Ford v. Ford

• Decision Date: 01 September 1985
• Docket Number: No. 91,91
• Citation: 512 A.2d 389,307 Md. 105
• Parties: George Benjamin FORD, Jr. v. Pearl Rose Holland FORD. ,
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 105

307 Md. 105

512 A.2d 389

George Benjamin FORD, Jr. v. Pearl Rose Holland FORD.

No. 91, Sept. Term, 1985.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

July 25, 1986.

Rignal W. Baldwin, Jr. (Miller, Brassel & Baldwin, P.A., on brief), Annapolis, for appellant

Ellen Luff (Gill Cochran, on brief), Annapolis, for appellee.

Argued before SMITH, ELDRIDGE, COLE, RODOWSKY, COUCH and McAULIFFE, JJ., and CHARLES E. ORTH, Jr., Associate Judge of the Court of Appeals (retired), Specially Assigned.

CHARLES E. ORTH, Jr., Judge, Specially Assigned.

I

Pearl Rose Ford murdered her mother, Muriel L. Holland, by stabbing her some 40 times. She wrapped the body in plastic garbage bags and deposited it in the backyard of her home. She now seeks to obtain the property left her under her mother's will. George Benjamin Ford, Jr., her son, asserts that Pearl forfeited her entitlement to the property by the matricide and claims the property as the alternative beneficiary named in the will. The Orphans' Court for Anne Arundel County, in which the will was admitted to probate, ruled that George "be declared the heir" of the estate. The Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, on appeal by Pearl to it, decided that Pearl was entitled to the property. We ordered that a writ of certiorari be issued to the Court of Special Appeals, to which George appealed, before decision by that court.

II

The Maryland Legislature has not enacted a "slayer's" statute establishing what principles govern when a person kills another and would be tangibly enriched by the death. This Court, however, has addressed the matter in three of its decisions: Price v. Hitaffer, 164 Md. 505, 165 A. 470 (1933); Chase v. Jenifer, 219 Md. 564, 150 A.2d 251 (1959); and Schifanelli v. Wallace, 271 Md. 177, 315 A.2d 513 (1974). Through these cases the Court has created in the common law of this State, the equivalent of a "slayer's" Price concerned an appeal from an Orphans' Court order passed in the administration of the estate of an intestate. The order excluded from participation in the distribution of the estate the heirs or personal representatives of the husband of the deceased, who, it was admitted and proved, shot and killed his wife and almost immediately thereafter committed suicide. The question before this Court was:

statute, which we shall refer to herein as the "slayer's rule."

Can a murderer, or his heirs and representatives through him, be enriched by taking any portion of the estate of the one murdered? 164 Md. at 506, 165 A. 470.

The Court dealt with the question as one of first impression in Maryland and noted the conflicting decisions of other courts of last resort in this country. The decisions at that time represented two views.

One line of decisions apply the common-law principle of equity that no one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, to take advantage of his own wrong, to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime, and hold that provisions of a will and the statutes of descent and distribution should be interpreted in the light of those universally recognized principles of justice and morality; that such interpretation is justified and compelled by the public policy embraced in those principles or maxims, which must control the interpretation of law, statutes, and contracts. The other and opposite view, as expressed in those decisions which reach a different conclusion, is that, while they recognize the public policy of the common law as declared in the principles and equitable maxims above set forth, such public policy founded upon the common law has been abrogated and denied, and a new and different public policy declared by the Legislature in the enactment of statutes to direct descents and distribution, or governing the execution and effect of testamentary disposition. Some of the courts in the last mentioned group also rely upon constitutional or statutory declarations to the effect that conviction of The Court fully discussed the two views and forcefully rejected any view which would "result in sanctioning the enrichment of the perpetrator of the most heinous murder from the estate of his victim." Id. at 516-517, 165 A. 470.

                crime shall not work a corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate.   Id. at 506-507, 165 A. 470
                

Suffice it to say that we decline to follow the reasoning supporting any interpretation fraught with consequences so pernicious and so abhorrent to the sense of justice, equity, and morality entertained by what we are pleased to believe is the overwhelming majority of thoughtful and moral people, but prefer to give expression and adherence to the principles and reasoning so forcibly presented by those courts who have in the past adopted the views ... expressed [in the common law]. Id. at 517, 165 A. 470.

We observed in Chase v. Jenifer, 219 Md. at 567, 150 A.2d 251, that the decision in Price, which "was rested upon the maxim that one cannot profit by his own wrong, and on a broad ground of public policy of the common law," was perhaps not then supported by a majority of the courts dealing with the question. "Nevertheless," we declared, "we regard the decision of the Maryland Court [in Price ] as settled law." Chase, 219 Md. at 567, 150 A.2d 251. Thus, it is the basic rule of this State that a murderer, or his heirs or representatives through him, ordinarily may not profit by taking any portion of the estate of the one murdered.

The Court in Price indicated that "the equitable maxims of the common law" which it followed in answering the question before it, would apply not only in the case of intestacy but equally to benefits by way of wills and life insurance policies. 164 Md. at 516, 165 A. 470. Chase v. Jenifer, 219 Md. 564, 150 A.2d 251, involved the proceeds of a life insurance policy. The question was whether a wife, named as the beneficiary under the policy upon the life of her husband, "was disqualified from recovering the proceeds by reason of the fact that she killed her husband, was tried on a charge of murder," and was found not guilty of murder, but guilty of manslaughter. 219 Md. at 565, 150 In Schifanelli v. Wallace, 271 Md. 177, 315 A.2d 513, we were presented with virtually the same question we did not reach in Chase--whether the named beneficiary under a life insurance policy is precluded from collecting the proceeds by reason of the fact that he unintentionally killed his wife, the insured; the homicide was the result of gross negligence. We found that "the overwhelming weight of [t]he rule which prevents a beneficiary who has intentionally killed the insured from recovering on an insurance policy is grounded on the public policy against permitting a wilful and felonious killer to profit by his felony. Thus, it has no application where even though the acts of the beneficiary cause death, they are without the intent to do so, Tippens v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., [99 F.2d 671 (5th Cir.1938) ] supra; where the death is the result of accident, or even when caused by such gross negligence on the part of the beneficiary that he is guilty of involuntary manslaughter, the beneficiary may still recover, Commercial Travelers Mutual Acc. Ass'n v. Witte, [406 S.W.2d 145 (Ky.1966) ] supra; the basic rule is that while a beneficiary cannot recover where the death of the insured has been intentionally caused by his act, if it is the result of carelessness and is not intentional, the beneficiary's rights under the policy are not barred.... Id. [271 Md.] at 188-189, 315 A.2d 513 (citations omitted).

                A.2d 251. 1  The criminal court judge had found the beneficiary not guilty of murder but guilty of manslaughter, without designating, of course, whether it was voluntary or involuntary manslaughter. 2  It was contended in the civil proceeding that "an unintentional killing, even though unlawful and felonious," is not a bar to recovery.   Id. at 569, 150 A.2d 251.   We did not reach that point, however, because the facts clearly supported a finding by the criminal court [512 A.2d 392] judge that the killing was intentional. 3  There was "no room for a contention that the [killing] was merely negligent and unintended."   Id. at 570, 150 A.2d 251.   We held that where the killing is both felonious and intentional, the beneficiary cannot prevail.   Id.  In that context, we refused to distinguish between murder and manslaughter
                authority allows recovery where the beneficiary causes the death of the insured unintentionally or not feloniously."  271 Md. at 188, 315 A.2d 513 (citations omitted).   We observed, on the authority of cases cited, that
                

We held that the husband (the beneficiary) was not barred from recovering the policy proceeds merely because the death of his wife (the insured) "was the result of his gross negligence where that determination was accompanied by an express finding that the death was caused unintentionally." Id. at 189, 315 A.2d 513.

As established by Price, Chase and Schifanelli, the present status of the law of Maryland is:

1) A person who kills another

a) may not share in the distribution of the decedent's estate as an heir by way of statutes of descent and distribution, or as a devisee or legatee under the decedent's will, nor may he collect the proceeds as a beneficiary under a policy of insurance on the decedent's life when the homicide is felonious and intentional b) may share in the distribution of the decedent's estate as an heir by way of statutes of descent and distribution, or as a devisee or legatee under the decedent's will and may collect the proceeds as a beneficiary under a policy of insurance on the decedent's life when the homicide is unintentional even though it is the result of such gross negligence as would render the killer criminally guilty of involuntary manslaughter.

2) These principles apply not only to the killer but to those claiming through or under him.

3) The disposition of a criminal cause is not conclusive of the...