Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Parks
| Decision Date | 11 May 2022 |
| Docket Number | 1D21-1130 |
| Parties | FORD MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY, LLC, Appellant, v. Yolanda D. PARKS, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Michael Ingino of Moody, Jones & Ingino, P.A., Plantation, for Appellant.
Yolanda D. Parks, pro se, Appellee.
At issue is the legibility of the fine print in an electronically filed copy of the two-page motor vehicle lease agreement between Ford Motor Credit Company, LLC, and Yolanda D. Parks. Ford sued Parks for failing to make payments totaling $7,986.45 under the lease, copies of which were attached to Ford's complaint and entered electronically into evidence during the virtual bench trial.
A month post-trial, the trial court entered a final judgment in favor of Parks. The sole reason for doing so was that the trial court deemed the electronically filed lease agreement to be "illegible," such that it "cannot decipher the written contractual language and, thus, cannot enter an award of damages based upon unknown contract language." Ford appeals, claiming the trial court erred in concluding that the language in the electronically filed copy of the lease was undecipherable.
To begin, Ford points out that no objection to the lease's legibility was made at trial and that the trial court did not "indicate that it found the subject lease agreement to be illegible" at that time; it bemoans that the trial court "did not provide [Ford] with an opportunity to reply with a ‘more legible copy’ of the subject contract." Once the trial court issued its final order, however, Ford had the opportunity seek a new trial and submit a clearly legible copy, but it didn't do so. See Fla. Sm. Cl. R. 7.180 (2021).1 Ford thereby can't complain that it lacked an opportunity to clear up the matter prior to appealing the final judgment. Filing a legible copy of the lease agreement in the trial court after filing a notice of appeal, as was done in this case, is pointless because the trial judge had lost jurisdiction at that point. Perhaps the trial court should have sought a clearer copy of the lease before rendering a final judgment.2 But the responsibility to ensure that filed documents are legible generally falls on the litigants, not the trial courts.
Turning to the merits, the focus of Ford's appellate argument is that the totality of the record evidence, including the decipherable portions of the "illegible" lease agreement, was sufficient to establish its entitlement to a money judgment in its favor. It argues that it established, via documentary evidence and testimony at trial, the elements of a breach of contract claim: (a) the existence of a contract; (b) a breach of the contract; and (c) damages resulting from the breach. A.R. Holland, Inc. v. Wendco Corp ., 884 So. 2d 1006, 1008 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004).
Putting aside the latter two elements, no one contests that the first element was established, i.e., that a written contract existed between Ford and Parks. The contract was attached to Ford's complaint, was separately admitted into evidence without objection, and was the focus of Ford's witness who testified Parks entered and then breached it. Indeed, the trial judge stated that this action is "based on a written contract between the parties." The only question is its legibility and sufficiency as evidence.
Little caselaw exists nationwide involving whether an appellate court may substitute its judgment as to a document's legibility for that of the trial court. The limited caselaw reflects that appellate courts may do so, but only if the relevant portions of the document are readily discernable. For example, in Burrell v. Kaiser's Estate , 344 S.W.2d 622, 625 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961), the Missouri appellate court examined a handwritten note and concluded that it was legible, stating that Georgia appellate courts review documents for legibility, but reported cases typically confirm the trial court's determinations. See, e.g., Black v. Floyd , 280 Ga. 525, 630 S.E.2d 382, 383 (2006) ( ; see also Butler Auction Co., Inc. v. Hosch , 120 Ga.App. 541, 171 S.E.2d 651, 652 (1969) ().
The electronically filed copy of the lease agreement at issue is not entirely illegible. Many portions of the agreement are legible without magnification because they are in a larger font; other portions are legible because computer magnification increases their visual size rendering them readable. As Ford points out, the agreement "was electronically filed and, although not a perfect image, the words can be deciphered, especially when using a computer monitor which has the capability to be magnified." The pertinent inquiry is whether the relevant portions of the electronically filed lease agreement are decipherable, even if not perfectly legible, with readily available computer magnification.
By this standard, the agreement is decipherable as to the parties (who are clearly legible), the nature of the agreement and its terms (clearly legible as an automobile lease agreement with specified payments due), and nonpayment as a ground for default in paragraph 33 (which is legible in part and decipherable in part).
Paragraph 33 is entitled "DEFAULT" in a large, legible font. The first sentence of the paragraph says that "You will be in default if (a) You fail to make any payments when due[.]" These decipherable portions make clear that Parks is in default (i.e., breach) if she fails to make payments. As in Kaiser's Estate , we do not agree that the electronically filed copy is entirely illegible; these key provisions "can be read" or "discerned," 344 S.W.2d at 625, and are sufficient evidence to establish Ford's contractual basis for its claim of default by Park.
As to the other two elements of Ford's breach of contract claim, the record evidence and testimony establish that Parks failed to make required payments; both she and Ford's witness testified to the breach. She initially made about seventeen monthly payments to Ford but stopped doing so thereafter, resulting in repossession of the vehicle and related expenses incurred by Ford. This record evidence was unrebutted, thereby establishing the latter two elements: breach and damages. While portions of paragraph 33 detailing the default balance due (after repossession and sale of the vehicle) are, in large measure, decipherable, some portions are less so; Ford's witness, however, specifically testified about how the balance due of $7,986.45 was calculated pursuant to the terms of paragraph 33, thereby providing competent substantial evidence to support the amount of damages sought and proven.
We therefore conclude that the trial court erred in entering judgment in favor of Parks; the judgment below is reversed with instruction to enter a final judgment of $7,986.45 in Ford's favor.
REVERSED and REMANDED with instructions.
The county court erred for sure, and the judgment it rendered against Ford Motor Credit Company ("FMCC") must be reversed. The dispensing of justice surely can come with challenges in small-claim cases like this one, in which a large corporation appearing by counsel is up against an individual appearing pro se . On the one hand, the county court must honor the corporation's entitlement to prove its case for contract damages. On the other, the court feels a gentle tug toward a flexible application of the rules so the individual may participate fully. The county court certainly has leeway to strike the right procedural balance. See Fla. Sm. Cl. R. 7.010 (). In the American judicial enterprise, however, there is no room for play in the joints (so to speak) when it comes to faithfully applying the law, not even in a small-claim case. The county court appears to have gone astray on this fundamental point.1
I endeavor here to address what, in my view, should be the basis for reversal, which has nothing to do with whether the county court should have been able to read an obscure, tucked-away paragraph on the second page of a digital scan. The reversible error is the county court's lack of authority to do what it did—render a judgment resting on an apparent defense that was not raised or tried by consent. Relatedly, even if that defense properly had been in play, the essential terms of the agreement between the parties and the quantification of FMCC's damages as result of Parks's breach were readily apparent to all. By any measure, the disposition imposed by the county court did not comport with the proven facts and the applicable law. It was wholly unreasonable.
FMCC claimed that Parks breached her 24-month car lease when she stopped making monthly payments. Parks was seven payments short of satisfying her obligation under the lease agreement. FMCC did its best to fit the awkwardly long and skinny sized, two-page lease agreement into an 8.5-by-11-inches PDF,2 and that PDF was part its electronically filed statement of claim. The exhibit looked like this in the digital record:
The reader of this opinion will just have to trust me that on a computer screen, with just two fingers, one could zoom in to see the pertinent text easily. When I do this, I see the essential terms of the lease agreement on the first page, as follows:
Parks clearly signed the agreement, as...
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