Ford v. Durie

Decision Date16 January 1894
Citation35 P. 595,8 Wash. 87
CourtWashington Supreme Court
PartiesFORD v. DURIE, CITY TREASURER. [1]

Appeal from superior court, King county; T. J. Humes, Judge.

Application by I. D. Ford for mandamus to compel Adolph Krug, treasurer of the city of Seattle, to execute a tax deed to certain lots sold to petitioner by the city of Seattle at a tax sale. A writ was denied, and petitioner appeals. Reversed.

Dunbar C.J., dissenting.

W. D. Lambuth, for appellant.

Geo Donworth and Jas. B. Howe, for respondent.

HOYT J.

But a single question is presented by the record in this case: Was the law in relation to the execution of deeds for lands sold for state and county taxes, in force at the date of the adoption of the charter of the city of Seattle, so made a part thereof by the provisions of section 34 of article 9 of said charter that a subsequent change in the law relating to such sales would have no effect upon the law repealed by such subsequent legislation so far as it related to the provisions of said charter? To ascertain the intent of the framers of the charter in that regard, it will be necessary to look at other provisions contained therein, from which it will clearly appear that it was their aim to assimilate all proceedings for the collection of taxes under the charter, so far as practicable, with those of the general law in force at the time of such collection. Interpreting the language of this particular section in the light of these provisions, and the evident intent of the framers of the charter as shown therefrom, it must be held that no specific provision of the statute in force relating to the execution of deeds for property sold for delinquent taxes was so made a part of the charter as not to be affected by subsequent general legislation. The language used is as follows: "Provided however, that no such deed shall be made until the notice is given that a tax deed will be applied for and such notice duly served as prescribed in the laws of the state of Washington relating to property sold for state or county taxes." The force of such language as well authorizes the contention of the appellant, that it refers to the law in force at the time of the making of the deed, as that of respondent, that it refers to that in force at the time of the adoption of the charter; and the intent of the framers of the charter, as manifested by other provisions makes it necessary that we should hold, with the...

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1 cases
  • Young v. Young
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • January 16, 1894

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