Ford v. Holly Springs School Dist.

• Decision Date: 21 September 1995
• Docket Number: No. 92-CC-00448-SCT,92-CC-00448-SCT
• Citation: 665 So.2d 840
• Parties: 105 Ed. Law Rep. 1374 Joseph O. FORD v. HOLLY SPRINGS SCHOOL DISTRICT; Christine Ratcliff, Chairperson, and Robert Hill, Trudy Byard, James Luvene and Knowledge Gipson, Board Members.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Page 840

665 So.2d 840

105 Ed. Law Rep. 1374

Joseph O. FORD v. HOLLY SPRINGS SCHOOL DISTRICT; Christine Ratcliff Chairperson, and Robert Hill, Trudy Byard, James Luvene and Knowledge Gipson, Board Members.

No. 92-CC-00448-SCT.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Sept. 21, 1995.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 21, 1995.

James D. Minor, Oxford, for appellant.

Dolton W. McAlpin, McAlpin & Quarles, Starkville, for appellee.

Before DAN M. LEE, P.J., and McRAE and SMITH, JJ.,

SMITH, Justice, for the Court:

Joseph Ford appeals to this Court from a decree of the Marshall County Chancery Court, which affirmed the Holly Springs School Board's decision for the District not to reemploy Ford as principal of Holly Springs High School, for the 1990-91 academic year. The parties do not dispute the fact that Ford was notified in writing by the District on February 27, 1990, that his contract would not be renewed. The District declined to reemploy Ford because of his insubordination, his attempts at undermining the superintendent's authority, and his inability to accept policy decisions. The District found that Ford received notice prior to March 1, 1990, and that Ford failed to object at the board hearing that the notice he received was defective.

Ford appealed the District decision to chancery court where he raised the issue of defective notification for the first time. Ford abandoned his contention that the District's decision was not supported by substantial evidence and was arbitrary and capricious. The chancellor upheld the decision of the District and found that Ford received timely notification since he was given his letter of nonrenewal before March 1st, and that the superintendent did have the authority on behalf of the District to mail such notice to Ford. Aggrieved, Ford appeals to this Court citing the following issues:

I. WHETHER THE NOTICE OF NONRENEWAL OF EMPLOYMENT WAS TIMELY MADE.

II. WHETHER THE SUPERINTENDENT OF A SCHOOL DISTRICT HAS THE AUTHORITY TO ISSUE A LETTER OF NONRENEWAL TO THE PRINCIPAL.

This Court is confronted squarely with an issue of first impression concerning the time of required notification of non-renewal of employment of a principal and whether a superintendent can give such notice on behalf of a school district. At first glance Miss.Code Ann. § 37-9-105(b) (1972) appears to have conflicting provisions which support both Ford's contention that he should have been notified by February 22, 1990, and the District's contention that they had until March 1, 1990. We hold that the latter date of March 1st is controlling because it fixes the ultimate, final, definite and certain date. Thus notification on February 27th comes within this deadline and is, therefore, timely.

Ford's contention that the superintendent is without authority to send the notification letter on behalf of the district is also rejected. Miss.Code Ann. § 37-19-1(d), (1972), defines the superintendent as the head of a school district. Common sense would dictate that the full time position of superintendent, charged with the day to day administrative operation of the school district, would be the logical representative of a part-time Board of Education to send notice for the school district to a principal of the District's decision of non-reemployment of that principal for the forthcoming school year. This odd argument that the head of a school board/district is without power to issue a letter of nonrenewal has been presented to this Court on one prior occasion. In Cox v. Thomas, 403 So.2d 135 (Miss.1981), this Court held that harmless error applied and did not actually address the issue on the merits. Upon thoughtful consideration of the issue, we must reject Ford's argument, as in virtually every case challenging the timeliness of notice, it has been the superintendent who supplied the letter of nonrenewal. We hold that the superintendent has the authority to issue a letter of nonrenewal on behalf of a school district. At the very least, under the facts of this case, harmless error, if any, would apply.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

The facts are undisputed. Dr. Fenton Peters (hereinafter, "Peters") was the superintendent of the Holly Springs School District (hereinafter, "District"). Joseph Ford (hereinafter, "Ford") was the principal of the Holly Springs High School. On February 13, 1990, Peters recommended to the School Board (hereinafter, "Board") that Ford's employment contract not be renewed for the following 1990-91 academic year. Ford was notified in writing of the nonrenewal decision on February 27, 1990. On March 16, 1990, Peters gave Ford a written notice of the reasons supporting nonrenewal. Ford, pursuing his administrative remedies, sought a hearing before the Board.

On April 4, 1990, a hearing was held. Ford was represented by counsel. The Board sustained the superintendent's recommendation not to reemploy Ford as principal because of his bouts of insubordination, his attempts at undermining the superintendent's authority, and his inability to accept policy decisions. The Board also found that Ford received notice prior to March 1, 1990, and Ford made no objections that any required notice was defective.

Ford appealed this adverse decision to the Marshall County Chancery Court on grounds that the decision was not supported by substantive evidence, and that the notice of contract nonrenewal was not issued to or received by him within the time and manner required by Miss.Code Ann. §§ 37-9-15 and 37-9-105 (1972). For remedies, Ford sought re-employment, back pay, attorneys fees and costs.

The trial court reviewed the Board's decision to see if the action of the Board was unlawful because it was (1) not supported by any substantial evidence; (2) arbitrary and capricious; or (3) in violation of some statutory right of the employee. However, during oral arguments, Ford abandoned his contention that the Board's decision regarding the merits of the charges against him was not supported by any substantial evidence and was arbitrary and capricious. Thus, Ford has pursued his claim solely on grounds that his statutory right to timely notice of nonrenewal had been violated and that the superintendent was without authority to send the non-renewal notice on behalf of the District.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Supreme Court proceeds de novo in determining claimed errors of law. Cooper v. Crabb, 587 So.2d 236, 239 (Miss.1991). This Court must review the lower court's ruling under a de novo standard of review. The only issues to be resolved are matters of law, especially since both parties agree to the facts.

DISCUSSION OF LAW

I. WHETHER THE NOTICE OF NONRENEWAL OF EMPLOYMENT WAS TIMELY MADE.

The question that approaches this Court is very narrow. Simply put, we must decide whether school principals must be notified of contract nonrenewal by February 22nd, a date deduced by coupling Miss.Code Ann. § 37-9-105 (1972), and Miss.Code Ann. § 37-9-15 (1972), or by March 1st, the date listed by the legislature under § 37-9-105(b) as the absolute last date on which to notify.

As a general rule, this Court has insisted on mandatory compliance with the notice provisions of the School Employment Procedures Act, Miss.Code Ann. § 37-9-101 (1972) et seq., Jackson v. Bd. of Ed. of Oktibbeha County, 349 So.2d 550 (Miss.1977); McDonald v. East Jasper City Sch. Dist., 351 So.2d 531 (Miss.1977). "[P]rocedural requirements of timely notice and hearing must be met in order to deny reemployment." Calhoun City Bd. of Ed. v. Hamblin, 360 So.2d 1236, 1238-39 (Miss.1978). The intent of the legislature in enacting the School Employment Procedures Act of 1977 was to grant a teacher the limited right to notice and an opportunity to be heard by the school board but not to place restrictions on what decision the school board might make. The main purpose of the Act is to provide employees with notice that they will not be reemployed in sufficient time to enable them to secure alternative employment. Lamar Cty. Sch. Bd. of Lamar Cty. v. Saul, 359 So.2d 350, 354 (Miss.1978).

The bulk of the case law involves teachers claiming defective notification of employment nonrenewal. Merchant v. Pearl Mun. Sep. Sch. Dist., 492 So.2d 959 (Miss.1986); Noxubee County Sch. Bd. v. Cannon, 485 So.2d 302 (Miss.1986); Noxubee County Bd. of Education v. Overton, 483 So.2d 301 (Miss.1985); Cox v. Thomas, 403 So.2d 135 (Miss.1981). However, several cases do address principals challenging the efficacy of their school district's notification of contract nonrenewal. Lamar Cty. Sch. Bd. of Lamar Cty. v. Saul, 359 So.2d 350 (Miss.1978); Everett v. Bd. of Trustees Meridian Mun. Sep. Sch. Dist., 492 So.2d 277 (Miss.1986).

This Court cannot rely too heavily on the teacher nonrenewal line of cases. First, the dates for which teachers need to be notified of nonrenewal are different than the dates for which school principals need to be notified. Second, the current teacher notification statutes, Miss.Code Ann. § 37-9-17 (1972), and Miss.Code Ann. § 37-9-105 (1972), do not contain any possible inconsistency that is inherent in the current principal notification statutes, Miss.Code Ann. § 37-9-15 (1972), and Miss.Code Ann. § 37-9-105 (1972). Third, most of the cases that challenged timely notification involved situations where the school district went well beyond the scope of timely notification. See McDonald v. East Jasper Cty. Sch. Dist., 351 So.2d 531 (Miss.1977) (both the letter of nonrenewal, which was tendered on April 14th, a week after the April 8th deadline, and the hearing process were not in accord with the statutory time schedule); Jackson v. Board of Education of Oktibbeha Cty., 349 So.2d 550 (Miss.1977) (where the employee was notified by regular mail on August 19th, when the notification date was April 8th); Lamar Cty. Sch. Bd. of Lamar Cty. v. Saul, 359 So.2d 350 (Miss.1978) (where the school board initially chose to renew employee's contract, and later rescinded its previous...