Ford Motor Co. v. Burdeshaw
| Decision Date | 12 May 1995 |
| Citation | 661 So.2d 236 |
| Parties | Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 14,231 FORD MOTOR COMPANY v. June BURDESHAW, as administratrix of the Estate of Robin Burdeshaw, deceased. 1931482. |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Samuel H. Franklin and Harlan I. Prater IV of Lightfoot, Franklin, White & Lucas, Birmingham, for appellant.
Kevin J. Hawkins of Hardin & Hawkins, Birmingham, for appellee.
June Burdeshaw sued Ford Motor Company (hereinafter "Ford"), alleging that negligence on its part had caused the wrongful death of her husband, Robin Burdeshaw. Specifically, she contended that Ford negligently manufactured a defective automatic transmission shifter, and negligently designed and manufactured a defective brake system, on a 1978 Ford truck and that that negligence caused the death of her husband, when the truck's transmission slipped out of "neutral" into "reverse" and caused the truck to crush him against a loading dock. Ford argued that the accident was not due to any negligence on its part, but rather was due to poor maintenance and to the natural wear of the components of the truck. The jury found in favor of Mrs. Burdeshaw and awarded her $1,225,000 for the wrongful death of her husband. Ford filed a series of posttrial motions, requesting that the trial court enter a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, grant a new trial. The trial court denied these requests, specifically stating:
Generally, in cases where a defect in a vehicle is alleged to have caused an injury-producing accident, manufacturers have been sued on one or more of three legal theories: implied warranty, under Alabama's implied warranty of merchantability statute, Ala.Code 1975, § 7-2-314; common law negligence; and liability under the Alabama Extended Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine (AEMLD). General Motors Corp. v. Edwards, 482 So.2d 1176 (Ala.1985). Here, however, Burdeshaw dropped her AEMLD claim, and the only theory submitted to the jury was common law negligence. Negligence is the failure to do what a reasonably prudent person would have done under the same or similar circumstances, or the doing of something that a reasonably prudent person would not have done under the same or similar circumstances. Elba Wood Products, Inc. v. Brackin, 356 So.2d 119 (Ala.1978). To recover under a negligence claim, the plaintiff must establish (1) that the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff; (2) that the defendant breached that duty; (3) that the plaintiff suffered a loss or an injury; and (4) that the defendant's negligence was the actual and proximate cause of that loss or injury. Lollar v. Poe, 622 So.2d 902 (Ala.1993).
When reviewing a jury verdict, we presume that the verdict is correct, and we review the tendencies of the evidence most favorably to the prevailing party. Mason & Dixon Lines, Inc. v. Byrd, 601 So.2d 68 (Ala.1992). We indulge such reasonable inferences as the jury was free to draw from the evidence, and we will not overturn a jury verdict unless the evidence clearly indicates that the jury's verdict was wrong and unjust. Mason & Dixon Lines, supra. This presumption is further strengthened by the trial court's denial of a motion for a new trial. Senn v. Alabama Gas Corp., 619 So.2d 1320 (Ala.1993). The credibility and weight of the evidence presented at trial are for the jury to determine, and the jury's verdict is not easily set aside by the court. Stokes v. Long-Lewis Ford, Inc., 549 So.2d 51 (Ala.1989).
Viewing the record with the attendant presumptions, we note the following:
In October 1990, Robin Burdeshaw was crushed to death when the transmission of a 1978 Ford garbage truck jumped from "neutral" into "reverse" and the truck moved, pinning him against a loading dock. The Ford truck was owned by Mr. Burdeshaw's employer, the Wiregrass Rehabilitation Center ("Wiregrass"), and was used in its recycling activities. The compactor was powered by the truck's "power takeoff" unit ("PTO unit") and operation of the compactor required an engine speed of about 1500 rpm. Most garbage trucks have a hand throttle in the rear to increase the engine speed when necessary to operate the compactor. However, this truck had no hand throttle. Rather, to maintain an accelerated engine speed during compactor operations, Wiregrass employees placed a piece of pipe between the driver's seat and the accelerator pedal.
An employee of Wiregrass testified that on the day of the accident he visually inspected the truck and then backed the truck to approximately 10 feet from the loading dock. He put the...
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