Ford Motor Co. v. Pace

• Decision Date: 11 March 1960
• Citation: 10 McCanless 559,206 Tenn. 559,335 S.W.2d 360
• Parties: , 206 Tenn. 559 FORD MOTOR COMPANY v. Chester R. PACE, etc., et al.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Page 360

335 S.W.2d 360

10 McCanless 559, 206 Tenn. 559

FORD MOTOR COMPANY v. Chester R. PACE, etc., et al.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

March 11, 1960.

Rehearing Denied May 4, 1960.

James M. Swiggart, Asst. Atty. Gen., Hooker, Keeble, Dodson & Harris, Nashville, for appellants.

Allison B. Humphreys, Sol. Gen., Nashville, for George F. McCanless, Atty. Gen., appellant.

Cecil Sims, Nashville, for appellee, Ford Motor Co.

Edwin F. Hunt, of Howard, Davis, Boult & Hunt, Nashville, for General Motors, amicus curiae.

J. E. McCadden and Walter P. Armstrong, Jr., of Armstrong, McCadden, Allen, Braden & Goodman, Memphis, for Chrysler Corp., amicus curiae.

BURNETT, Justice.

The original bill in this cause was filed by the Ford Motor Company seeking declaratory judgment as to the validity of Chapter 79 of the Public Acts of 1955 (now codified as Sections 59-1701 through 59-1720, as this Chapter was amended by subsequent Acts), and, if valid, construction of the Act. We take jurisdiction only on the proposition that the constitutionality of the statute 'is the sole determinative question in the litigation'. (§ 16-408, T.C.A.). If this were not true, the jurisdiction of the case would be in the Court of Appeals.

The chancellor in a memorandum opinion, which is made a part of the record, held that the Act as a whole and each particular part thereof was unconstitutional. From this holding an appeal was seasonably perfected and six of the most able briefs, it has been the writer's pleasure to read, have been filed setting forth the questions to be determined on one side or the other. We have read and re-read the statute as it is codified, supra, the various briefs and all authorities cited therein as well as making some independent investigation on our own part. After spending many days at this work we have now reached our conclusions and will hereinafter attempt to put them on paper.

The basic argument is that the Act is an invalid exercise of the police power of the State, in that this Motor Vehicle Act serves no public purpose, that such regulations as it provides do not promote the health, safety, moral or general welfare of the public, and consequently it is inimical to the due process clauses of Article 1, Section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution, and the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The basic case around which this argument hinges, and upon which one of the briefs is pitched entirely, is our recent opinion of Livesay v. Tennessee Board of Examiners in Watchmaking, Tenn., 322 S.W.2d 209.

In considering the question, whether or not the Legislature has the right to enact such a statute under the police power, we must take into consideration and look at things in the light of the social and economic conditions existing at the present time rather than at the time our Constitution was adopted. Legislative power is not static and helpless but arises to adjust and face new conditions as they appear to affect the people of the State. Of course, the Legislature of the State cannot prohibit an ordinary business but it may, however, regulate the business to promote the health, safety, morals or general welfare of the public. The guarantees of the Constitution imply the absence of arbitrary restraint, but not immunity from reasonable regulations and prohibitions imposed in the interest of the people of the State.

Aside from the record herein we must take judicial knowledge of the tremendous growth of the automobile vehicular industry in the State. All other industries employing any number of people have had to create huge parking lots for the people to park their cars who come to work. The highways are crowded. The State and Nation are building more, and broader and larger, highways to care for this motor vehicular traffic. The papers and radio are constantly warning people and trying to educate them as to careful driving because of the many, many accidents and deaths that occur by reason of negligence or faulty cars or whatnot. Thus it is, knowing these facts, when we consider the matter in this light, we think that the statement of the Supreme Court of Nebraska in Nelsen v. Tilley, 1939, 137 Neb. 327, 289 N.W. 388, 392, 126 A.L.R. 729, 734, is very appropriate under the discussion now being had. That court said:

'Motor vehicles, once luxuries, are now necessities. The handling of motor vehicles has become a complex business. The sale of new automobiles is closely tied in with the purchase, trade and sale of used cars. The possibilities of fraud upon the public have correspondingly increased. The elimination of harmful trade practices and dishonest dealings resulting in injury to the purchasing public may have been, and undoubtedly was, a factor in the passage of the act. Many courts have sustained similar legislative enactments.'

A fortiori this statement is true today.

From our investigation we have been unable to find any case which holds that it is not within the police power of the State to enact such legislation as that referred to in the quotation last above. See 46 Am.Jur., page 200, Section 5, Sales.

The Court of Appeals of Ohio in Ohio Motor Vehicle Dealers, etc. v. Memphis Auto Sales, 103 Ohio App. 347, 142 N.E.2d 268, 275, had this to say: 'True the sale of motor vehicles is affected by public interest and laws regulating their sale generally are salutary.' And further: 'Certainly the legislature has the power to determine that the conduct of an agency engaged in the sale of new motor vehicles is a business affected by the public interest. This fact has been recognized by legislatures and courts throughout the country.' Another case holding to this same view is Rebsamen Motor Co. v. Phillips, 1956, 226 Ark. 146, 289 S.W.2d 170, 57 A.L.R.2d 1256. We in this State long ago established the legal principle which is followed in most cases that when the Legislature has enacted a statute, which is apparently for the protection of the public safety, or the public health or the public morals of the people, that the Court will not encroach upon this Act or the right of the Legislature. This Court said in Petition of Carter, 188 Tenn. 677, 222 S.W.2d 11, 12, 13:

'* * * Furthermore we are not concerned in determining the constitutionality of an Act 'whether it was dictated by a wise or a foolish policy, or whether it will ultimately redound to the public good, or whether it is contrary to natural justice and equity. These are considerations solely for the Legislature.' Motlow v. State, 125 Tenn. 547, 589, 145 S.W. 177, 188, L.R.A.1916 F, 177.'

We, too, have said that 'Public Policy is the present concept of public welfare or general good. The police power is the attribute of sovereignty by which the public policy is preserved and promoted.' State ex rel. Loser v. National Optical Stores Co., 189 Tenn. 433, 225 S.W.2d 263, 269. Thus it is, from what has been said above, we can readily see how the Legislature had it in mind that legislation as that herein, which will hereinafter be more specifically referred to, was well within its police power. It is not at all unreasonable for us to believe that the Legislature had the purpose in mind in enacting this legislation to protect the public safety, health, and/or public morals of its people. When we thus have determined that the legislation is reasonable, certainly under the Section of our Constitution hereinbefore referred to and the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution, this legislation is not unconstitutional merely because it is attemping to regulate the motor vehicle or automobile industry, its dealers, salesmen, etc.

The Act in question does not involve watch repairers or makers, house painters, paper hangers, land surveyors, morticians, dancing schools, horse shoers, dry cleaners, layers of drain tile and things of that kind, which have been correctly held beyond the police power of the Legislature for the very apt and fine reasons as set forth in the Livesay case, supra. The question before us though involves the classification of the entire automobile industry, an industry constituting one of the largest segments of our economy. This within itself gives some possible reason for the classification and the action of the Legislature in adopting and enacting this police statute. Phillips v. State, 202 Tenn. 402, 304 S.W.2d 614, which was prepared for this Court by Mr. Justice Tomlinson, who also wrote the very excellent opinion in the Livesay case.

It makes no difference what our personal views may be as to the necessity of such legislation as that herein, the fact remains that the Legislature of the State concluded that a reasonable basis existed for its enactment, and, there being some foundation in fact to justify this legislative action, the Court is powerless and it wouldn't be right on our part for us to substitute our judgment for that of the Legislature even if we cared to do so. Thus having concluded that the Legislature had the authority under the police power to regulate the purchase and sale of motor vehicles for the protection and general welfare of the public, we now come to consider various Sections of the Act and attacks made thereon.

Our reference to the Act in question is to the Act as codified in Sections 59-1701 through 59-1720, Cumulative Supplement to T.C.A.

The first section is a declaration of legislative intent, it being necessary for the public welfare etc., the Legislature under its police power passed this Act to regulate and license motor vehicles, dealers, salesmen, etc. The next section defines the principal terms used in the Act and then follows the creation of the Tennessee Motor Vehicle Commission, which was composed of one member from each of the nine Congressional Districts, plus a Chairman selected from the State at large, all selected and appointed by the Governor from a list furnished by the Tennessee Automotive Association. The Act provides for the qualifications, terms,...