Pac. Props. v. Twp. of Shelby
| Decision Date | 01 March 2005 |
| Docket Number | 249945 |
| Parties | PACIFIC PROPERTIES, LLC, Petitioner-Appellant, v. TOWNSHIP OF SHELBY, Respondent-Appellee |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
UNPUBLISHED
Before: Markey, P.J., and Murphy and O'Connell, JJ.
This case arises out of the improper assessment of taxes for Pacific Properties (Pacific's) real property situated in the Charter Township of Shelby, Macomb County. Pacific appeals by leave granted the Michigan Tax Tribunal (MTT or tribunal) dismissal for lack of jurisdiction a petition to amend the property's assessed and taxable values for tax years 1999 and 2000. We reverse and remand for entry of an order granting the relief requested.
The parties agree on the relevant facts. Pacific owns a parcel of real property (23-07-13376-031) in Shelby Township. At its December 2000 meeting, the township's board of review erroneously revised the assessed and taxable value of the property for tax years 1999 and 2000 to include the value of a building that was not located on the property. Pacific was not notified of the change until January 2001 when it received its revised 2000 tax bill. Pacific asserts that it did not learn how and why this problem arose until receiving a letter from the township's attorney dated April 24 2003, which states:
Sometime after the March Board of Review, an employee of Shelby Township's Assessor Department came to the Assistant Assessor and indicated that property had been omitted for tax parcel 23-07-13-376-031, because there had been construction of a building on the property. The adding of the value of this building to the assessment was placed upon the December, 2000, Board of Review meeting. The Shelby Township's Assessor's office employee had the wrong parcel number on the material provided to the Assistant Assessor. The new construction was on a different parcel number.
When Pacific brought the error to the attention of the township assessor's office, the assessor contacted the State Tax Commission (STC) and was advised that Pacific must seek its relief from the tribunal. Consequently, on July 1, 2002, Assessor William D. Griffin wrote to the tribunal requesting that the assessed and taxable values for the subject parcel be amended for tax years 1999 and 2000 pursuant to MCL 211.53a.[1] Griffin stated in his letter that "[t]he assessed and taxable values were revised in error as a part of the 2000 December Board of Review without properly notifying the taxpayer," and that "[t]he taxpayer was not aware of the value change until January 2001 upon receiving the revised 2000 tax bill." Griffin requested that the assessed value of the parcel for 1999 and 2000 be changed from $497,840 to $34,500, and the taxable value changed from $475,650 for each year to $12,310 (1999) and $12,540 (2000). The tribunal treated Griffin's letter as a "stipulation," docketed the matter as a petition by Pacific, and notified Griffin the filing was defective without a motion fee and address of the "petitioner."
On July 25, 2002, Pacific filed a motion with the tribunal to amend the assessed and taxable value of its property pursuant to MCL 211.53a in accordance with Griffin's letter. On August 2, 2002, the tribunal hearing officer entered an "Order Denying Parties' Stipulation for Entry of Consent Judgment," finding that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction under MCL 211.53a. The hearing officer reasoned that because Griffin stated in his letter that the "building was erroneously added to the assessment roll when in fact it did not exist," "it does not appear that the assessments for tax year(s) 1999 and 2000 were the result of a clerical error or mutual mistake of fact." The hearing officer further determined that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction over the subject assessments because Pacific had failed to timely appeal the changed assessments in accordance with the time limits required by MCL 211.27b and 205.735.
On October 9, 2002, the parties filed a joint motion for reconsideration. The parties argued that MCL 211.27b is not applicable because that section is limited to issues involving transfers of ownership and correcting arithmetic errors. The parties also argued that MCL 205.735 is not applicable because, although that section provides time limits for protesting an assessment, it does not delineate the MTT's subject-matter jurisdiction. The parties further contended that although MCL 205.735 might bar recovery if it were raised as an affirmative defense, the township conceded that Pacific was entitled to have the assessed and taxable value for its property for 1999 and 2000 corrected.
On December 18, 2002, the MTT denied the parties' motion for reconsideration. The hearing officer first determined that the motion was untimely[2] and that the township had no authority to waive the statutory deadline. The hearing officer then found that although the parties were correct that MCL 211.27b was inapplicable to this case, the error was inconsequential because MCL 205.735 requires compliance with the time limits to invoke the tribunal's jurisdiction, citing Electronic Data Systems Corp v Twp of Flint, 253 Mich.App. 538; 656 N.W.2d 215 (2002). The hearing officer also found no palpable error in his earlier determination that the tribunal did not have jurisdiction under MCL 211.53a because the erroneous tax assessments did not result from a clerical error or a mutual mistake of fact. Instead, the board of review failed "'to consider all relevant data,'" which was not a clerical error, citing Int'l Place Apartments-IV v Ypsilanti Twp, 216 Mich.App. 104; 548 N.W.2d 668 (1996). Further, although MCL 211.53a provides an exception to the jurisdictional time limits of § 735, here, the township assessor's office made a unilateral mistake; there was no mutual mistake of fact required by § 53a.
On July 25, 2003, Pacific filed a delayed application for leave to appeal with this Court, which was granted. This Court directed the parties to address whether jurisdiction over this issue lies with the MTT or with, for example, the STC. During these proceedings, the subject property was scheduled for a tax sale because the erroneous assessment had not been paid. The parties stipulated to stay the tax sale pending a final determination of the validity of the assessment.
In the absence of fraud our review of property tax valuations or allocations on appeal from the MTT is limited by Const 1963, art 6, § 28 to "error[s] of law or the adoption of wrong principles." EDS, supra at 541; MCI Telecommunications Corp v Dep't of Treasury, 136 Mich.App. 28, 30; 355 N.W.2d 627 (1984). We must generally accept factual findings of the tribunal but an error of law occurs when decisions of the tribunal are not supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole record. Great Lakes Div of Nat Steel Corp v City of Ecorse, 227 Mich.App. 379, 388; 576 N.W.2d 667 (1998); Kern v Pontiac Twp, 93 Mich.App. 612, 620; 287 N.W.2d 603 (1979). Finally, we review de novo the questions of law presented here: whether the tribunal has jurisdiction, Jackson Community College v Dep't of Treasury, 241 Mich.App. 673, 678; 621 N.W.2d 707 (2000), and the interpretation and application of pertinent statutes, WA Foote Mem Hosp v City of Jackson, 262 Mich.App. 333, 336; 686 N.W.2d 9 (2004).
The primary goal of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. Wikman v Novi, 413 Mich. 617, 631; 322 N.W.2d 103 (1982); Ford Motor Co v Bruce Twp, 264 Mich.App. 1, 7; 689 N.W.2d 764 (2004). We look first to the words used in the statute because they are the most reliable evidence of the Legislature's intent. Shinholster v Annapolis Hosp, 471 Mich. 540, 549; 685 N.W.2d 275 (2004); Wikman, supra at 632. We must construe an entire act as a whole and interpret particular words in one part giving due consideration to every other part so as to produce a meaning that is, if possible, an harmonious and consistent whole. Great Lakes, supra at 431. Thus, we must give effect to every word, phrase, or clause of a statute by considering its plain meaning as well as "'its placement and purpose in the statutory scheme.'" Shinholster, supra at 549, quoting Sun Valley Foods Co v Ward, 460 Mich. 230, 237; 596 N.W.2d 119 (1999). Of course, when the plain and ordinary meaning of the language is clear, judicial construction is neither necessary nor permitted. Id.; Ford Motor Co, supra at 7. We must enforce clear and unambiguous statutes as written. Shinholster, supra at 549; Jackson Community College, supra at 679.
MCL 205.731 establishes the jurisdiction of the MTT by providing: The tribunal's exclusive and original jurisdiction shall be:
Whether this case is considered a "proceeding for direct review of a . . . determination . . . relating to assessment, [or] valuation . . . under the property tax laws," or as a "proceeding for . . . redetermination of a tax under the property tax laws," the plain and unambiguous words of § 731 provide that the tribunal has subject-matter jurisdiction over the issue presented in this case. See Highland-Howell Development Co, LLC v Marion Twp 469 Mich. 673, 674, 676; 677 N.W.2d 810 (2004); WPW Acquisition Co v City of Troy (On Remand), 254 Mich.App. 6, 8; 656 N.W.2d 881 (2002). But a petitioner must act timely to invoke the jurisdiction of the tribunal. For "an assessment dispute . ....
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