Ford v. State

• Decision Date: 16 September 2008
• Docket Number: No. 20060720.,No. 20070587.,20060720.,20070587.
• Citation: 2008 UT 66,199 P.3d 892
• Parties: Solomon Lee FORD, Petitioner and Appellee. v. STATE of Utah, Respondent and Appellant,
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

199 P.3d 892

2008 UT 66

Solomon Lee FORD, Petitioner and Appellee. v. STATE of Utah, Respondent and Appellant,

No. 20060720.

No. 20070587.

Supreme Court of Utah.

September 16, 2008.

Rehearing Denied January 14, 2009.

Kimberly Neville, Troy L. Booher, Emily Smith, Katherine Carreau, Salt Lake City, for petitioner.

Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., Thomas Brunker, Asst. Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, for respondent.

On Certification from the Utah Court of Appeals

DURHAM, Chief Justice:

INTRODUCTION

¶ 1 This appeal poses two questions. First, whether, in 1993, court commissioners were authorized to conduct preliminary hearings binding defendants over for trial. Second, whether defendants who succeed in vacating their convictions in a post-conviction relief proceeding are entitled to paid counsel to represent them during the State's appeal. We hold that court commissioners were entitled to conduct preliminary hearings binding defendants over for trial in 1993. We also hold that impecunious defendants who are granted post-conviction relief from their sentences are entitled to paid counsel if the State decides to appeal the district court's grant of relief.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 On August 19, 1993, Solomon Lee Ford (Ford) was charged by information with possession of a dangerous weapon and aggravated assault. On September 9, 1993, a court commissioner conducted a preliminary hearing and bound Ford over for trial. Ford was acquitted of the assault charge but convicted by a jury of possession of a dangerous weapon, a second degree felony, and was sentenced to serve not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. Ford served thirteen years; during that time he filed four post-conviction requests for relief.

¶ 3 In his fourth post-conviction relief request, the district court determined that Ford was improperly bound over for trial by a court commissioner who lacked judicial authority to conduct preliminary hearings. The district court explained: "The problem which is alleged here is that the Legislature acting alone could not authorize Commissioners to function as magistrates presiding over preliminary hearings." The district court analyzed the issue in three parts, "(1) whether a Commissioner in 1993 had authority to preside over a preliminary hearing; (2) if the Commissioner did not have such authority, whether the bindover was lawful; and (3) if the bindover was not lawful, did the district court have jurisdiction to try the Petitioner for the alleged crimes" or did Ford "knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive[ ] his constitutional right to a preliminary hearing before a properly authorized magistrate." The district court found that Ford was "wrongfully bound over for trial and the trial court was without jurisdiction to try him."

¶ 4 Because Ford was impecunious, the district court appointed the Salt Lake Legal Defenders Association (LDA) to represent Ford while the court considered whether Ford was entitled to immediate release or only to a new trial. Ford's conviction was vacated, and he was released from prison. The State appealed. The district court and the court of appeals denied the State's motions to keep Ford incarcerated until the outcome of the appeal was determined.

¶ 5 LDA had a conflict and was unable to represent Ford on appeal. The district court granted LDA's motion to substitute counsel, but it failed to indicate whether substituted counsel would be pro bono or paid. The State argued that the appointment had to be pro bono. Ford's current counsel filed a motion to replace the substituted counsel and argued that under the Indigent Defense Act, the United States Constitution, and the Utah Constitution, Ford's counsel was entitled to compensation. The district court granted Ford's motion for paid counsel to represent him on appeal and entered an order to that effect. Under the Indigent Defense Act, the district court found: "Because it is the State, not Mr. Ford, that has chosen to appeal the Court's ruling and challenge the current status quo, the appeal is not a discretionary proceeding as to Mr. Ford. Therefore, Mr. Ford is entitled to paid counsel to defend against the State's appeal under 77-32-301(6)." Under the Utah Constitution, the district court also found: "Because Mr. Ford faces prison if the State is successful on appeal, the State's appeal is functionally equivalent to an original criminal prosecution and the right to counsel attaches." Finally, under the United States Constitution, the district court found: "[W]here a first appeal of right is successful, and the State petitions for discretionary review, the right to counsel does attach because the proceeding is not discretionary as to the person whose liberty interest is in jeopardy."

ANALYSIS

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 6 We review the district court's order granting Ford post-conviction relief for correctness. See Wickham v. Galetka, 2002 UT 72, ¶ 7, 61 P.3d 978. The district court's order appointing paid counsel to represent Ford in post-conviction proceedings implicates issues of statutory and constitutional interpretation that we also review for correctness. See Duke v. Graham, 2007 UT 31, ¶ 7, 158 P.3d 540 (citing MacFarlane v. State Tax Comm'n, 2006 UT 25, ¶ 9, 134 P.3d 1116 (discussing statutory interpretation); Grand County v. Emery County, 2002 UT 57, ¶ 6, 52 P.3d 1148 (discussing state constitutional interpretation)).

II. BINDOVER BY COMMISSIONER

¶ 7 The district court vacated Ford's conviction, holding that the court commissioner who bound Ford over for trial lacked authority to do so, and therefore the district court had not had jurisdiction to try him. The district court apparently assumed that a bindover order constituted a core judicial function, and it ultimately concluded that under Salt Lake City v. Ohms, a commissioner could not properly enter such an order. 881 P.2d 844, 853 (Utah 1994). We disagree with the first premise, making an analysis under Ohms unnecessary.

¶ 8 In State v. Humphrey, we outlined the procedure for binding defendants over for trial:

By the bindover order, the magistrate requires the defendant to answer the information in the district court. The information is then transferred to the district court, permitting that court to take original jurisdiction of the matter. At that point, the district court has the inherent authority and the obligation to determine whether its original jurisdiction has been properly invoked. In doing so, the district court need show no deference to the magistrate's legal conclusion, implicit in the bindover order, that the matter may proceed to trial in district court, but may conduct its own review of the order.

823 P.2d 464, 465-466 (Utah 1991) (citations, internal quotation marks, and footnote omitted).

¶ 9 Article I, section 13 of the Utah Constitution gives "magistrates" the duty to conduct preliminary hearings. "Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment, shall be prosecuted by information after examination and commitment by a magistrate, unless the examination be waived by the accused with the consent of the State, or by indictment, with or without such examination and commitment." Utah Const. Art. I, § 13 (emphasis added); see also Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-17.5 (1992) (giving magistrates the authority to "conduct a preliminary examination to determine probable cause"). The Utah Constitution does not define a magistrate. At the time of Ford's preliminary hearing and conviction, the Utah Legislature defined a magistrate as "a justice or judge of a court of record or not of record or a commissioner of such a court appointed in accordance with Section 78-3-31." Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-3(4) (Supp.1992). Commissioners at the time were appointed by the Judicial Council and a majority of the district court judges in the district to which the commissioner would be assigned. Id. § 78-3-31(2)(a) (1992). Commissioners were required to "comply with applicable constitutional and statutory provisions, court rules and procedures, and rules of the Judicial Council," and "comply with the Code of Judicial Conduct to the same extent as full-time judges." Id. § 78-3-31(5)(a)-(b).

¶ 10 In reviewing a 1991 statutory amendment that authorized court commissioners to "accept pleas of guilty or no contest, impose sentence, and enter final judgment in misdemeanor cases," and "conduct a jury or nonjury misdemeanor trial in accordance with law," Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-31(6)(a) (1992), this court declared that commissioners were unable to perform "core judicial functions such as entering final orders and judgments or imposing sentence." Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 852 n. 17 (Utah 1994). However, this court did not invalidate the service of commissioners:

Court commissioners have provided a valuable service to the judiciary for over thirty years pursuant to constitutionally valid statutes. They have conducted fact-finding hearings, held pretrial conferences, made recommendations to judges, and provided counseling and other worthwhile functions. However, over that thirty-year period, commissioners were never allowed to perform ultimate or core judicial functions such as entering final orders and judgments or imposing sentence. In every case, commissioner actions led to recommendations which resulted in final review and signature by a judge.

Id. Whether an action is a core judicial function is based on whether "the commissioners' actions are reviewable by a judge [and] ultimate judicial power remains with the judge." State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 302 (Utah 1998) (holding that the issuance of a search warrant constituted a core judicial function). So long as the commissioner's actions are reviewed and the commissioner does not exercise ultimate judicial authority, his or her actions are not core judicial functions. Id.

¶ 11 Unlike the district court, we conclude that binding a defendant over to the district court for trial does...