Ford v. Blackshear Mfg. Co.
| Decision Date | 04 October 1913 |
| Citation | 79 S.E. 576,140 Ga. 670 |
| Parties | FORD et al. v. BLACKSHEAR MFG. CO. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
While a trial judge may, within the restrictions prescribed by Civ Code 1910,§ 5331, direct a verdict, this court will in no case reverse a judgment refusing to do so.
A ground of a motion for a new trial, complaining of the admission in evidence, overstated objections of the movants of certain documents, which are neither set out literally or in substance in the motion nor attached thereto as exhibits properly identified, but are merely referred to in the motion in general terms as being "fully set out in the brief of evidence accompanying this motion," presents no question for adjudication.
If a wife, having an equitable title to land to which a deed is taken in the name of her husband, permits him to hold the property and use it in his business and commercial transactions for the purpose of obtaining credit, and a third person, without notice of the equity, extends credit to the husband on the faith that the land is his, the wife, after the creditor has reduced his debt to judgment, will be estopped from asserting title to the land as against the lien of the judgment, although before rendition of the judgment the husband, in recognition of the equity, may have conveyed the land to her.
Where a creditor who holds a promissory note for the purchase price of goods reduces it to judgment, after a subsequent discharge of the debtor in bankruptcy the creditor cannot enforce an execution based on such judgment against property of the debtor acquired after such discharge.
(a) Whether or not such a creditor might have a right to enforce by appropriate proceedings, a liability for obtaining property by false pretenses or false representations, such is not the nature of the present case. It is an effort to enforce the liability based on contract.
(b) Under one phase of the evidence, the charge was erroneous in that it excluded from consideration the principle above announced.
(c) The error does not affect the whole case; and, in reversing the judgment, direction is given in regard to restricting the issues on another trial.
(d) The evidence authorized the verdict in so far as it found certain portions of the property subject to the plaintiff's fi fas.
Error from Superior Court, Tift County; W. E. Thomas, Judge.
Claim case by J. H. Ford and others against the Blackshear Manufacturing Company. Judgment for defendant, and claimants bring error. Reversed, with directions.
J. J. Forehand & Son and J. B. Williamson, all of Sylvester, for plaintiffs in error.
C. W. Fulwood, of Tifton, and Wilson, Bennett & Lambdin, of Waycross, for defendant in error.
1. One ground of the motion for a new trial complains that the court refused, on motion, to direct a verdict in favor of the claimants. While a trial judge may, within the restrictions prescribed by Civil Code, § 5331, direct a verdict, this court will in no case reverse a judgment refusing to do so. Green v. Scurry, 134 Ga. 482, 68 S.E. 77.
2. Complaint was made, in another ground, of a ruling of the judge admitting in evidence, over appropriate objection, a designated "commercial report" of the "financial condition of J. H. Ford, the defendant in fi. fa." It was alleged that the report was fully set out in the brief of evidence; but neither in form nor in substance was the document set out in the ground of the motion for new trial, by exhibit or otherwise. Under these circumstances, this ground of the motion was incomplete within itself, and insufficient to present any question for decision. Roberts v. Devane, 129 Ga. 604, 59 S.E. 289.
3. J. H. Ford was the defendant in fi. fa.; but no question was raised as to his right to interpose a claim, or as to the remedy in any respect. For title the claimants relied in part on a deed executed by J. H. Ford to Mrs. S.D. Ford, his wife. This was attacked by the plaintiff as fraudulent on the ground that it was a mere conveyance, without consideration, to defeat creditors. To meet this attack the claimants introduced evidence tending to show that the property was purchased with money of the wife, that legal title was taken in the name of the husband by mistake, and that before the plaintiff's judgment was obtained the husband had executed a deed to the wife in recognition of her equitable title. In reply the plaintiff introduced further evidence, and contended that if the money of the wife paid for the land, she permitted her husband to hold the legal title thereto and use it in his business and commercial transactions for the purpose of obtaining credit, that the plaintiff, without notice of any equity of the wife, and on the faith that the property belonged to the husband, extended credit to the latter, thereby creating the debt on which the judgment was based, and that under such circumstances the title of the wife could not be asserted against plaintiff"s judgment. Concerning these contentions the judge delivered a concrete charge, instructing the jury, in effect, that if they should find that the deed was based on a valuable consideration and not made by the husband to defeat his creditors, or, if he had such intention, the intent was not disclosed to the wife, the verdict should be for the claimant, unless they should further find that, although the wife was the owner of the land, she nevertheless permitted the husband to hold the same in his own name as a basis for credit in the conduct of his business and commercial transactions, and the plaintiff, without notice that she was the owner, extended the husband credit on the faith that his apparent ownership was real, in which latter event the property should be held subject. The claimants excepted to the charge on account of the qualification contained in the last part, urging as ground for exception that, as under the undisputed evidence the husband had executed the deed to the wife before the plaintiff obtained judgment, and assuming the deed to have been executed in good faith, and upon a valuable consideration, as hypothesized by the judge in his charge, the wife thereby acquired legal title, which would prevail in the contest with the judgment creditor.
There was no exception on the ground that the charge was otherwise contrary to the evidence. Under this criticism of the charge the question is not one of mere comparison of equities between the judgment creditor and the person holding the equitable title. Some of the cases in this state on that subject are: Reed v. Holbrook, 123 Ga. 781, 51 S.E 720; Roberts v. Devane, 129 Ga. 604 (5), 605, 59 S.E. 289; Kennedy v. Lee, 72 Ga. 39; Gorman v. Wood, 68 Ga. 524; Zimmer v. Dansby, 56 Ga. 79; Dill v. Hamilton, 118 Ga. 209, 44 S.E. 989. But the competition is between a judgment creditor and one claiming legal title to the property, the latter holding under a deed executed by the defendant before judgment was rendered against him, the deed having been executed in recognition of a preexisting equitable title in the grantee, arising from the fact that the money of the latter paid for the land, while the legal title was taken in the name of the grantor. Cases in which the competition was of this character are: Hunt v. Doyal, 128 Ga. 416, 57 S.E. 489; Bell v. Stewart, 98 Ga. 669, 27 S.E. 153; Dodd v. Bond, 88 Ga. 355, 14 S.E. 581. Under the principle of the cases last cited, the property would not be subject to the judgment if there were nothing more than the extension of credit by the creditor on the faith that the property, which was apparently that of the debtor, really belonged to the wife. But if, among other things, it further appeared, in addition to the extension of credit under the circumstances enumerated, that the conduct of the person holding the equity tended to induce third persons erroneously to believe that the property was in fact the property of the husband, as it appeared to be, and the creditor, upon the faith of the property being that of the husband, and without notice of the outstanding secret equity, extended credit to the husband, and thereby suffered loss, the holder of the title would be estopped from asserting it against the judgment obtained by the creditor. This is the doctrine of the Civil Code, § 4419, and is recognized in the cases last above cited. See, also, 5...
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