Ford v. State
| Decision Date | 06 February 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. A06A2263.,A06A2263. |
| Citation | 283 Ga. App. 460,641 S.E.2d 671 |
| Parties | FORD v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Wystan B. Getz, for appellant.
Daniel J. Porter, District Attorney, Nancy J. Dupree, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
Sylvester Ford appeals his convictions for committing aggravated stalking upon his wife, aggravated assault upon his wife's friend, and possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony. He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the aggravated stalking charge and contends that the trial court erred in admitting in evidence a temporary protective order and in rejecting his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Because he has demonstrated no error, we affirm.
The evidence showed that at about 9:00 a.m. on August 21, 2003, Ford's wife was walking in a park with a male friend. Ford appeared out of a gully, approached the two and then pointed a gun at the friend. Ford's wife screamed Ford's name repeatedly, rushed to him, and began struggling with him. The gun remained pointed at her friend, however, and was fired, missing the man, who ran away.
1. Challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction for committing aggravated stalking upon his wife, Ford argues that there was no evidence that his contact with her at the park that day was without her consent and for the purpose of harassing and intimidating her.
OCGA § 16-5-91(a) provides:
A person commits the offense of aggravated stalking when such person, in violation of a ... temporary restraining order, temporary protective order, permanent restraining order, [or] permanent protective order ... in effect prohibiting the behavior described in this subsection, follows, places under surveillance, or contacts another person at or about a place or places without the consent of the other person for the purpose of harassing and intimidating the other person.1
The state showed that on three earlier occasions, Ford appeared unexpectedly when his wife was with the same friend. On the first occasion, Ford stopped his wife and the man as the two were riding together in a car. He approached them and asked her who was accompanying her. She told him that the man was a client. On the second occasion, Ford approached his wife and her friend as the two were walking in the park. He asked the man, "Who the hell are you?" Because the man "didn't know what [Ford] was going to do," he gave Ford a fictitious name and then walked away, hearing behind him Ford and his wife arguing. On the third occasion, Ford drove into the driveway of the home where he and his wife were living. The wife was there with her friend, who saw Ford and therefore left through a basement door before Ford got out of his car.
About a month before the incident underlying this case, Ford's wife obtained a six-month, temporary protective order against Ford. Pertinently, it stated that "[Ford] is restrained and enjoined from approaching within 100 yards of [his wife] and/or the minor children of [Ford's wife], except during exercise of visitation." It allowed Ford's wife to "visit with [Ford] if she chooses and if mutually agreeable."
Here, evidence of Ford's wife screaming when she saw him suddenly appear, their physical struggle, and her "hysterical" condition when the police arrived at the scene moments later, authorized the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Ford's contact with her that day was without her consent, choosing or agreement. Evidence that Ford suddenly appeared in a public place and pointed a gun at his wife's companion, toward whom he had expressed hostility in the past, was sufficient to authorize a reasonable trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Ford's purpose was to harass and intimidate his wife. Ford does not argue, nor was there any evidence, that his approach within 100 yards of his wife was to exercise visitation with his wife's children. Thus, Ford's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is without merit.2
2. Ford contends that the trial court erred by admitting the temporary protective order, asserting that it contained allegations by his wife, who elected not to testify. He argues that such allegations therefore constituted hearsay, the admission of which violated his right to confront a witness against him.
Rejecting this argument below, the trial court noted particularly that the order itself stated, "in lieu of a finding by the court that an act of family violence was committed by [Ford] and/or [Ford's wife], [Ford] and [Ford's wife] have consented that this Protective Order should be entered by the court, without specifically admitting to the commission of an act of family violence by either party." On appeal, Ford cites no specific allegation made by his wife contained in the order. Consequently, he has failed to show that the trial...
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