Ford v. State
| Decision Date | 01 April 1897 |
| Citation | 37 A. 172,85 Md. 465 |
| Parties | FORD v. STATE. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Appeal from criminal court of Baltimore city.
Thomas M. Ford was convicted of a violation of the lottery laws, and appeals. Affirmed.
Argued before McSHERRY, C.J., and BRYAN, FOWLER, BRISCOE, PAGE RUSSUM, and BOYD, JJ.
Thos C. Ruddell and B. Chambers Wickes, for appellant.
Atty Gen. Clabaugh and Henry Duffy, for the State.
The appellant was indicted in the criminal court of Baltimore city for violating the lottery laws of this state. There are five counts in the indictment, to the fourth and fifth of which demurrers were filed, which were overruled. The traverser then filed a special plea to the fourth and fifth counts, which was demurred to by the state, and the demurrer sustained. The case was then submitted to the court on a plea of not guilty, and the traverser was found guilty on the fourth and fifth counts, and not guilty on the others. During the progress of the trial, he offered certain evidence which was ruled out, and an exception was taken to that ruling. Although the rulings of the court on the several demurrers, and on the admissibility of the evidence offered, are all before us, the principal questions involved in them are the construction and constitutionality of section 178 of chapter 310 of the Laws of 1894. The portion of that section with which we are particularly concerned on this appeal is the provision that, "if any person shall have in his possession in this state any book, list, slip or record of the numbers drawn in any lottery, whether in this state or elsewhere, or any book, list, slip or record of any lottery ticket or anything in the nature thereof, mentioned in this section, or of any money received or to be received from or for the sale of any such lottery ticket, or thing in the nature thereof as aforesaid, [he] shall be liable to indictment, and upon conviction shall be, in the discretion of the court, fined any sum not exceeding one thousand dollars, or shall be imprisoned for a period not exceeding one year, or shall be both fined and imprisoned: provided, however, that this section shall not apply to any person who may have possession of any of the articles herein mentioned for the purpose of procuring or furnishing evidence of violations of any of the provisions of the laws relating to lotteries." An examination of our statutes will show numerous efforts on the part of our legislatures to prevent the lottery business from being carried on in this state. Most of the provisions in our present Code looking to that end were in the Code of 1860, and some of the statutes therein codified had been passed many years before that date Under that Code it was, and still is, a violation of law to draw any lottery, to sell lot tery tickets, policies, certificates, or anything by which the vendor or other person promises or guaranties that any particular number, character, ticket, or certificate shall in any event, or on the happening of any contingency, entitle the purchaser or holder to receive money, property, or evidence of debt. If any person kept a house, office, or other place for the purpose of selling such tickets, policies, certificates, etc., he was subject to a penalty of $1,000, as was the owner of the house or office who permitted it to be used for such purpose. Then section 178 of article 27 of the Code imposed a like penalty on any person who brought into this state any such lottery tickets, policies, certificates, etc.; and other provisions, with heavy penalties attached, are in the Code, looking to the suppression of this great evil, but it still existed. The legislature of 1894 went a step further, and added to section 178 the provision above quoted, whereby the mere possession of the articles named therein is made a crime, unless it be for the purpose of procuring or furnishing evidence of violations of any of the provisions of law relating to lotteries. The language of this section is too plain to admit of any discussion as to its meaning. When considered in connection with the previous legislation on this subject, it is evident that the legislature found that the statutes in force were not sufficient to prevent the lottery business in this state; and it was therefore made a crime for any one to have any of the articles named in his possession, unless it be for the one purpose provided for by the statute,--procuring or furnishing evidence of violations of the law. It will be necessary, then, for us to determine whether such legislation is a valid exercise of the powers vested in the state. It cannot now be denied that laws and regulations necessary for the protection of the health, morals, and safety of society are strictly within the legitimate exercise of the police powers of the state, provided, of course, that such regulations be reasonable. Such laws are not prohibited either by the federal constitution or that of this state. The cases of Singer v. State, 72 Md. 464, 19 A. 1044; McAllister v. State, 72 Md. 390, 20 A. 143; Long v. State, 74 Md. 565, 22 A. 4; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 8 S.Ct. 273; and Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 8 S.Ct. 992, 1257,--will illustrate the application of the doctrine, without incumbering this opinion with the citation of the numerous other decisions on the subject.
If it be necessary to refer to any authority to show that the laws for the suppression of lotteries are regarded by the courts to be in the interest of the morals and welfare of the people, the cases of Ballock v. State, 73 Md. 1, 20 A. 184, and Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, will suffice to give the views of the supreme court of the United States and of this court on that subject. There probably never was a time in the history of this state when it was more necessary than the present to use all legitimate means to stamp out this and kindred evils, which are demoralizing so many who might otherwise be useful and honest citizens. The man that is always looking for greater returns than his investment or efforts justify is generally a useless, if not a dangerous, member of society, and a lottery is said to be "a game in which small sums are ventured for the chance of obtaining a larger value." It is not difficult to see why one given up to that sort of business soon becomes worse than useless to his community. The tendency is to make him idle, and idleness easily begets crime. Families are deprived of the comforts and sometimes necessaries of life which are due them, because those who should provide them either squander their means in pursuit of such gains, or have had their powers of earning paralyzed by the pernicious habit of this form of gambling. In view of the disastrous effect on those dealing with lottery tickets, and upon the community where such business is conducted, there can be no doubt about the right of the legislature to prohibit any one from having them in his possession, if that be reasonably necessary for the suppression of the evil. As the statute makes it a crime to have them in possession, the purpose for which the traverser had them is wholly immaterial; and, inasmuch as the legislature did not make the crime dependent upon the knowledge of the party as to what the articles were, it was unnecessary to allege in the indictment that the traverser had them in his possession knowingly, willfully, or in any other words that would impute knowledge of the fact that they were some of the articles prohibited by the law. The allegations in the indictment were clearly sufficient.
But it is contended that, if that be conceded, the effect of the statute was simply to shift the burden to the traverser, and he could still prove that he did not have knowledge of what the articles were, and hence was not guilty of a violation of law, and that, if the statute must be so construed as to deprive him of that right, then it is in conflict with the constitutions of the United States and of this state. This question was intended to be raised by the special plea filed and the offer of testimony stated in the bill of exceptions. The plea alleges that the defendant "was in possession of policy books and slips, as stated in said indictment, but...
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