Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Waters

Decision Date29 January 1973
Docket NumberNo. 72-441,72-441
Citation273 So.2d 96
Parties12 UCC Rep.Serv. 18 FORD MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY, Appellant, v. Milton R. WATERS, Jr., Appellee.
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

Bradford, Williams, McKay, Kimbrell, Hamann & Jennings and B. Hume Morris, II, Miami, for appellant.

Copeland, Therrel, Baisden & Peterson and Fred R. Baisden, Jr., Miami Beach, for appellee.

Before PEARSON and HENDRY, JJ., and SPECTOR, SAMUEL, Associate Judge.

HENDRY, Judge.

Appellant defendant, Ford Motor Credit Company, seeks review of that part of an amended final judgment awarding $1,000.00 punitive damages to the appellee in his action for conversion of certain personal property contained in his automobile repossessed by an agent of the appellant. Appellee Waters has filed a cross-appeal concerning the vacating of an award for compensatory damages of $738.00 for wrongful repossession of the car itself. No issue is raised by either party as to the propriety of compensatory damages of $311.00 as the value of the personal property converted by appellant.

On April 25, 1969, appellee Waters purchased a new 1970 Ford Maverick from Jones Ford, Inc., of Charleston Heights, South Carolina and signed a South Carolina automobile installment contract. 1 Appellee paid $450.00 down on the car and financed the balance of the purchase price ($1,786.50) with Ford Motor Credit Company at a rate of $60.07 per month for 36 months, commencing May 28, 1969. Appellee made timely payments from May through January. At that time he received a payment deferment from the appellant. Thereafter appellee's pattern of payments was irregular and in many cases untimely. In May or June of 1970 appellee moved to Miami and fell one month behind in his payments. At that time the South Carolina office of appellant referred the account to their Miami office for collection and appellee received notice of a late payment charge from appellant. Thereafter, on July 3, 1970, appellee paid up the missed payment and his payment for June of 1970. Appellee's July payment, however, was also a month late, and his August payment was almost two months late. 2 In September, 1970, appellee received a second late payment notice and subsequently made three more payments in October and November of 1970, and in January of 1971. 3 In November, 1970, a second collection ticket was sent to the Miami office of the appellant. Appellee's automobile was repossessed on January 25, 1971, at which time appellant's records reflected that appellee was three months in arrears, 4 while appellee thought he was only a month behind. In reality, appellee was two months behind in his payments at the time of the repossession of his car.

The repossession of appellee's car was accomplished peaceably and without violence by an agent of the appellant making a duplicate set of keys to the car and driving it away from the parking lot of appellee's place of business. Appellant's agent, a Mr. Seagren, was performing his first repossession even though he had observed the procedures for same some three to five times during his six week employment with appellant. According to company procedures, Seagren returned the car to appellant's storage parking lot and inventoried the personal property therein. However, contrary to procedure, Seagren then returned the property to the automobile 5 rather than to the company to be held for the appellee. Appellee's attempts to procure the return of his property prior to the car's sale met with failure and the property was never recovered. Both parties agreed that the value of the personal property was $311.00.

Final judgment was rendered in appellee's favor after a nonjury trial and appellee was awarded $311.00 compensatory damages for the loss of his personal property, $738.00 compensatory damages for the wrongful repossession of his car, and $1,000.00 punitive damages for the conversion of his personal property. The judgment was subsequently amended to eliminate the award for wrongful repossession of the car and is the subject of appellee's cross-appeal. Appellant challenges the award of $1,000.00 punitive damages.

Initially, it is our opinion that the granting of punitive damages in the instant case was proper and not an abuse of the trial judge's discretion sitting as the trier of fact under the circumstances appearing of record and before the court. In the recent case of Buie v. Barnett First National Bank of Jacksonville, Fla.1972, 266 So.2d 657, our Supreme Court has noted:

'Punitive or exemplary damages are allowable, however, solely as punishment or 'smart money' to be inflicted for the malicious or wanton state of mind with which the defendant violated plaintiff's legal right, and can only be imposed in cases where either by direct or circumstantial evidence some reasonable basis for an inference of wantonness, actual malice, deliberation, gross negligence, or utter disregard of law on defendant's party may be legitimately drawn by the jury trying the case.' (Quoting Winn & Lovett Grocery Co. v. Archer, 126 Fla. 308, 171 So. 214.)

In Richards Co. v. Harrison, Fla.App.1972, 262 So.2d 258, 262, the First District Court of Appeal also stated that punitive damages are allowable in circumstances where the defendant:

'. . . (A)cts willfully or with such gross negligence as to indicate a Wanton disregard of the rights of others. Punitive damages need not flow from an intentional course of conduct or intent to inflict damages but may also be allowed in such cases where there is that Entire want of care which would raise the presumption of a conscious indifference to the consequences of one's action or inaction.' (Emphasis supplied.)

In the case sub judice just such a showing of wanton disregard of the rights of appellee in and to his personal property appears of record, as well as an entire want of care...

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29 cases
  • King v. South Jersey Nat. Bank
    • United States
    • New Jersey Supreme Court
    • December 10, 1974
    ...repossession to be unconscionable. Fontaine v. Industrial Nat'l. Bank, R.I., 298 F.2d 521 (R.I.Sup.Ct.1973); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Waters, 273 So.2d 96 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1973). Two other jurisdictions have reached the same result by barring all repossessions in which the creditor has not ......
  • Adams v. Southern California First National Bank
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • March 12, 1974
    ...opportunity for a hearing may in some instances be unconscionable, or void as a matter of public policy. See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Waters, 273 So.2d 96 (Fla. Dist.Ct.App.1973); Fontaine v. Industrial National Bank, 298 A.2d 521 (R.I.1973). Both cases held wrongful, summary repossession w......
  • Gaynor v. Union Trust Co., 14001
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • November 13, 1990
    ...a contract in force, by accepting late payments, while simultaneously enforcing a right to retake. See, e.g., Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Waters, 273 So.2d 96, 99-100 (Fla.App.1973); Barrier v. Marine Midland Trust Co., 263 Md. 596, 608-11, 284 A.2d 418 (1971); Cobb v. Midwest Recovery Bureau,......
  • Benschoter v. First Nat. Bank of Lawrence
    • United States
    • Kansas Supreme Court
    • November 8, 1975
    ...it may be liable for damages. (Klingbiel v. Commercial Credit Corporation, 439 F.2d 1303 (10th Cir. 1971); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Waters, 273 So.2d 96 (Fla.App.1973); and Jerman v. Superior Court, 245 Cal.App.2d 852, 54 Cal.Rptr. 374 (1966).) (See also, K.S.A. 84-9-507 and Annot., 35 A.L.......
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