Ford v. Ford
| Decision Date | 27 September 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 63212,63212 |
| Parties | Jon R. FORD, Appellant, v. Jane FORD, Appellee. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
Rehearing Granted in Part and Denied in Part Jan. 23, 1989.
Certiorari to the Court of Appeals, Division No. IV; Ray Dean Linder, Trial Judge.
The trial court granted a decree of divorce. Husband and wife both appealed contesting the award of custody, the property division, support alimony award, attorney's fee and litigation expense award, temporary support award, and the granting of the divorce to both parties. Court of Appeals, Division IV affirmed the granting of the divorce to both parties and joint custody, but modified the property division, support alimony, attorney's fee and litigation expense award, and vacated the temporary support award. The wife sought certiorari.
CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED. COURT OF APPEALS OPINION VACATED IN PART, JUDGMENT OF TRIAL COURT AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART.
Robert J. Turner, Turner, Turner, Green & Braun, Oklahoma City, for appellant.
Philip F. Horning, Carolyn S. Thompson, Horning, Johnson, Grove, Moore & Hulett, Oklahoma City, for appellee.
This case involves the divorce of Jane and Jon Ford. The trial court granted the divorce, divided the property, awarded support alimony, established custody of the minor child, and ordered the husband to pay the wife's attorney's fee and litigation expenses. The husband appealed complaining of the property division, support alimony, award of attorney's fee, award of litigation expenses, award of additional temporary support, and that no grounds existed to award the wife a divorce. The wife appealed the determination of custody, amount of support alimony, and the division of property.
The Court of Appeals issued an opinion and the wife petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari. The petition for writ of certiorari was previously granted by the Court and we now turn to an analysis of the issues raised on the petition for certiorari. 1
The first issue raised by the petition is whether a spouse's practice of a profession such as law or medicine is to be characterized as jointly acquired marital property and subject to division. The Court of Appeals held that it was not. In Carpenter v. Carpenter, 657 P.2d 646 (Okl.1983) we approved the award of jointly acquired marital property based in part on a valuation of a closely held professional corporation providing medical services. Here the trial court properly held that the husband's law practice was in part jointly acquired property.
Where one spouse brings separate property to a marriage and an increased value of the property occurs as a result of joint efforts of the husband and wife, the other spouse is entitled to an interest in the appreciation of the property. Templeton v. Templeton, 656 P.2d 250, 252 (Okl.1982). The trial court found that:
"the wife has been the primary caretaker for the minor child of the parties since its birth and does not now, nor has she during the marriage worked outside the home except for one semester while she was at school." R. at 70.
The minor child was five years old at the time of the decree of divorce. The share of "joint industry" attributable to the wife need not be in the form of a monetary contribution or actually working in the law office as suggested by the husband. In Carpenter v. Carpenter, supra, the wife was briefly employed during the early years of marriage and then devoted herself to the rearing of children, running the home, and volunteer work.
The evidence was conflicting as to the value of the husband's law practice. The husband testified that the practice had a value of approximately $113,000.00 as based upon stockholders' equity, accounts receivable, an estimated amount uncollectable, work in progress, and a received bonus. The wife's evidence was that the law practice had a value of approximately $150,000.00. The difference between the value arrived at by the husband and that of the wife was due to 1) An addition of $3,000.00 cash held by the corporation at the time of trial and 2) An amount of accounts receivable that the husband said was uncollectable as to which the wife's expert had the opinion that it had some value as being potentially collectible in the future. The husband testified that the practice had a value of $40,000.00 in 1975 and that he married Jane Ford in November of 1975. The trial court determined the value of the law practice to be $136,325.00, and then subtracted $40,000.00 to reach a value of $96,325.00 for the practice. The trial court then awarded each party one-half of the $96,325.00. The trial court further awarded each party one-half the value of the building used in the law practice.
A trial court's valuation of property will be left undisturbed unless clearly against the weight of the evidence. Johnson v. Johnson, 674 P.2d 539, 544 (Okl.1983). See also, Carpenter v. Carpenter, 657 P.2d at 652-53. Although the value of the husband's "uncollectable" accounts receivable was based to some extent on speculation by both parties' testimony, we are unable, based on the evidence, to find that the trial court's value of the law practice was clearly against the weight of the evidence. Thus, the value of the law practice made by the trial court will be left undisturbed.
The second issue raised on certiorari by the wife is that the marital estate should not be reduced by amounts spent during the marriage for medical expenses of one of the wife's children by a former marriage. There was testimony that at least $30,000.00 had been spent for such purpose, but not from separate funds of the husband. Husband without citing any authority asks this court to "carve out a rule" that such expenditures be considered in reducing property or alimony awarded the wife. A husband is not obligated to support a wife's children by a former marriage. Byers v. Byers, 618 P.2d 930 (Okl.1980). But his gratuitous payments for the child's medical expenses were considered by the trial court in balancing the equities in the property settlement. The trial court stated that:
"There was controversy as to the amount, but the Court did take into consideration that a substantial sum was spent, that at least $30,000.00 of the medical attention provided quite likely came from out-of-pocket expenditures by the plaintiff for the seriously ill daughter and as such, there was some reduction in the amount of property that would be set over to the defendant." R. at 80.
Although the trial court said he "did take into consideration" such payments he did not in fact deduct them from the martial estate. Title 10 O.S.1981 § 15 states:
"A husband is not bound to maintain his wife's children by a former husband; but if he receives them into his family and supports them, it is presumed that he does so as a parent, and where such is the case, they are not liable to him for their support, nor he to them for their services." (emphasis added)
Thus, while it may have been improper for the trial court to consider such medical bills paid prior to the divorce in balancing the equities, the record does not disclose that the marital estate or that portion thereof awarded to the wife was diminished by the trial court's consideration of the payment of those medical bills. The error is harmless and no abuse of discretion appears in the record in this regard. In the absence of an abuse of discretion this action of the trial court must be affirmed. Phillips v. Phillips, 556 P.2d 607 (Okl.1976).
The third issue presented on certiorari is whether the wife's litigation expenses and attorney's fee should be subtracted from the gross joint property estate prior to division. The effect of a rule that would require subtracting legal fees and litigation expenses from the joint marital estate prior to division would, we believe, run contrary to the statute which provides:
"[T]he court may require the husband or wife to pay such reasonable expenses of the other in the prosecution or defense of the action as may be just and proper considering the respective parties and the means and property of each;" 12 O.S.1981 § 1276.
We do not address the subject further in view of our disposition of the attorney fee question.
The husband...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Lynch
...in excess of the statutorily prescribed norms for extraordinary expenditures of time and expense. Since Bias, we held in Ford v. Ford, 766 P.2d 950, 952 (Okla.1988), that a law practice can be considered jointly acquired property subject to division as a part of the marital estate. Under th......
-
Hough v. Leonard
...J., dissenting);Matter of S.C., Okl., 833 P.2d 1249, 1252 (1992); Matter of D.D.F., Okl., 801 P.2d 703, 709 (1990); Ford v. Ford, Okl., 766 P.2d 950, 952 n. 1 (1989). See Mitchell v. Ford Motor Credit Co., Okl., 688 P.2d 42, 44 (1984).12 Cunningham, supra note 11 at 979; Matter of S.C., sup......
-
Strelecki v. Oklahoma Tax Com'n
...to those parties actually before the court in that proceeding, and this limitation is imposed by the Due Process Clause. Ford v. Ford, 766 P.2d 950, 954 (Okla.1989). The Court today states that certain taxpayers not before us are "similarly situated" to those who are, and that the Tax Commi......
-
Arkansas Valley State Bank v. Phillips
...865 (1950); Patel v. OMH Medical Center, Inc., 1999 OK 33, ¶ 41, 987 P.2d 1185; Blocker v. Martin, 1994 OK 17, ¶ 4, 868 P.2d 1316; Ford v. Ford, 1988 OK 103, ¶ 10, 766 P.2d 13. U.S. Const. amend. 6 provides in pertinent part: In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right t......
-
§ 6.04 Appreciation of Separate Property During Marriage
...791 A.2d 1146 (N.J. Super. 2001) (appreciation must be "linked in some fashion" to efforts of the non-owner). Oklahoma: Ford v. Ford, 766 P.2d 950 (Okla. 1988) (joint effort required). Utah: Elman v. Elman, 45 P.3d 176 (Utah App. 2002) (emphasizing the non-owner's substantial homemaking eff......