apron. The repairs totalled $32.41 and consisted of $20.46 for parts and $11.95 for labor. The testimony was that the truck had been running fine ever since.

The Mendenhall Motor Company itemized parts and labor on a 'Combination Repair Order and Adjustment Claim' form furnished by Ford Motor Company. This Adjustment Claim form was sent in to the Ford Motor Company, was okayed by it on August 1, 1966, and the total claim paid by it to Mendenhall Motor Company. This form showed the Date of Sale as 2/5/66, the Date of Repair as 6/15/66, and the mileage as 5,154 miles. The truck thus was 4 months and 10 days old and had been driven a total of 5,154 miles.

Under the headings 'Instructions to Mechanic No. _ _' and 'Describe Cause and Nature of Defect,' on the Adjustment Claim form, Watts Williamson, the service manager of Mendenhall Motor Company, had written:

'Burnt wires-Replace wire loom from Dash to Engine Comp-Replace Battery to Relay Switch-Replace Starter Solenoid Switch-Repair wires-Wire Loom in Engine Comp. shorted out on fender apron causing wire Loom and Battery Cable to burn and switch to short out-causing starter to turn.'

The appellant assigned as error the following:

'1. The lower Court erred in failing to grant a directed verdict and a peremptory instruction to Appellant for the reason that, as a matter of law, Appellee wholly and completely failed to make out a prima facie case of negligence against Appellant as alleged in the Declaration.

'2. The lower Court erred in failing to grant a directed verdict and a peremptory instruction to Appellant for the reason that, as a matter of law, Appellee wholly and completely failed to offer any proof, if believed, which would tend to prove that the vehicle in question was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer at the time the vehicle left the possession of Appellant.

'3. Alternatively, the lower Court erred in refusing and failing to grant Appellant a new trial for the reasons:

'(a) The jury was allowed to hear answer of witness, Edward Wallace, to hypothetical question propounded by Appellee, over the objection of Appellant, in absence of which, no evidence was available on which a verdict could have been returned against Appellant;

'(b) The verdict of the jury was against the overwhelming weight of the law and evidence.'

In tracing the history of the doctrine of strict liability in tort, Chief Justice Ethridge, in State Stove Manufacturing Company v. Hodges, 189 So.2d 113 (Miss.1966), said:

'In 1916 Judge Cardozo, in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company, held, in a suit against the manufacturer of an automobile with a defective wheel, that the maker was liable for negligence. By placing the car on the market, it assumed a responsibility to the consumer, resting not on contract but upon the relation arising from the purchase, together with the foreseeability of harm if proper care was not used. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050, L.R.A.1916F, 696 (1916); Prosser, Torts 658-661 (3d ed.1964).

'Prosser summarizes the effect of MacPherson in subsequent cases in this way:

"This decision found immediate acceptance, and at the end of some forty years is universal law in the United States, with the barely possible but highly unlikely exception of Mississippi. Massachusetts, which was one of the last jurisdictions to capitulate, has said that 'The MacPherson case caused the exception to swallow the asserted general rule of nonliability, leaving nothing upon which that rule could operate.' Some of the courts have continued to speak the language of 'inherent danger,' but it seems clear that this now means nothing more than that substantial harm is to be anticipated if the chattel should be defective. * * * It is certainly the prevailing view that it extends to any product whatever which, if in fact negligently made, may reasonably be expected to be capable of inflicting injury. * * *

"The conclusion is clear that the duty extends to any one who may reasonably be expected to be in the vicinity of the chattel's probable use, and to be endangered if it is defective. * * *'

'The rule which we adopt extends to any product which, if in fact negligently made, may reasonably be expected to be capable of inflicting injury. Privity of contract is not necessary in a suit by a consumer against a manufacturer.' (Id., 189 So.2d at 115-116) (Emphasis added)

'(W)e conclude that the appropriate standards of responsibility are well stated in Section 402A of the American Law Institute's Restatement of Torts (Second) * * *:

"Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer-"(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if

"(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and

"(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.

"(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although

"(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and

"(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.'

'The foregoing rule is not exclusive. It does not preclude liability based upon the alternative ground of negligence of the manufacturer or seller, where such negligence can be proved. Restatement (Second), Torts at 348. (Id. at 118.)

'The rationale of this rule is well stated in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 27 Cal.Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897, 13 A.L.R.2d 1049 (1962). Plaintiff was injured while using a power tool, given to him by his wife, who had purchased it from a retailer. The evidence showed that there were inadequate set screws installed by the manufacturer, which permitted the lathe to move away from the piece of wood, allowing it to fly out of the lathe and hit plaintiff on the head. Affirming a judgment for plaintiff against the manufacturer, the California Supreme Court said:

"A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being. Recognized first in the case of unwholesome food products, such liability has now been extended to a variety of other products that create as great or greater hazards if defective. * * *

"Although in these cases strict...