Ford Motor Co. v. BRUCE TP., Docket No. 246579.

Citation689 N.W.2d 764,264 Mich. App. 1
Decision Date22 November 2004
Docket NumberDocket No. 246579.
PartiesFORD MOTOR COMPANY, Petitioner-Appellant, v. TOWNSHIP OF BRUCE, Respondent-Appellee, and Michigan Chamber of Commerce, Amicus Curiae.
CourtCourt of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Honigman Miller Schwartz and Cohn (by John S. Kane), Lansing, for the petitioner.

Seibert and Dloski, P.L.L.C. (by Lawrence W. Dloski), Mt. Clemens, for the respondent.

Robert S. LaBrant, Lansing, for amicus curiae the Michigan Chamber of Commerce.

Before: RICHARD ALLEN GRIFFIN, P.J., and MARK J. CAVANAGH and FORT HOOD, JJ.

MARK J. CAVANAGH, J.

Petitioner appeals as of right the dismissal of its petition for review by the Michigan Tax Tribunal (MTT) on the ground that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.1 We affirm.

On February 19, 2002, petitioner filed its petition for review pursuant to MCL 211.53a for recovery of excess tax payments not made under protest. It averred that, because of a mutual mistake of fact, it had paid taxes in excess of the correct and lawful amount since "Petitioner and Respondent did not realize at the time the personal property tax statements were filed that Petitioner was double reporting certain assets." Specifically, petitioner claimed that its inadvertent double reporting on its personal property statements caused respondent to assess the personal property twice and petitioner to pay taxes twice on the same property, which constituted a mutual mistake of fact under MCL 211.53a.

On March 13, 2002, the MTT sua sponte entered an order of dismissal of the action. The MTT held, in pertinent part, that petitioner had not properly invoked its subject-matter jurisdiction under MCL 205.735 because petitioner had not protested the assessments at issue to its board of review. The MTT further held that the assessments at issue were not the result of either a clerical error or a mutual mistake of fact because the assessments resulted solely from petitioner's failure to properly prepare its personal property statements. The MTT, citing Int'l Place Apartments-IV v. Ypsilanti Twp., 216 Mich.App. 104, 109, 548 N.W.2d 668 (1996), and Wolverine Steel Co. v. Detroit, 45 Mich.App. 671, 674, 207 N.W.2d 194 (1973), noted that the "mere presence of an erroneous assessment does not suffice as either a clerical error or mutual mistake of fact," and, thus, petitioner failed to properly invoke the MTT's subject-matter jurisdiction under MCL 211.53a. Finally, the MTT noted that the remedy for the incorrect reporting of personal property is through the filing of a petition with the Michigan State Tax Commission under MCL 211.154.

Petitioner filed its claim of appeal with this Court and, without reaching the merits of the appeal, the order of dismissal was reversed and the matter remanded to the MTT for the purpose of addressing the issue of necessary joinder or substitution of parties. Ford Motor Co. v. Romeo, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered September 13, 2002 (Docket No. 240649). Thereafter, petitioner submitted a motion to the MTT to amend its petition to substitute Bruce Township for the City of Romeo as respondent and to make minor corrections in the petition. The amended petition averred that it was filed pursuant to MCL 211.53a for a refund of personal property taxes paid as a result of a mutual mistake in that property was reported twice and assessed twice. It further averred that the MTT had original and exclusive jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to MCL 205.731(b) because it was a proceeding for a tax refund under the property tax laws. On January 17, 2003, the MTT granted petitioner's motion to substitute, denied its motion for leave to file an amended petition, and dismissed the petition on the ground that petitioner had not properly invoked the MTT's subject-matter jurisdiction. This appeal followed.

Petitioner argues that the MTT erroneously concluded that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the petition, which sought a refund of excess taxes paid, pursuant to MCL 205.731(b), as a result of a mutual mistake of fact, as required by MCL 211.53a. We agree with petitioner that the MTT had jurisdiction, but uphold the decision to dismiss on the substantive basis of the MTT's holding — that petitioner failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted, MCR 2.116(C)(8). We review a decision of the MTT to determine whether it committed an error of law or adopted a wrong legal principle; factual findings supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole record will not be disturbed. Professional Plaza, L.L.C. v. Detroit, 250 Mich.App. 473, 474, 647 N.W.2d 529 (2002); Michigan Milk Producers Ass'n v. Dep't of Treasury, 242 Mich.App. 486, 490-491, 618 N.W.2d 917 (2000).

The Tax Tribunal Act, MCL 205.703 et seq., grants the MTT exclusive and original jurisdiction over property tax proceedings as follows:

The tribunal's exclusive and original jurisdiction shall be:
(a) A proceeding for direct review of a final decision, finding, ruling, determination, or order of an agency relating to assessment, valuation, rates, special assessments, allocation, or equalization, under property tax laws.
(b) A proceeding for refund or redetermination of a tax under the property tax laws. [MCL 205.731.]

Petitioner argues that, pursuant to MCL 205.731(b), the MTT had jurisdiction over its petition for a refund under the property tax laws, namely, MCL 211.53a of the General Property Tax Act, which provides:

Any taxpayer who is assessed and pays taxes in excess of the correct and lawful amount due because of a clerical error or mutual mistake of fact made by the assessing officer and the taxpayer may recover the excess so paid, without interest, if suit is commenced within 3 years from the date of payment, notwithstanding that the payment was not made under protest.

Relying on Shell Oil Co. v. Estate of Kert, 161 Mich.App. 409, 421-422, 411 N.W.2d 770 (1987), a contract case, petitioner claims that the excess payment was the result of a "mutual mistake of fact" within the contemplation of the statute because "Ford mistakenly identified this property twice on its personal property statement, and the assessor mistakenly based the assessment on that non-existent property's putative value." Because the MTT is vested with the power and authority to adjudicate tax refund cases, it had subject-matter jurisdiction over petitioner's petition. See In re AMB, 248 Mich.App. 144, 166-167, 640 N.W.2d 262 (2001). Accordingly, we turn to the substantive basis for the MTT's holding — that petitioner failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted. See MCR 2.116(C)(8).

The meaning of the phrase "mutual mistake of fact" as provided in MCL 211.53a presents an issue of statutory construction. In construing a statute, our goal is to ascertain, and give effect to, the intent of the Legislature; thus, we first consider the statute's language. In re MCI, 460 Mich. 396, 411, 596 N.W.2d 164 (1999). If the plain and ordinary meaning of the language is clear, judicial construction is neither necessary nor permitted. Sun Valley Foods Co. v. Ward, 460 Mich. 230, 236-237, 596 N.W.2d 119 (1999). The fair and natural import of its terms, in view of the subject matter of the law, governs. In re Wirsing, 456 Mich. 467, 474, 573 N.W.2d 51 (1998). On March 8, 2000, the MTT issued an "order designating definition of `mutual mistake of fact' as precedent" as that phrase is used in MCL 211.53a. General Products Delaware Corp. v. Leoni Twp., 2001 WL 432245, Docket No. 249550 (Mich. Tax Tribunal, March 8, 2001). We accord deference to the MTT's interpretation of a statute that it is legislatively charged with enforcing, although we are not bound by that interpretation. See Judges of the 74th Judicial Dist. v. Bay Co., 385 Mich. 710, 727-729, 190 N.W.2d 219 (1971); Bechtel Power Corp. v. Dep't of Treasury, Revenue Div., 128 Mich.App. 324, 329, 340 N.W.2d 297 (1983).

MCL 211.53a was enacted following our Supreme Court's decision in Consumers Power Co. v. Muskegon Co., 346 Mich. 243, 78 N.W.2d 223 (1956),2 which held that equitable principles did not apply to cases seeking recovery of excess taxes paid by mistake because taxation powers are controlled by constitutional and statutory provisions. Id. at 247-251, 78 N.W.2d 223. In that case, the respondent's assessor calculated and levied the excess tax, and the petitioner, which failed to discover that the amount was excessive, paid the tax. The excess tax was the result of the assessor misplacing the decimal point when entering the tax data into the tax and assessment rolls so that instead of, for example, the proper tax of $32.94 being entered, the erroneous tax of $329.40 was entered. Id. at 251-253, 78 N.W.2d 223 (Smith, J., dissenting). In other words, the error was not based on misinformation, it was based on an obvious clerical or arithmetic mistake. The Court concluded that "[t]o grant the relief requested by the plaintiff would require this Court to exercise legislative prerogatives — namely, to write into the statute the right to recover taxes paid under mutual mistake." Id. at 251, 78 N.W.2d 223.

Subsequently, in 1958 the Legislature exercised its authority and provided a limited remedy in cases of excess taxation, i.e., "Any taxpayer who is assessed and pays taxes in excess of the correct and lawful amount due because of a clerical error or mutual mistake of fact made by the assessing officer and the taxpayer may recover the excess so paid...." MCL 211.53a. In 1967, the Legislature more directly addressed the issue raised in Consumers Power Co., supra, by enacting MCL 211.53b(1) which begins: "If there has been a clerical error or a mutual mistake of fact relative to the correct assessment figures, the rate of taxation, or the mathematical computation relating to the assessing of taxes...." MCL...

To continue reading

Request your trial
4 cases
  • Ford Motor Company v. City of Woodhaven
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Michigan
    • June 28, 2006
    ...Ford appealed to the Court of Appeals. In a split, published decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the MTT's order. 264 Mich.App. 1, 689 N.W.2d 764 (2004). First, the Court of Appeals majority opined that the MTT had subject-matter jurisdiction over Ford's petition because the MTT is vest......
  • Pac. Props. v. Twp. of Shelby
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan (US)
    • March 1, 2005
    ...when the plain and ordinary meaning of the language is clear, judicial construction is neither necessary nor permitted. Id.; Ford Motor Co, supra at 7. We must enforce clear unambiguous statutes as written. Shinholster, supra at 549; Jackson Community College, supra at 679. MCL 205.731 esta......
  • Moore v. Prestige Painting
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan (US)
    • December 8, 2004
    ......Docket No. 249924. Court of Appeals of Michigan. ...Ford Motor Co., 439 Mich. 257, 269, 484 N.W.2d 227 ......
  • Sobiecki v. Michigan Department of Corrections
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan (US)
    • May 18, 2006
    ...judgment without delay" when "the pleadings show that a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Ford Motor Co. v. Bruce Twp., 264 Mich. App. 1, 15, 689 N.W.2d 764 (2004). This case presents issues of law only. Upon concluding that defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter ......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT