Ford Motor Co. v. Cooper

• Decision Date: 08 January 2004
• Docket Number: No. 06-03-00009-CV.,06-03-00009-CV.
• Citation: 125 S.W.3d 794
• Parties: FORD MOTOR COMPANY and Crane Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., Appellants, v. John T. COOPER, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

125 S.W.3d 794

FORD MOTOR COMPANY and Crane Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., Appellants, v. John T. COOPER, Appellee.

No. 06-03-00009-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Texarkana.

Submitted December 18, 2003.

Decided January 8, 2004.

Craig M. Patrick and Eric L. Lindstrom, Craddock, Reneker & Davis, LLP, Dallas, for appellant.

Clarice Attaway Allen, Attorney At Law, Texarkana, for appellee.

Before MORRISS, C.J., ROSS and CARTER, JJ.

OPINION

Opinion by Justice ROSS.

John T. Cooper purchased a new 1998 Lincoln Town Car from Crane Lincoln Mercury, Inc., an authorized dealer for Ford Motor Company, in Texarkana. After experiencing a steering problem with the vehicle, he sued Crane and Ford for alleged violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA)¹ and for breach of warranty. The jury found Crane and Ford did engage in deceptive trade practices and failed to comply with the warranty, and awarded Cooper $5,000.00 for diminished value of the vehicle and $1,000.00 for expenses. The jury also awarded Cooper additional damages of $44,000.00 against Crane and $22,000.00 against Ford for knowingly engaging in such conduct. The trial court reduced the award and rendered judgment against Crane and Ford for a total of $18,000.00.² Ford and Crane appeal, contending the evidence was legally insufficient to support the jury's award of actual damages. We agree and reverse the judgment, but in the interests of justice remand the case for a new trial.

Background

Cooper purchased the automobile in question August 29, 1998, for $33,150.00. He testified he decided to buy a Lincoln Town Car because of its dependability and ease of driving during long trips. When he test drove the car, Cooper discovered it "had a pull on the steering wheel." He discussed the problem with Crane's salesman, who assured him that the car needed an alignment and that it would be repaired before Cooper purchased the vehicle. Cooper testified that, when he took possession August 29, he was assured by the salesman the car had been repaired. He discovered, however, the problem had not been corrected to his satisfaction—that the car drifted to the right at high speeds and to the left at low speeds. He testified pressure had to be applied to the steering wheel in order to keep the vehicle on the road.

Cooper returned the vehicle to Crane on numerous occasions for the dealership to correct the problem. Crane had the vehicle realigned under the warranty each time, but Cooper testified the problem persisted. Cooper took the vehicle to several independent repair shops for evaluations. He testified Craig Cummins, of Superior Spring and Brake in Conway, Arkansas, found the car dangerous to drive long distances.³ Cooper also testified Dale Clark, of Cooper Tire and Supply⁴ in Texarkana, told him the car was dangerous. After the vehicle had been driven approximately 1,000 miles, Cooper decided to park it and cease using it. Cooper testified that he felt the car was dangerous to drive on the highway and that the car should go back to the manufacturer.

Regarding the value of the car and the expenses he incurred in having the car evaluated, Cooper testified as follows:

Q. Now, you've already told the jury about how much you paid for the car [$33,150.00]. Did you incur some expenses trying to get it evaluated and get this information to Crane so they would talk to you and solve the problem?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. And are you asking the jury to make a finding that you're entitled to— based on the action that you've testified to here today, that you're entitled to have your money refunded?

A. Yes, I am. I can't use the car.

Q. Where is the car now?

A. The car's at my house ... in the garage.

Q. And why have you not driven that car?

A. It is unsafe for what I want it for, long distance travel, it's fatiguing. And so we bought [another] car to be able to make long trips, ....

....

Q. Mr. Cooper, I believe you've said that the car is parked in the garage because you feel it's unsafe to drive it. Just tell me what value would you place on that car.

A. Nothing. It's absolutely worthless to me for what I bought it for.

Joe Crane, co-owner of the dealership, testified there was an alignment concern with the car, but that it could be repaired. He testified that he sold the car for $33,150.00 and that the value of the car was not diminished because of the alignment problem.

Jury Findings

In answer to the questions submitted in the court's charge, the jury found: 1) Crane and Ford engaged in one or more false, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices that were a producing cause of actual damages to Cooper; 2) Crane and Ford failed to comply with a warranty, and said failure was a producing cause of damages to Cooper; 3) $5,000.00 would fairly and reasonably compensate Cooper for the difference between the fair market value of the car in the condition in which it was sold to him and the value it would have had if it had been as warranted and represented, and $1,000.00 would fairly and reasonably compensate him for his expenses; 4) Crane's and Ford's conduct found in 1) or 2) above was committed knowingly; and 5) $44,000.00 should be assessed against Crane and $22,000.00 against Ford as additional damages.

Standard of Review

In determining a no-evidence issue, we are to consider only the evidence and inferences that tend to support the finding and disregard all evidence and inferences to the contrary. Bradford v. Vento, 48 S.W.3d 749, 754 (Tex.2001); Cont'l Coffee Prods. Co. v. Cazarez, 937 S.W.2d 444, 450 (Tex.1996). A no-evidence point will be sustained when (a) there is a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact, (b) the court is barred by rules of law or of evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact, (c) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla, or (d) the evidence conclusively establishes the opposite of the vital fact. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Martinez, 977 S.W.2d 328, 334 (Tex.1998). More than a scintilla of evidence exists if the evidence furnishes some reasonable basis for differing conclusions by reasonable minds about the existence of a vital fact. Rocor Int'l, Inc. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 77 S.W.3d 253, 262 (Tex.2002).

Fair Market Value

The Legislature's stated public policy in enacting the DTPA was to "protect consumers against false, misleading, and deceptive business practices, ... [and] unconscionable actions, ...." Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 17.44(a) (Vernon 2002); see Latham v. Castillo, 972 S.W.2d 66, 68 (Tex.1998). The Act "shall be liberally construed and applied" to promote that underlying purpose. Tex. Bus. & Com.Code Ann. § 17.44(a); Latham, 972 S.W.2d at 68. Under the Act, "each consumer who prevails may obtain ... the amount of economic damages found by the trier of fact." Tex. Bus. & Com.Code Ann. § 17.50(b)(1) (Vernon 2002). "Economic damages" are defined as "compensatory damages for pecuniary loss, including costs of repair and replacement." Tex. Bus. & Com.Code Ann. § 17.45(11) (Vernon 2002).

In cases involving misrepresentation, plaintiffs may recover under either the "out of pocket" measure of damages or the "benefit of the bargain" measure of damages, whichever gives the plaintiff the greater recovery. Leyendecker & Assocs. v. Wechter, 683 S.W.2d 369, 373 (Tex.1984). The "out of pocket" measure is the difference between the value of what the plaintiff parted with and the value of what he or she received. W.O. Bankston Nissan, Inc. v. Walters, 754 S.W.2d 127, 128 (Tex.1988). The "benefit of the bargain" measure of damages is the difference between the value as represented and the actual value received. Leyendecker & Assocs., 683 S.W.2d at 373. The measure of damages pled by Cooper was the difference between the fair market value of the car in the condition in which it was sold to him and the value it would have had if it had been as warranted and represented. This was the measure of damages the jury was instructed to use in assessing Cooper's economic damages (not including expenses).

Both Cooper and Crane testified they negotiated a price of $33,150.00 for the vehicle. The price agreed on between two parties is sufficient evidence to support a fact finding on market value in an action under the DTPA. See Chrysler Corp. v. Schuenemann, 618 S.W.2d 799, 805 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see also Jack Roach Ford v. De Urdanavia, 659 S.W.2d 725, 728-29 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, no writ). There was, therefore, evidence of the market value of the vehicle as warranted and represented.

Crane and Ford claim the judgment cannot stand, however, because no evidence of damages was offered as to the actual market value of the vehicle in its alleged defective condition. They contend Cooper's only attempt at proving such value was his own opinion, which was legally insufficient because: 1) his opinion referred to the vehicle's personal value to him, not its market value; and 2) his opinion did not refer to the value of the vehicle in its alleged defective condition at the time of purchase.

Crane and Ford rely on Porras v. Craig, 675 S.W.2d 503 (Tex.1984); Lester Goodson Pontiac v. Elliott, 775 S.W.2d 395 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, writ denied); and Vista Chevrolet, Inc. v. Lewis, 704 S.W.2d 363 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1985), aff'd in part & rev'd in part, 709 S.W.2d 176 (Tex.1986), for their position that Cooper's testimony referred to the personal intrinsic value the vehicle had to him, and was no evidence of its actual market value.

It is a longstanding rule that an owner of property can testify as to its market value even though such owner cannot qualify to testify about the value of like property belonging to someone else. However, as the Texas Supreme Court explained in Porras, an owner's testimony in this regard is not without restrictions:

In order for a property owner to qualify as a...